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Preface 
The purpose of this report is to discuss the conditions for future multinatio-
nal peace operations in the Commonwealth of Independent States, including 
both Russian and Western forces.  
The aim and scope of this study are based on a positive attitude to chal-
lenges in general, in other words, a will to see opportunities and solu   ns 
instead of obstacles and insolvable problems. I would, however, like to 
emphasise that I see military co-operation between Russia and the West 
neither as an objective in itself, nor as necessary from a military point of 
view. On the other hand I am convinced that combined peace operations 
(CPOs) have a potential for building confidence and mutual understanding, 
and create conditions for better relations between Russia and the West. Apart 
from these idealistic goals it is obvious that a combined peacekeeping force 
could be seen as a more reliable one by all the belligerent parties in the 
actual conflict. It also could give the West an opportunity to influence the 
development of democracy, human rights and other vital values in the CIS 
area. Last but not least, some Western nations also could be willing to use 
this instrument to protect the West’s economic (and other) interests in the 
region. It could be one of the reasons why Russia has been reluctant to 
accept Western forces on former Soviet Union territory.  
It could be argued, as several experts have done, that it is impossible for 
Russia and the West to co-operate militarily in the CIS area. The report will 
indeed point to the many difficulties which may effectively hinder attempts 
at co-operation in that field. All the negative aspects, however, do not pre-
vent combined peace operations from being at least a theoretical option. 
IFOR/SFOR and KFOR have shown that co-operation is possible if the will 
in Moscow and Washington (and Brussels) is present. In this report I will 
focus on the conditions necessary for this type of co-operation to become 
possible. 
I would also like to emphasise that I do not see peace operations as an 
objective in itself, because, as Carl von Clausewitz stated, ‘military means 
are the tool when diplomacy and preventive measures fail’ and as such could 
be seen as a manifestation of the failure of diplomatic efforts to prevent con-
flict from going into the armed phase. On the other hand, there seems to be 
plenty of work for the armed forces in this millennium as well. When they 
are called upon, the ambition must be to deploy rapidly, to create conditions 
for the development of a civil society, and then withdraw.  
During the work on this report I received valuable support from several -
people. I would especially like to thank Dr Lena Jonson from the Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs, Dr Pavel Baev from the International Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo and last but not least my colleagues Helge 
Blakkisrud and Dr Jakub Godzimirski at NUPI, Oslo. Valuable input has 
also been received from the former Norwegian Chief of Defence, General 
(R) Fredrik Bull Hansen, Editor of the Norwegian Military Journal, Major 
General (R) Gullow Gjeseth and Chief of the Norwegian Naval Staff, 
Commodore Jacob Børresen. I would like to thank you all for your construc-
tive approach to the questions I have raised in discussions with you.  
The first draft of the report was prepared in the beginning of January 
2000, and the report reflects the state of affairs by the end of 1999. 

Introduction 
Background 
During the Cold War traditional peacekeeping around the world happened 
without the participation of the United States of America or the Soviet 
Union. The UN action in Korea in June 1950 was a remarkable exception, 
authorised by the Security Council in the absence of the Soviet Union’s 
delegation. Experiences in the latest 10 years have shown, however, that the 
participation of the major powers is essential in post-Cold War peace opera-
tions.  
There have been almost twice as many United Nations peacekeeping mis-
sions in the period after 1988 as in the previous 40 years. The most impor-
tant catalyst leading to this dramatic increase was the end of the Cold War 
and a newly found resolve in the Security Council to play a more positive, 
proactive role in resolving international disputes.  
The Gulf War was also an important event in the development of peace-
keeping after the end of the Cold War. This UN-authorised action to force 
Iraq out of Kuwait after its invasion of that country, increased expectations, 
principally among Western powers, about the role the Security Council 
could play in international security. These factors led the Security Council to 
embark on more ambitious operations, sometimes even in conflict areas 
where peace had not yet been reached and the consent of the parties to the 
UN presence was tenuous. In situations where there was a lack of consent, 
greater force was authorised to accomplish mission goals. The operations in 
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia are examples of two ambitious opera-
tions undertaken by the UN during that period.  
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union there have been a number of 
regional conflicts internally in Russia and within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). The world community and Russia have so far 
handled the domestic Russian conflicts as internal Russian matters. The CIS 
conflicts have been handled mainly by Russia and according to what has 
been defined as Russian national interests, but the solution of conflicts has 
also involved the CIS, the United Nations and the Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe. The overall impression is, however, that the 
Russian policy so far has been that Russia should be an exclusive leading 
peacekeeper on former Soviet Union territory, and that no foreign troops 
from outside the CIS should be allowed. On the other hand, the Russians 
have stated that organisations like the UN and the OSCE have an important 
role in conflict prevention and solution, also in the CIS area. There is there-
fore both a potential for international peace operations to solve conflicts in 
this part of the world as well, and an obvious need for creating better politi-
cal conditions for co-operation. The Balkan experience of keeping the peace 
together is perhaps one of the best possible cornerstones of future co-opera-
tion in the field of peacekeeping, also on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union. 
The Dayton agreement, the deployment of the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) to Bosnia and the ongoing operation of the Stabilisation Force 
(SFOR) represented a new and enticing concept. The operation in Bosnia, 
based on a UN Security Council resolution, was lead by NATO. In addition 
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to the alliance, IFOR/SFOR includes several partner states, among them 
Russia.  
The deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is also based on a Security 
Council resolution, even though the NATO air campaign that created the 
conditions for the force to be deployed was not. The unauthorised NATO 
operation in Kosovo resulted in grave tensions between Russia and the West. 
Russia recalled its military representatives from NATO and shut down the 
NATO liaison office in Moscow during the air campaign. These discrepan-
cies were an obstacle to the establishment of KFOR after the agreement 
between NATO, Russia and Slobodan Milosevic was signed after an 77 days 
air campaign. The peak of tension was reached when a small Russian unit of 
paratroopers from SFOR in Bosnia captured the airport in Pristina. KFOR 
was, however, established and Russians are today an integrated part, 
although they have their own command and control arrangements. The over-
all experiences after nearly four years of co-operation in peace operations 
between Russia and NATO in the Balkans could be a platform for future co-
operation and improved relationship in peace operations including Russia 
and Western countries. This report will seek to discuss conditions needed for 
this extended co-operation to happen. 
Analysis 
Problem  
What are the possible options for multinational peace operations including 
Russian and Western forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States? I 
will focus on investigating possibilities for CPOs in the CIS area.  
Content 
The report will consist of an initial discussion focusing on various Russian 
approaches that influence thinking on combined peace operations. The focus 
on Russia is an inevitable consequence of my West/NATO origin, but in 
order to give a more balanced view of the problem it will also be necessary 
to look at some other factors influencing this potential co-operation. Further, 
I will discuss three generic options for combined peace operations in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.  
Central topics  
The report will discuss the potential differences between Russian and West-
ern terminology concerning peace operations as well as legal foundations 
and international umbrella organisations for peace operations and the most 
relevant types of combined peace operations. 
Next, I will consider whether there is a gap between Russian terminology 
and doctrines on the one hand, and what the Russians are actually doing in 
the field on the other. It is necessary to take into account the role of internal 
Russian operations when evaluating Russia’s credibility as a participant in 
peace operations. The next step is to investigate whether certain areas are out 
of bounds for Western forces from a Russian point of view and vice versa. 
Introduction 
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The next step will be to outline how the overall military and political 
relations between Russia and the West may influence conditions for co-
operation in peace operations. 
From a military point of view it is important to evaluate the capabilities 
and capacity of the Russian forces to conduct peace operations, focusing on 
Russian interoperability with potential Western counterparts.  
The report will also contain a brief description of possible scenarios and 
geographical areas for multinational peace operations involving Russian and 
Western forces, including potential force compositions and command and 
control arrangements for such operations.  
Terminology and definitions  
The term ‘peace operation’ is used deliberately in the introduction as a gene-
ral term. This is due to the fact that the term ‘peacekeeping’ is unfortunately 
often misused or misinterpreted. Any discussion of peace operations has to 
be based on a very clear definition of the terms used in the analysis and this 
is one of the main reasons why these terms are going to be thoroughly pre-
sented in chapter two. 
When I speak about the ‘the West’ in this report I generally mean the 
NATO and EU member states. If other states, such as countries applying for 
NATO and/or EU membership are relevant, they will be mentioned explic-
itly. The military term ‘combined operations’ means operations conducted 
by a force consisting of more than one nation. This report has taken the lib-
erty of extending the term to ‘combined peace operations’ (abbreviated 
CPOs), meaning a force consisting of at least one Western state in addition 
to Russia (and possibly one or more CIS countries). A full list of abbrevia-
tions can be found in the appendix. 
Assumptions 
It is presumed that the overall political relations between Russia and the 
West will stay at a level that makes mutual participation in some kind of 
peace operation somewhere in the world possible.  
Based on the experiences from SFOR and KFOR it is useful to underline 
that combined Western-Russian peace operations are seldom necessary from 
a military operational point of view. The overall rationale for this is political 
– for instance as an incitement to improve conditions for overall co-opera-
tion, conflict solutions and prevention, as well as to improve the Russian-
Western relationship in general.  
Limitations 
My engagement at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, during 
which I have written this report, has been limited to six months. Such a short 
assignment has inevitably forced me to reduce the span of the study and to 
treat some topics and sources only superficially. The new war in Chechnya 
has also taken away some of my attention from multinational peacekeeping, 
but on the other hand it helped me to focus on the complex challenge of 
bringing stability to the whole Caucasus region. 
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This report will only discuss peace operations with the participation of 
purely military formations. It will not cover national or multinational -
operations with the use of police forces or various sorts of observers or 
advisers. The main focus will be on conflict areas in the former Soviet 
Union. The West and Russia are co-operating in CPOs in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, but Russia and the CIS countries have so far operated alone in the 
CIS area. The time frame is limited to one to three years ahead, but I hope 
that this report could be seen as an important contribution to a more general 
debate on peacekeeping co-operation between the West and Russia.  
Working method 
The report is based on open, available official documents, news reports and 
comments, articles, studies and papers from the Internet, magazines, news-
papers, radio/TV and available literature. I have also participated in discus-
sions and seminars related to the subject, and when possible discussed it with 
relevant people. The information used is derived mainly from secondary 
sources published originally in English, although many of the texts used are 
reliable English translations of original Russian documents. The extensive 
use of news clippings has hopefully ensured that the report is relatively up-
dated (as of January 2000) with respect to the developments in recent years 
which could have had a direct impact on the conditions for combined peace 
operations. 
The report seeks to present the most relevant terms and definitions related 
to peace operations, and to clarify whether there is a conceptual gap between 
Russia and the West when it comes to terminology related to peacekeeping 
operations. It also looks at the international legal basis and principles for 
such operations, and analyses possible umbrella organisations. Thereafter, it 
presents various Russian doctrines and concepts related to peace operations. 
The next step is a presentation of a short historical review over Russian 
involvement in peace operations and their evaluation with respect to their 
compatibility with Russian national doctrines and concepts, and internation-
ally accepted rules and principles. I also found it important to analyse the 
actual Russian military capacity and capability to conduct peace operations 
as well as the general framework of political/military relations between 
Russia and the West. It is also of crucial importance to assess the will and 
the intentions of Russia and the West with regard to combined peace opera-
tions, especially in the CIS area, where no actual co-operation has taken 
place so far. 
The report will also sketch possible geographical areas and scenarios for 
CPOs, and then suggest umbrella organisations, command and control 
arrangements and force composition. Finally the report will outline the 
future prospects for CPOs in the CIS. Positive as well as negative conditions 
will be highlighted, and in the last part I will take the liberty of presenting 
some recommendations for the way ahead from a Western perspective. 
Terminology 
The use of standardised terminology helps define and delineate the nature, 
goal and scope of peace operations. Launching a CPO would inevitably 
make it necessary to cope with inherent cultural, political and linguistic dif-
ferences. If multinational operations in general are to achieve maximum 
effectiveness with minimum risk, all participating states, forces and person-
nel must uniformly understand the relevant terminology.  
The concepts behind the terminology must also be commonly recognised, 
particularly when working across several languages. If, for example, a 
French peacekeeper speaks of ‘rules of engagement’, his Russian, British 
and Norwegian counterparts should all understand the term in the same way. 
The challenge seems to be, nevertheless, that the terminology to describe 
multinational operations has become confused and blunt, largely because an 
increased number of operations with diverging mandates and objectives have 
been conducted since the end of the Cold War under the much too general 
term of ‘peacekeeping’. 
The terminological confusion reflects the fact that new methods of 
resolving conflicts are still being developed and lessons are still being 
learned. While there is a more or less accepted understanding of the concepts 
involved in traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, there is little 
consensus on the meaning and variety of missions that fall between them. 
It is important to stress that in evaluations and discussions related to for-
mer and ongoing peace operations, issues of terminology are theoretical. The 
way the operation is conducted at all levels, from the strategic political level 
through commanders at all levels down to the individual soldier, shows the 
true face of intentions, capability, impartiality, morale, and code of conduct 
of the parties involved. The perception of the operation is also to a certain 
extent influenced by its presentation in national and international media (the 
so-called ‘CNN effect’) and often decides whether it is evaluated as success 
or failure. This report will therefore at a later stage discuss experiences from 
former and ongoing peace operations and to some extent other operations. 
Whether such experiences are judged positively or negatively in respectively 
Moscow and the Western capitals, is of course vital for decision-making re-
lated to CPOs.  
Presentation and comparison of terminology 
Since the UN is a global organisation and all states mentioned in this report 
are members, it is natural to adopt the UN Glossary. I will, however, look 
also at other terms relevant for the debate, for example on a Canadian re-
definition of terms in the wake of the country’s quite negative experiences 
from the UN-authorised operation in Somalia in 1992. The understanding of 
the mandate during this operation changed from a traditional peacekeeping 
operation to a peace enforcement operation. The Canadian work is relevant 
as an exemplification of the necessity of a common and unambiguous termi-
nology in peace operations. In addition NATO’s definitions from NATO 
Logistic Handbook are presented where applicable. The NATO term ‘peace 
support operations’ (PSOs) is a NATO general term for everything apart 
from traditional NATO Article 5 operations in defence of NATO territory. 
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Next I will outline the differences between Western and Russian termino-
logy concerning peace operations (based mainly on Demurenko & Nikitin 
1997). Russia does not yet have an officially approved peacekeeping 
terminology, and this causes certain problems in preparing for and 
implementing such operations inside the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), and makes the application of internationally accepted standards 
difficult. Some difficulties also arise because nearly all of the terminology 
and concepts used in connection with peace operations were developed and 
formulated in English. Hence, it is not always possible to translate them into 
Russian literally and yet preserve all the unique features of the English 
‘original’. 
Peace operations 
UN definition 
Peace support operations include preventive deployment, peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operations, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplo-
macy, peacemaking and peace building, as well as humanitarian assistance, 
good offices, fact-finding, and electoral assistance.  
NATO definition  
Traditional peacekeeping missions: 
• Observation 
• Interposition forces 
• Transition assistance. This type of operation is initiated to support the 
transition of a country to peaceful conditions and an acceptable political 
structure after a civil war or struggle for independence or autonomy 
 
Conflict prevention missions: 
• Conflict prevention can never be guaranteed, but there are several means 
that may have a positive influence on the situation. One means is preven-
tive deployment, which may be attempted by the deployment of multi-
national forces to areas of potential crises.  
Humanitarian missions: 
• Disaster relief  
• Refugee/displaced person assistance  
• Humanitarian aid.  
 
Indirect NATO involvement in PSOs: 
In addition to direct involvement in PSOs, NATO can make important 
contributions to such missions through the less direct involvement of its as-
sets:  
• Co-ordination of support 
• Employment of selected alliance resources 
• Monitoring of sanctions 
Russian definition 
Peace operations: 
Terminology 
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At present, no single, strictly verified, co-ordinated Russian terminology 
exists that describes peacekeeping operations. It is interesting to see that the 
Russian proposal seems not to discriminate thoroughly between peace opera-
tions and peacekeeping. However, despite definite differences and ambigui-
ties, the definitions in use to today have much in common and reflect the 
specifics of various types of peacekeeping operations. Virtually every well-
known classification divides these operations into three groups:  
 
• Those which employ primarily non-force methods of armed forces acti-
ons (such as observing and various forms of monitoring) in order to 
strengthen and support political and diplomatic efforts to halt and settle a 
conflict  
• Those which combine political methods with active operations by armed 
peacekeeping forces that do not, however, conduct any combat opera-
tions  
• Those which involve the use of force, including combat actions, to com-
pel peace, in concert with political efforts, or even without them.  
 
Canadian definition 
The term ‘peace support operations’ covers a broad range of mechanisms for 
conflict resolution and management, from dialogue, i.e. preventive diplo-
macy, to intervention, i.e. peace enforcement. Preventive diplomacy involves 
the peaceful resolution of disputes before they develop into armed conflict. 
Peacemaking involves the peaceful resolution of disputes persisting after 
armed conflict stops. For example, the deployment of forces in Macedonia 
along the Macedonian-Serbian border in an effort to contain the Balkan con-
flict was a form of preventive deployment. 
Peacekeeping 
UN definition 
According to this definition, ‘peacekeeping’ is a hybrid politico-military 
activity aimed at conflict control, involving a United Nations presence in the 
field (usually both military and civilian personnel). The goal of this activity 
is to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to 
the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces etc.), and their 
resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or to protect the deliv-
ery of humanitarian aid. An important reservation is that it should be done 
with the consent of the parties involved in the conflict.  
Russian definition 
Peacekeeping is a common term for various types of activities carried out in 
order to: 
• Resolve conflicts 
• Prevent conflict escalation 
• Halt or prevent military actions 
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• Uphold law and order in conflict zones 
• Conduct humanitarian operations 
• Restore social and political institutions which have been disrupted by the 
conflict 
• Restore basic conditions for daily life. 
 
The distinctive feature of peacekeeping operations is that they are conducted 
under a mandate from the UN or regional organisations whose functions in-
clude peace support and international security. English-language sources call 
these operations ‘peace operations’ (USA) or ‘peace support operations’ 
(NATO). Peace operations are subdivided into the following types:  
 
• Operations (or actions) to preserve peace. English-language sources 
refer to such operations as ‘military support of diplomacy’ (US 
Armed Forces), or ‘conflict-prevention missions’ (NATO). The 
objectives of operations to preserve peace include:  
• Preventing the deterioration of a situation in an internal or interna-
tional conflict zone, and preventing armed actions 
• Resolving and regulating conflicts. 
 
In conducting such operations, the role of peacekeeping forces consists of:  
 
• Establishing and maintaining contacts between the opposing armed 
parties in order to establish and build trust 
• Providing for the security of political structures that perform peace-
keeping functions 
• Preventing and halting incidents that could draw in the armed groups 
of the opposing sides and thus disrupt the process of peaceful settle-
ment  
• Acting as the guarantor of cease-fire agreements and treaties. 
Canadian definition 
The term ‘peacekeeping’ has been used to describe all types of peace opera-
tions. When used in this generalised fashion, the term ‘refers to any interna-
tional effort involving an operational component to promote the termination 
of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes’. The UN contin-
ues to use the term ‘peacekeeping’ to refer generally to such international 
efforts.  
Peacekeeping operations 
UN definition 
Non-combat military operations undertaken by outside forces with the con-
sent of all major belligerent parties. Designed to monitor and facilitate the 
implementation of an existing truce in support of diplomatic efforts to reach 
a political settlement, PKOs cover: peacekeeping forces, observer missions 
and mixed operations.  
Terminology 
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Russian definition 
Peacekeeping operations are also conducted with the consent of one or all 
sides of the conflict and fall into one of the two categories. The first includes 
operations that are a sort of logical or practical continuation of peacemaking 
operations. After an armistice has been signed, negotiations begin in order to 
bring about the peaceful resolution of the conflict.  
The second category includes operations conducted in order to implement 
a previously signed accord. One such example would be the NATO opera-
tion in Bosnia after the signing of the Dayton agreement. In this case, the 
goal of the operation, including its military aspect, is to assure implementa-
tion of the terms of the agreement by all parties involved in the conflict.  
In addition to other peacekeeping tasks, peacekeeping forces perform the 
following missions:  
 
• They provide the military means to secure the realisation of cease-fire 
agreements, armistices or other peaceful conflict resolution methods, 
including a system of cease-fire lines, demilitarised and buffer zones, re-
duced-arms zones and various types of special-status regions  
• They assist in the exchange of territories, if this is called for by peace 
treaty 
• They help set up refugee camps and assembly points for dislocated per-
sons  
• They maintain law and order and help organise the activities of civilian 
authorities within their zones of responsibility 
• They investigate complaints and pretensions with regard to armistice 
violations or violations of conflict settlement agreements 
• They organise, if called for by the appropriate treaties, the collection and 
monitoring of certain categories of weapons, primarily heavy weapons. 
 
As a rule, peacekeeping operations last as long as the possibility of resump-
tion of fighting or other hostilities exists. 
 
Canadian definitions 
Traditional peacekeeping: 
Because it is necessary to distinguish between the different types of 
operations, I use the term ‘traditional peacekeeping’ to describe only those 
operations which are based on the consent of all involved parties, impartial-
ity, and the use of force only in self-defence. The term ‘traditional 
peacekeeping’ refers, therefore, to UN operations under the command and 
control of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, conducted by mili-
tary troops provided by member states on a voluntary basis, with the costs 
met collectively by member states. Because such missions are authorised and 
carried out by the UN, the troops appear impartial, something that is a pre-
requisite for this type of operation.  
Second generation peacekeeping: 
Between ‘traditional peacekeeping’ and enforcement actions, the military 
is likely to be involved in second generation tasks such as supervising cease-
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fires between irregular forces, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, 
protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and guaranteeing rights of 
passage.  
In all these cases of second generation peacekeeping, the consent of the 
parties is likely to be elusive and dynamic. Consequently, these missions 
require a ‘humane, but more proactive, concept of operations’, and forces 
must be able to choose from a range of military responses as tensions esca-
late and de-escalate. In other words, they must be ready to respond with the 
force necessary to control the situation.  
Others use the term ‘second-generation peacekeeping’ to describe mis-
sions based on the same fundamental principles as traditional peacekeeping, 
but with greatly expanded tasks. Typically, these operations are multifunc-
tional missions designed to implement comprehensive peace agreements 
addressing the roots of a conflict. Second generation peacekeeping is some-
times referred to as ‘wider peacekeeping’ as it involves tasks beyond those 
associated with traditional peacekeeping, but is still based on the consent of 
the parties. The functions of peacekeepers in these operations may include: 
 
• Monitoring cease-fires 
• Cantonment and demobilisation of troops 
• Destruction of weapons 
• Forming and training new armed forces 
• Monitoring existing police forces and forming new ones 
• Supervising or even controlling existing administrations 
• Verifying respect for human rights 
• Observing, supervising, or even conducting elections 
• Repatriating refugees 
• Undertaking information campaigns to explain the peace settlement. 
Peacemaking 
UN definition 
The UN defines ‘peacemaking’ as the diplomatic process of brokering an 
end to a conflict, principally through mediation and negotiation, as foreseen 
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Military activities contributing to 
peacemaking include military-to-military contacts, security assistance, and 
shows of force and preventive deployments.  
Russian definition 
Peacemaking operations are conducted with the mutual consent of the 
combating sides, or possibly at their request. For example, the parties may 
decide, independently or under pressure from international organisations or 
individual states, to cease military actions, but they are unable to do so with-
out help from the world community and international peacekeeping forces.  
Among the goals of such operations are helping stop military actions and 
organising the negotiation process. 
The political aspect of these operations consists of arranging contacts, 
either direct or through intermediaries, for purposes of fire-extinguishing, or 
for a first-time separation of the combating sides, as well as to prepare and 
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initiate negotiations to bring the conflict under control. In this process, the 
armed peace force performs several basic military missions. Peacemaking 
operations are generally initiated when the combatants agree to halt their 
fire, and they usually conclude when an armistice is signed.  
Canadian definition 
Until recently, the term ‘peacemaking’ has referred to diplomatic activities 
to resolve outstanding issues such as demobilisation, disarmament, or repa-
rations, once the parties to a conflict have agreed to stop fighting. However, 
the term is not mentioned in the UN Charter, nor is it exclusively the pur-
view of the United Nations, though it is often said that peacemaking is pro-
vided for in the mechanisms included in Chapter VI on the ‘Pacific Settle-
ment of Disputes’.  
Because it is confusing to use the term ‘peacemaking’ to describe mili-
tary operations that use force to bring about peace, this report instead uses 
the term ‘peace enforcement’.  
Peace enforcement 
UN definition 
‘Peace enforcement’ is a new and tentative concept applying to the 
multidimensional operations which, while originally mandated under -
Chapter VI, are forced by realities in the field to turn into Chapter VII opera-
tions, as when humanitarian convoys need to be defended, or exclusion 
zones enforced by air strikes. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement should 
not be confused. UN peacekeeping has traditionally relied on the consent of 
opposing parties and involved the deployment of peacekeepers to implement 
an agreement approved by those parties.  
In the case of enforcement action, the Security Council gives member 
states the authority to take all necessary measures to achieve a stated objec-
tive. Consent of the parties is not necessarily required. It has been used in 
very few cases including the Persian Gulf war, in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania. None of these enforcement operations 
was under direct UN control. Instead a single country or a group of countries 
directed them on behalf of the UN. A NATO-led multinational force suc-
ceeded the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The United Nations Charter provisions on the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security are the basis for both peacekeeping and enforce-
ment action. 
Russian definition 
Peace enforcement operations involve the use of an armed force, or the 
threat of such use, in order to compel combatants to cease fighting and seek 
peace. Such operations might include combat actions taken by a peacekeep-
ing force in order to separate and disarm the warring sides. These operations 
might be directed at all warring parties, or at a single party that refuses to 
submit to cease-fire demands.  
At a practical level, peace enforcement actions include:  
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• Implementing international sanctions against the opposing sides, or 
against the side that represents the driving force in the armed conflict 
• Isolating the conflict zones and preventing arms deliveries to the 
area, as well as preventing the penetration of the area by armed for-
mations  
• Delivering air or missile strikes against positions of the side that re-
fuses to halt its combat actions  
• The rapid deployment of peace forces to the combat zones in num-
bers sufficient to carry out the assigned missions, including localis-
ing the conflict and disarming or eradicating any armed formations 
that refuse to cease their warfare  
• Upon the successful completion of these missions, i.e., after cessa-
tion of military activity, the peace force switches to actions that are 
typical of peacekeeping or peacemaking.  
 
It must be noted that a number of peace enforcement operations conducted 
under a UN mandate have taken the form of ‘classic’ warfare. Such instances 
would include the UN operation in Korea during the 1950-53 war, and 
Operation Desert Storm, conducted against Iraq. 
Canadian definition 
Like ‘peacekeeping’, the term ‘peace enforcement’ has been used to describe 
a broad range of operations using force authorised under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. It has been applied to missions that impose economic sanctions 
or arms embargoes (in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia). The aims have 
varied, and have included, among other things, the creation of secure condi-
tions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Croatia, Somalia), the 
enforcement of a no-fly zone or creation of a buffer zone between belligerent 
forces (Croatia). Another objective was the protection of civilian populations 
in safe areas (Bosnia-Herzegovina) or the defence of a member state against 
armed attack by another state (the liberation of Kuwait after the Iraqi inva-
sion).  
The term ‘peace enforcement’ is sometimes used interchangeably with 
the term ‘enforcement’. However, it is helpful to distinguish between them. 
In keeping with a growing consensus on terminology, this report uses the 
term ‘enforcement’ to describe operations in which the United Nations 
authorises collective action in response to aggression by one state against 
another, such as the operation in Korea (1950-53) and the action in Kuwait 
and Iraq.  
By contrast, the term ‘peace enforcement’ refers to the use of force with 
specific objectives (e.g., protecting safe areas, securing the delivery of 
humanitarian aid) designed to support non-military efforts to bring about a 
peace. Peace enforcement is sometimes referred to as ‘third generation 
peacekeeping,’ or ‘muscular peacekeeping’. These are missions in which the 
use of force is authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter, but the United 
Nations remains neutral and impartial between the warring parties, without a 
mandate to stop the aggressor (if any is identified) or impose a cessation of 
hostilities.  
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Consent of the parties is desirable but not necessary. Examples of peace 
enforcement missions include the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), 
the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), and the Imple-
mentation Force in the former Yugoslavia (IFOR).  
Other important Russian definitions 
Operations-other-than-war 
In recent years the term ‘operations-other-than-war’ has been used widely 
internationally. Perhaps a more accurate description would be: ‘the use of 
armed forces for purposes other than war’. Such operations could, in Russian 
view, include  various types of peacekeeping operations, international police 
operations (e.g., eradicating international criminal groups, combating terror-
ism, piracy, illegal arms and drug trade, and guarding strategically important 
facilities, such as nuclear power plants), and legal interventions. 
Comment 
A very important observation at this stage is the fact that the Russian defini-
tion says that the operations could be undertaken ‘with the consent of one or 
all sides of the conflict’. This is a principal difference compared with the UN 
and Western definitions stating very clearly that ‘the consent of all belliger-
ent parties’ is needed although it can ‘be elusive and dynamic’ in second 
generation peacekeeping. From the Western point of view the consent of all 
parties is an important premise for CPO in a traditional peacekeeping and 
even in second generation peacekeeping. The Russian approach that a peace 
enforcement force easily can switch to peacekeeping when the situation 
permits is controversial, as the ‘peace enforcing’ units can easily be per-
ceived as partial and thus lacking credibility.  
Underlying principles of traditional peacekeeping 
The term ‘peacekeeping’ is for different reasons misused. It is therefore 
decisive to present principles which have to be fulfilled in order to describe 
an operation as traditional peacekeeping. This report will only use the term 
‘peacekeeping operation’ when an operation is planned and conducted with 
respect for these principles. These basic principles are thoroughly analysed 
in the Canadian Somalia report containing a thorough and fairly objective 
evaluation of this peace operation. 
Consent of parties 
The principle of all-party consent is crucial to traditional peacekeeping. Re-
spect for state sovereignty, explicitly stated in the UN Charter, requires the 
UN to obtain prior approval of the parties involved in a conflict before de-
ploying a peacekeeping force and during its employment. Consent remains a 
cornerstone for all traditional peacekeeping operations. This principle is of a 
formal as well as a practical character. 
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Non-use of force 
Traditional peacekeeping missions limit the use of force to self-defence. 
Peacekeepers are only lightly armed and the configuration and equipment of 
the peacekeeping force sends out a clear message about its purpose. This 
principle ensures that UN peacekeepers cannot be perceived as a coercive 
force, which could diminish their ability to mediate and facilitate. Non-use 
of force is a practical principle that has to be implemented by the command-
ers and individual soldiers on the ground.  
Impartiality 
Peacekeeping forces (PKF) are meant to be impartial. No party to the dispute 
should be seen as favoured by the force, or identified as an aggressor. Nor 
should any part of the PKF be seen to have any stake or interest in the out-
come of the dispute. The rationale for this principle is that impartial troops 
are more likely to be accepted by the parties involved in the conflict.  
Impartiality is part of the rationale for having the United Nations or the 
OSCE as the sponsoring institution, as opposed to a member state. It implies 
drawing troops only from states that do not have an interest in the dispute, 
which would exclude neighbouring states or superpowers. 
Comments 
Impartiality as such is rather theoretical because most states and nationalities 
will have or will be perceived by the involved parties as having preferences. 
Therefore not only the selection of participating states is important, but also 
the composition of states in a PKF. The same could be said of the 
deployment of various ‘national units’ within the actual area of operations. A 
current example is the USA- led division MND (North) in SFOR with a 
Russian brigade in the Serbian sector and a Turkish brigade in the Bosnian 
sector. 
Consent, the non-use of force and impartiality are interrelated and mutu-
ally reinforcing principles. All three are usually present in traditional peace-
keeping operations, in conjunction with three less critical features. First, tra-
ditional operations are usually established only after the parties have agreed 
to a cease-fire or truce. Such operations have no guarantee of success. The 
peace agreement must be in place before the operation begins. Peacekeeping 
operations are thus largely reactive. Second, peacekeepers are primarily 
military personnel disciplined and trained as combat-ready soldiers in the 
first place. Third, UN forces must be dispatched by the appropriate author-
ising agency, usually the Security Council, whose mission mandate sets the 
legal foundation for the mission.  
Strict adherence to the principles of traditional peacekeeping is para-
mount. While they do not necessarily determine mission success, missions 
are more likely to succeed if all conditions are fulfilled.  
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Terms related to ongoing operations 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA ) 
UN definition 
The status of (the peacekeeping) force(s) agreement (SOFA) is an agreement 
between the UN and the host country. 
Russian definition 
This agreement is concluded between the UN (and/or other organisation 
under whose mandate the peace operation is conducted) and the country on 
whose territory the peacekeeping force is deployed. It defines the basic 
rights, immunities and privileges of the peacekeeping personnel, and it also 
regulates:  
 
• Financial problems, including the use of local currency 
• Issues of peacekeeping personnel movement across the territory of 
the host country; rules for the use of transport centres, including air-
fields and ports 
• The nature of co-ordination between peacekeeping personnel and the 
local armed forces, special forces, etc. 
• Conditions and rules for using local personnel 
• Conditions for peacekeeping personnel use of electricity, water, 
various day-to-day services, and payment for these services  
• Issues of civil and criminal liability of peacekeeping personnel 
• Other practical material, legal or daily living issues. 
 
The more detailed and skilfully prepared the Status-of-Forces agreement, the 
fewer problems will arise for the peacekeeping force as it organises the 
operation and conducts it.  
Standing Operations Procedure (SOP) 
UN definition 
SOP details the political and military situation in the area, staff duties, the 
structure of force, the mandate and methods of operations, the rules appli-
cable to the carriage of weapons, the use of force and the states of alert (see 
also rules of engagement). 
NATO definition 
SOP is a set of instructions covering those features of operations that lend 
themselves to a definite or standardised procedure without loss of effective-
ness. Procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise (NATO STANAG). 
Russian definition 
The standard operating procedure is a composite document containing the 
operation mandate, the UN classic peacekeeping force commander’s con-
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cept, and the instructions and orders that spell out the actions of the force at 
the sector level. The standard operating procedure contains: 
 
• Historical and political information  
• Organisational and administrative structure of the sector and its 
headquarters 
• A breakdown of operational units and services 
• Basic provisions on the rules of engagement 
• The operations plan and other directives.  
Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
UN definition 
Directives issued by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
specify how units engaged in PKOs should interact with hostile parties and 
the population.  
NATO definition 
Directives issued by the competent military authority to clarify the circum-
stances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue com-
bat engagement with other forces. 
Russian definition 
One of the most important principles of international peacekeeping opera-
tions is restraint in the use of force. This principle is often formulated as fol-
lows: weapons may be used only under extreme circumstances, when there 
is no other way to protect the life and health of service personnel. Great sig-
nificance is attached to the creation, adoption and observance of the ‘rules of 
engagement’ (abbreviated ‘ROE’ in English-language sources). The ROE 
strictly govern all instances involving the justifiable use of weapons and the 
restrictions on their use.  
Conclusions 
The UN, NATO, Canadian and Russian terms and definitions related to 
peace operations do not exclude CPOs. Even though there are differences 
between the various definitions, the differences are in many ways superfi-
cial. An important exception is the consent of parties in peacekeeping and to 
a some extent the Russian willingness to transform a peace enforcement 
force into a peacekeeping one. A CPO in a peacekeeping context must have 
the consent of all belligerent parties, and it seems that both the West and 
Russia share this view. The Russian terms and definitions are to a large 
extent translated from US documents on peacekeeping and seem to be based 
on Russian tradition and experiences only to a limited extent. The creation of 
positive conditions for co-operation depends on the more or less official 
common interpretation of terms and definitions. Nonetheless, the real chal-
lenge will be getting complete understanding and acceptance of the stan-
dards at all levels – from the political leadership to the individual soldier. 
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Development of a common and mutually accepted code of conduct, under-
standing and correct behaviour on the ground can only be developed through 
joint experience, in other words through the carrying out of CPOs. This is in 
itself a good argument for making an effort to launch a CPO-type operation 
with units from both the West and Russia. However, the need for real life 
practice should not lead to the negligence of common training, exchange of 
officers and other co-operation in the implementation of confidence and 
understanding building measures. 
All relevant types of operations can in fact be found on the Russian defi-
nition list. Terms and definitions are not and should not be a limitation. On 
the other hand it is important that the work for common understanding of the 
definitions describing the use of military force in peace operations is ex-
tended and speeded up. 
Common and mutually accepted terminology can serve as an important 
platform for common education, training, exercises and operations. In that 
respect it might be wise to discuss the NATO concept of ‘out of area’ opera-
tions and the idea of ‘spheres of interest’. 
It is vital to underline that every scenario and operation should be treated 
as unique. All parties involved in that type of operation should agree on 
SOFA and ROE.  
CPOs could be viewed as traditional peacekeeping, second generation 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement. The next chapters will most probably 
limit these three options even further. Experiences from SFOR and KFOR 
can be a platform for building a common Russian-Western peacekeeping 
glossary. 

Relevant Organisations and Legitimacy 
The NATO air campaign against the former Yugoslavia brought to the sur-
face key issues in the interaction between Russia and the West with respect 
to peace operations. The main issue is the question of whether to base an 
operation on a UN Security Council resolution or not. There is no doubt that 
the veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the 
lessons learned from operation ‘Allied Force’ might have created a custom 
for future operations without a resolution. It seems, however, that the five 
permanent members still see a Security Council resolution as the optimal 
way of initiating an operation and the opposite as an exception. It is impor-
tant to remember that both the deployment of KFOR to Kosovo after ‘Allied 
Force’ and the Australian-led Peace Force to East Timor were based on 
agreements reached in the UN Security Council. It is under all circumstances 
relevant to assume that a CPO has to be based on a UN Security Council 
resolution.  
A major challenge in the post-Cold War period is the nature of the con-
flicts facing the international community. Most of the conflicts are no longer 
inter-state conflicts but internal conflicts within the borders of a nominally 
sovereign state. Russia and China on the one hand and the West on the other 
hand seem to have quite different views on the way these internal conflicts 
could be tackled. The Russian and Chinese view is that an international 
organisation should not interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. 
This is a reality that has to be taken into consideration when estimating pos-
sibilities for combined peace operations. The experiences so far show that it 
will be extremely difficult to get a UN Security Council resolution to an 
operation that from a Russian and Chinese point of view could be seen as 
interference in an internal conflict. The West has through operation ‘Allied 
Force’ shown the will to interfere in internal conflicts for what it considers 
humanitarian reasons. The idea behind this seems to be that violation of 
human rights and crimes against humanity should not be allowed even 
within the borders of nominally sovereign states. This again leads one to the 
conclusion that the probability of CPO handling what the Russians consider 
a domestic issue is very low. 
United Nations  
Conflicts between sovereign states 
The UN Charter establishes a system of collective security designed to re-
solve disputes between sovereign states, in which the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council (the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet 
Union/Russia, the United States of America, and China) were to play a 
leading and co-operative role. As an initial step in the resolution of disputes, 
Chapter VI sets out methods for the pacific settlement of disputes through 
negotiation and mediation. 
If peaceful resolution proves futile, Chapter VII can be invoked. It pro-
vides for collective action (in the form of sanctions or action by land, sea, or 
air forces) to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression. The Charter authorises the Security Council to take action to 
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maintain or restore international peace and security. However, the Security 
Council’s ability to use this power is limited by the right to veto its decisions 
by one or more of its five permanent members and the veto right effectively 
demands unanimity of this forum. One of the results of the UN’s impaired 
security function was the growth of defensive alliances based on the concept 
of collective self-defence authorised in the Charter. The most significant 
were NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Another important outcome was the 
emergence of peacekeeping as the Security Council’s tool for maintaining 
peace and security.  
As the collective security powers (now known as enforcement powers) 
under Chapter VII of the Charter could have been neutralised by the veto in 
the Security Council, military operations for the management of conflict de-
veloped along different lines. The new operations, characterised by consen-
sus and non-enforcement, were acceptable to the superpowers.  
The development of UN peacekeeping operations without an explicit 
legal basis or mandate in the UN Charter led to ambiguity. UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld referred to this when he talked about ‘the elu-
sive Chapter VI and a half’. When compelled to identify an article authoris-
ing peacekeeping, commentators focus either on Article 36 in Chapter VI or 
Article 40 in Chapter VII. Article 36 provides that the Security Council may 
recommend, at any stage of a dispute that is likely to endanger international 
peace, ‘appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment’. Article 40 pro-
vides that the Security Council, in order to prevent the aggravation of a 
situation that constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression, may call upon the parties to comply with provisional measures. 
With respect to peace enforcement missions, it appears to be generally 
accepted that Article 40 provides the necessary authority for them.  
Internal conflicts 
The original purpose of the UN was to prevent and handle conflicts between 
sovereign states. However, the UN Charter describes circumstances that 
could legalise intervention in internal conflicts: ‘The United Nations shall 
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or re-
ligion.’ ‘All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in Article 55.’ 
After the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of states, civil wars and 
internal conflicts have risen on the agenda. The former Yugoslavia, with its 
ongoing NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia and especially Kosovo, is a 
very relevant example for the discussion of mandates. The fact that both 
SFOR and KFOR consist of forces from NATO countries, Russia and other 
states makes this case even more interesting for our study. 
The United Nations and the OSCE have a track record of co-operation in 
joint crisis prevention, peacekeeping and long-term peace-building. The two 
organisations have established field-level co-operation in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, Kosovo, Albania and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, including Georgia and Tajikistan. The OSCE is the only regional 
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organisation with which the United Nations in 1993 concluded a Framework 
Agreement for Co-operation and Co-ordination. 
Ongoing UN operations in the CIS area 
United Nations Missions of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT ) 
UNMOT was originally established by the United Nations Security Council 
in Resolution 968, adopted on 16 December 1994. The mission is still ope-
rating. It was to assist the Joint Commission, composed of representatives of 
the Tajik Government and of the Tajik opposition, and its main task was to 
‘monitor the implementation of the agreement on a temporary cease-fire and 
the cessation of other hostile acts on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the 
country for the duration of the talks’.  
United Nations Observer Mission In Georgia (UNOMIG) 
UNOMIG was established on 24 August 1993 by Security Council -
Resolution 858. The mission is still running to verify compliance with the 27 
July 1993 cease-fire agreement between the Government of Georgia and the 
Abkhazian authorities in Georgia. Its main task is to investigate reports of 
cease-fire violations and to attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties 
involved; to report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of its 
mandate, in particular on violations of the cease-fire agreement. The re-
sumed fighting in Abkhazia in September 1993 invalidated UNOMIG’s 
original mandate. Therefore the Mission was given an interim mandate by 
the Security Council to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and 
with Russian military contingents, and to monitor and report on the situation, 
with particular reference to developments relevant to United Nations efforts 
to promote a comprehensive political settlement. Following the signing, in 
May 1994, by the Georgian and Abkhazian sides of the Agreement on a 
Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, UNOMIG’s main tasks are: 
 
• Monitoring and verifying of the implementation of the agreement  
• Observing the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force.  
SHIRBRIG 
At the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the need for a more flexible 
composition of stand-by forces became apparent. In 1993 a United Nations 
Planning Team was mandated to develop a system of stand-by forces, able to 
be deployed as a whole or in parts anywhere in the world, within an agreed 
response time, for UN peace-keeping operations and missions. The system, 
known as the UN Stand-by Arrangement System is based upon commit-
ments by member states to contribute specified resources to the UN. How-
ever, the system has some limitations: Not all contributions meet the readi-
ness and self-sufficiency criteria originally foreseen. Consequently, the 
stand-by arrangement system does not at present provide the UN with a 
well-prepared rapid deployment capability. 
A working group addressed the key considerations and formulated a con-
cept outline for a Multinational Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade 
(SHIRBRIG) in a report in August 1996. On 15 December 1996, Austria, 
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Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden signed a 
Letter of Intent on co-operating in the establishment of a multinational 
Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade, organised according to the recom-
mendations of the Working Group. This was followed by the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on setting up a Steering Committee 
to supervise the establishment of the Brigade. In addition, a memorandum of 
understanding on the establishment of a permanent planning element 
(PLANELM) to exercise all the pre-deployment functions of the unit and, on 
deployment, to become the nucleus of the deployed Brigade, was signed. 
The SHIRBRIG headquarters are expected to be operational after 1 January, 
1999.  
SHIRBRIG has so far not participated in any operation. The concept im-
plies that none of the five permanent members in the UN Security Council 
will participate in the brigade. The basic fact is therefore that SHIRBRIG is 
excluded from leading CPOs with e.g. a Russian battalion as long as Russia 
is among the permanent five. On the other hand, it does not exclude the bri-
gade’s participation alongside formations including forces from the perma-
nent five, or be subordinated to head- quarters or division level formations 
from the permanent five. The brigade has therefore a potential role in CPOs 
if a Security Council resolution in a given situation demand that the UN 
plays an active military role in an operation. The military capacity of 
SHIRBRIG and the UN as a whole is limited to peacekeeping. The Security 
Council is undoubtedly a decisive organ in order to get a mandate for a CPO. 
The experiences from UN itself in peacekeeping are, however, to a large 
extent negative, especially in the Balkans. The UN Force concept is more or 
less based on ad hoc formations from a variety of states with very different 
background. This is probably not the right military response to future peace 
operations. Australia as the lead state in the East Timor operation is probably 
a result of such conclusions in the UN head-quarters. The establishment of 
SHIRBRIG is another answer from the UN to future challenges. 
Regional organisations 
Regional organisations based on the global UN Charter play various roles in 
the security web of the world and the Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian area in particu-
lar. Organisations like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are already involved in several 
ongoing peace operations. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union/Western European Union 
(EU/WEU) are developing concepts for peace operations but have so far not 
launched operations with troops on the ground. When it comes to CPOs, it is 
already at this stage worth mentioning that, besides the UN, the OSCE is the 
only organisation where Russia is a full member and as such on equal terms 
with the major Western powers. Furthermore it is important to point out that 
despite its new strategic concept, NATO is still an alliance with the defence 
of its member states as the main goal and rationale.  
A preliminary conclusion at this stage would be that the permanent five 
members can agree in the Security Council that there is a variety of options 
for CPOs, and that regional organisations can also be involved. In fact this is 
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the model for the NATO-led IFOR/SFOR and KFOR operations, which at 
present are the only running CPOs. Political agreement at the top level be-
tween Russia and the USA seems to be a decisive prerequisite of successful 
co-operation. This has been the case for Bosnia and Kosovo where the USA 
and the leading Western powers have pressed hard for a leading role for 
‘their’ organisation, NATO. In these cases the Russians have accepted this. 
In the following chapters I will discuss what regional organisations and con-
figurations of forces could be acceptable for the permanent five Security 
Council members in the CIS area. 
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a secu-
rity organisation of which the 55 participating states represent the geographi-
cal area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE is the main instrument 
for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation in the whole area.  
The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative. It 
deals with a wide range of security issues, including arms control, preventive 
diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, elec-
tion monitoring and economic and environmental security. Because deci-
sions are made on the basis of consensus, all states participating in OSCE 
activities have an equal status. Its area includes continental Europe, the 
Caucasus, Central Asia and North America, and it co-operates with Mediter-
ranean and Asian partners. The OSCE thus brings together the Euro-Atlantic 
and the Euro-Asian communities. 
Starting from the premise that security is indivisible, participating states 
have a common stake in the security of Europe and should therefore co-
operate to prevent crises from happening and/or to reduce the risk of already 
existing crises getting worse. The underlying assumption is that co-operation 
can bring benefits to all participating states, while insecurity in a state or 
region can affect the well-being of all. The key task is to work together, 
achieving security together with others, not against them. (OSCE Home-
page). 
The Helsinki Document 1992 made provision for OSCE peacekeeping 
activities, stating that peacekeeping constitutes an important operational 
element of the overall capability of the OSCE for conflict prevention and 
crisis management. OSCE peacekeeping activities may be undertaken in 
cases of conflict within or among participating states to help maintain peace 
and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution. So far, no 
OSCE peacekeeping operation has been mounted.  
Former and ongoing OSCE involvement in the former Soviet Union 
The organisation has so far not conducted peacekeeping operations. How-
ever, it has been and still is involved in the solution (or rather attempts at 
solving) several conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, includ-
ing the conflict in Chechnya. Generally speaking the purpose of the OSCE is 
twofold: to facilitate the political processes that are intended to prevent or 
settle conflicts, and to ensure that the OSCE community is kept informed of 
developments in the countries where missions are present. Russia has special 
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interest in the OSCE as it considers this forum an important instrument in 
building collective security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. It seems 
that the OSCE has to prioritise what it is good at and not try to bite off more 
than it can swallow, with the monitoring and observation of conflicts being 
the two most obvious tasks. However, it could be possible for the OSCE to 
become involved in peacekeeping, especially if the West wanted to get into 
CIS territory in order to conduct a traditional peacekeeping operation 
together with Russia and/or with some other CIS states. The OSCE High-
Level Planning Group (HLPG) was established on 20 December 1994. It is 
made up of military experts seconded by OSCE participating states and is 
mandated to:  
 
• Make recommendations to the Chairman-in-Office on developing a 
plan for the establishment, force structure requirements and opera-
tions of a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force for Nagorno-
Karabakh. 
• Make recommendations on, inter alia, the size and characteristics of 
the force, command and control, logistics, allocations of units and 
resources, rules of engagement and arrangements with contributing 
states.  
 
After conducting fact-finding visits to the region, the HLPG began a detailed 
conceptualisation that resulted in the Concept for an OSCE Multinational 
Peacekeeping Mission for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, presented to the 
Chairman-in-Office on 14 July 1995. It included four options, of which three 
were a mixture of armed peacekeeping troops and unarmed military observ-
ers, their strength varying from 1,500 to 4,500 personnel, the fourth being an 
unarmed military observer mission. Putting into place the peacekeeping 
force depends on the successful implementation of the political settlement 
process and on consensus among the OSCE participating states. At present, 
the HLPG is adapting the concept to the current stage of negotiations and 
updating the four options through fact-finding missions.  
Status by the end of the millennium 
The last OSCE summit of the 20th century, which took place in Istanbul in 
November 1999, was originally meant to draw up security and co-operation 
in the next millennium. However, these tasks were to some extent overshad-
owed by the Chechnya conflict. Russia maintained that the war in Chechnya 
is an internal matter and should not be interfered in by the outside world. 
The West, on the other hand, urged for political solutions, negotiations and 
aid to the refugees. The OSCE managed, however, to smooth over these dif-
ferences and the European Security Charter with the potential for creating 
conditions for combined peace operations was signed. The Charter 
 
• Creates a framework for OSCE peacekeeping operations 
• Establishes rapid reaction teams for crisis areas 
• Obliges states to answer accusations of human right violations 
• Spells out the OSCE’s role in relation to NATO and the UN 
• Reaffirms OSCE commitments to democracy and human rights 
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• Provides for the increased training and monitoring of police forces. 
 
It implies that the signatories remain committed to reinforcing the OSCE’s 
key role in maintaining peace and stability throughout our area. The OSCE’s 
most effective contributions to regional security have been in areas such as 
field operations, post-conflict rehabilitation, democratisation, and human 
rights and election monitoring. The OSCE decided to explore options for a 
potentially greater and wider role for the OSCE in peacekeeping. All future 
involvement in this type of operations will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis and decision should be reached by consensus. In accordance with the 
Platform for Co-operative Security, it could also provide a co-ordinating 
framework for such efforts. 
The actual capability of the OSCE in general and the HLPG explicitly is 
very limited in military terms. The OSCE has no intelligence or command 
and control capabilities and this makes the organisation totally dependent on 
member states and other organisations to launch even small peacekeeping 
operations. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
It is important to mention that the Council of Heads of States in the CIS has 
no standing in international law. Around 1992, Russia began formulating its 
policy to the newly independent states. From early 1993 the political guide-
lines from President Yeltsin moved towards consolidating Russia’s sphere of 
influence in the so-called ‘Near Abroad’. Moscow’s initial ambition seemed 
to be to take on a  leadership role in the CIS and the role of security guaran-
tor in troubled areas such as the Caucasus and Tajikistan. Internally in 
Russia there was a broad consensus about the expediency and efficiency of 
military instruments for restoring Russia’s great power status. This consen-
sus was, however, severely undermined by the first Chechen war. The CIS 
summit in Kishinev in October 1997 left little doubt that Russia’s leadership 
was unsupported by economic resources and humiliated by the military 
defeat in Chechnya. By the end of 1998 it became clear that Russia could no 
longer pretend to be a provider of stability and had instead became a major 
source of economic and security problems for its neighbours. The lack of 
natural leadership from Russia resulted in some CIS states seeking other 
powers and partners to co-operate with. The alternative solutions can be 
based either on co-operation with other CIS partners (for example GUUAM 
co-operation) or on tightening bonds with the Western anchor organisations 
such as NATO and the EU (Ukraine). These developments illustrate a trend I 
expect to see continue, in which former Soviet republics learn to co-operate 
rather with each other than with Russia. Russia, confronted with a war being 
fought on its own territory, with domestic and international problems and a 
need for reforming the country’s economy cannot find enough resources to 
support or even control its smaller neighbours. These developments within 
CIS may in the longer run contribute to creating better conditions for CPOs, 
as Russia can be challenged by other CIS members to let Western troops 
take part in peacekeeping operations in what is today defined as a Russian 
exclusive sphere of influence.  
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The Tashkent Treaty 
On 15 May 1992, in the Uzbek capital Tashkent, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Collective Secu-
rity Treaty (CST) of the CIS. Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia did not sign 
the treaty in 1992, but joined it later. In April 1994, upon ratification, the 
CST entered into force. The treaty is open to new members and member 
states do not intend to create a new military block (Zemsky 1999: 97) 
In accordance with the collective security concept, the signatories to the 
Treaty ensure their collective security by all available means with a special 
trust being placed in peaceful means. The main priorities in collective secu-
rity efforts are as follows: 
 
• Participation, jointly with other states and international organisa-
tions, in creating collective security systems in Europe and in Asia 
• The expansion of confidence-building measures in the military 
sphere 
• The establishment and promotion of partnership relations, on an 
equal footing, with various military political organisations and regio-
nal security structures with the aim of consolidating peace; to con-
duct peacekeeping operations in line with UN Security Council and 
OSCE decisions and co-ordinate measures on matters of disarma-
ment and arms control, the reduction and limitation of military 
activity, the harmonisation of border protection efforts and so forth. 
 
One of the main tasks of the collective security system to be built on the 
Tashkent Treaty should be to guarantee the member states’ protection. In the 
event of aggression against any of the member states all other member states 
are to make available to it the necessary assistance, including military assis-
tance. They will also provide support with the means at their disposal in 
exercise of the right to collective defence in accordance with Article 51 of 
the UN charter. 
Other tasks and achievments of the Tashkent Treaty are:  
 
• A collective security concept document 
• A declaration of signatories to the Collective Security Treaty 
• Main guidelines for deepening military co-operation for signatories 
to the Collective Security Treaty 
• Creation of a unified air defence system 
• Development of joint border protection 
• Regular consultations. 
 
Unfortunately, according to representatives of the member states themselves, 
the comprehensive full-scale fulfilment of first stage tasks is hindered by a 
lack of political will, economic means and not least by elements of mutual 
prejudice. Furthermore, the practical implementation of the agreements 
reached is lagging behind the process of co-ordinated decision-making. 
Conflicts on the territories of the member states can be a serious source 
of tension between them. These conflicts divert the member states’ attention 
as well as their human and material military resources, which naturally ham-
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pers the galvanisation of their joint efforts in the interest of collective secu-
rity. The Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty, Vladimir 
Zemsky, sees it as urgent that the Treaty is used more actively in the sphere 
of peacemaking and peacekeeping, although the text of the Treaty does not 
contain any reference to this type of operations. Russia has proposed to cre-
ate within the framework of the Treaty rapid reaction peacekeeping forces 
that could be used under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The idea 
has been discussed in the course of regular consultations and is currently 
being reviewed by the member states.  
Among last month’s developments in the field of collective security on 
CIS territory two issues seemed to play a central role in attempts at revitalis-
ing this organisation and restoring Russian influence within the CIS. The 
first was the war in Dagestan and Chechnya, the second the decision on 
military aid to Kyrgyzstan.  
In September 1999, Moscow insisted that ‘terrorists’ were using Geor-
gian and Azerbaijani territory to reach the North Caucasus and pressed for 
the creation of joint CIS intelligence and antiterrorist bodies under Russian 
control. All the CIS delegations unambiguously condemned terrorism and 
endorsed all-out efforts to combat it at the national and international levels. 
But most of them at the same time resisted, in various forms and degrees, the 
Russian proposals to create new structures within the CIS or to turn existing 
bodies into supranational ones. The September 1999 meetings resulted in 
general proposals to strengthen bilateral and multilateral co-operation 
against international terrorism, contraband and security of transportation 
arteries, as well as to create antiterrorist centres at the national and CIS lev-
els and to use more effectively the CIS data bank on terrorism. The two 
ministerial meetings demonstrated that all CIS countries are determined to 
co-operate in antiterrorist efforts, and that most of them seek to avoid the 
misuse of joint endeavours by Russia’s security agencies in Russia’s politi-
cal and hegemonic interests. 
In October 1999 the presidents of several CIS member states signed a 
decision ‘On collective military assistance to Kyrgyzstan within the frame-
work of the CIS’s Collective Security Treaty’. This was the first time in the 
history of the CIS that the 1992 treaty was activated and that a decision has 
been made on providing collective military assistance to a member country.  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
The military capability of NATO to conduct peace operations has been 
clearly demonstrated in IFOR/SFOR and so far in KFOR. This will be 
discussed further in a separate chapter. It is worthwhile including a discus-
sion of the effects of the air war against Yugoslavia, even though it is not 
strictly within the frame of this report. No matter what forced Slobodan 
Milosevic to the negotiating table, the facts are obvious: by the turn of the 
millennium NATO is the only multinational military organisation with the 
capability of conducting offensive joint military operations in a hostile envi-
ronment. This is due to some basic military requirements, for example: 
 
• A 19 state-integrated command and control system working on a 
daily basis with the option of ‘plug in’ for partner states and others. 
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IFOR/SFOR/KFOR has shown that this also is the case for the Rus-
sian forces 
• Access to global real time intelligence 
• Integrated air defence 
• The world’s strongest air power 
• Strategic mobility 
• The necessary vocabulary to launch a broad variety of operations, 
including peace support operations. 
 
The limitation for NATO as participant and/or a leader in peace operations is 
not related to the military capabilities of the alliance but to the political real-
ity. Even though NATO through its new strategic concept presents a spec-
trum of options for peace operations there are several realpolitik obstacles. 
These obstacles will be discussed in the chapters presenting different Rus-
sian concepts and doctrines and the actual relationship between Russia and 
the West. Some of the main problems with respect to possible combined 
peace operations would in short be: 
The overall negative Russian attitude toward NATO in general, especi-
ally among politicians and the top brass in the Russian army. 
USA is the dominating NATO state and the only superpower, while Rus-
sia is interested in building a multipolar world system and not a unipolar 
(read USA- led) one. US forces and probably NATO as a whole would not 
accept Russian or any other command – they would need a clear mandate 
from the Security Council, the OSCE or perhaps other regional organisa-
tions. 
Some of the NATO states, especially Turkey but also to some extent Ger-
many and Italy, have a negative record in the CIS area. Turkey is also seen 
as a rival by Moscow. 
NATO’s new strategic concept adopted at the Washington 1999 summit 
clearly indicates that the alliance also in the future will focus on peace sup-
port operations. Co-operation with other organisations such as the UN, the 
OSCE and the EU is specially mentioned. When it comes to possible CPO, 
especially the CJTF concept and PfP co-operation can be seen as important 
factors facilitating this sort of co-operation. It is also worth mentioning that 
NATO still regards the Security Council mandate as an important condition 
for launching a peace enforcement operation. 
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) as a CPO capability 
The definition of a CJTF is a multinational (combined) and multi service 
(joint) task force, organised for specific contingency operations that require 
multinational and multi service command and control by a CJTF headquar-
ters.  
This newly formed CJTF head-quarters would then provide a designated 
CJTF Commander with his mission-tailored command and control element. 
The concept also includes options to employ a NATO CJTF head-quarters 
for WEU operations and for the possible participation of partner and other 
non-NATO states, involving a much broader multinational approach. This is 
much like the military structure adopted by NATO for the IFOR/SFOR 
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operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has provided valuable practi-
cal insight into the CJTF concept’s development.  
The new operational role of the Partnership for Peace 
Numerous enhancements have also been introduced to make PfP more ope-
rational. The most significant of these are:  
 
• Participation by partner states that so wish, together with NATO al-
lies, in future PfP operations agreed by the North Atlantic Council;  
• Expanded scope of NATO/ PfP exercises to address the full range of 
the alliance’s new missions, including peace support operations;  
• The involvement of Partners in the planning and conduct of PfP 
activities, including NATO/PfP exercises and other PfP operations, 
through the establishment of PfP Staff Elements (PSEs) at different 
NATO Headquarters. Partner countries will thus be able to assume 
international roles in these spheres and, in addition, will fulfil inter-
national functions at the Partnership Co-ordination Cell (PCC) 
within NATO’s International Military Staff;  
• Possibilities for participation of PfP Staff Elements in CJTF (Com-
bined Joint Task Forces) exercise planning, concept and doctrine 
development, and operations;  
• Possible involvement of national personnel from Partner countries in 
CJTF headquarters;  
• The enhancement of arrangements for national liaison representa-
tives from Partner Countries at NATO Headquarters as part of the 
establishment of full Diplomatic Missions formally accredited to 
NATO;  
• Expansion of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) modelled on 
the NATO defence planning system, including the development of 
Ministerial Guidance and of Partnership Goals. These measures are 
to be combined with increased opportunities to develop transparency 
among PARP participants;  
• Development of modalities for extending in principle the scope and 
orientation of the NATO Security Investment Programme to include 
Partnership projects;  
• Increased scope for regional co-operation activities in the context of 
the Partnership, including consultations on regional security matters 
and on practical co-operation.  
 
NATO, with its new strategic concepts, CJTF and PfP, is undoubtedly the 
best military tool for CPO. Especially the PfP creates conditions for en-
hancement of interoperability between Western and Russian forces. The PfP 
should, however, be further developed to create conditions for a successful 
launching of a CPO. 
The European Union/ Western European Union 
‘The European Union has during the last year set up high ambition for future 
military capability. Before 2003 EU should be capable of mounting a 50-60 
000 men strong force for peace operations at army corps level. Even though 
Jørn Buø 
nupi april 01 
38 
it remains to be seen to what extent the member nations are able to reach this 
aim, I have to take into consideration that EU in mid-term can get a much 
more prominent role in security and defence issues’ (Løwer 1999: 7). 
The EU claims that Russia has to be a part of the European security 
architecture, be an equal partner and stresses co-operation across the old iron 
curtain. This view was clearly expressed at the EU meeting in Cologne in 
June 1999 at which the EU launched its strategy towards Russia. The Treaty 
on European Union establishes a number of links between the European 
Union and the Western European Union (WEU). The integration of EU with 
respect to security and foreign policy and closer co-operation in the military 
field is now gaining momentum, and it seems that the WEU will be inte-
grated into EU, but this development, as not relevant for this report, will not 
be discussed here. Until recently the Union has had to haverecourse to the 
WEU for drawing up and implementing any Union decisions and actions 
with defence implications. Now it seems that this type of decisions will be 
taken directly by the European Council and adopted and ratified by the -
member states. Petersberg tasks, so named after the place where the WEU 
Ministerial Council formulated them in June 1992, are important when the 
potential for CPO is discussed. These are: humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and combat force tasks in crisis management, including 
peacemaking. As a result of the Kosovo conflict, the Cologne meeting of the 
European Council placed the Petersberg tasks – as was already the case in 
the Treaty – at the core of the process of strengthening the European com-
mon security and defence policy. The fifteen Heads of State or Government 
and the President of the Commission, meeting on 3 and 4 June 1999, de-
clared that, to this end: 
‘The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to 
do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions 
by NATO’.  
Discussions are under way in the European Union with the aim of exer-
cising political control and strategic guidance in the Petersberg-type opera-
tions conducted by the European Union. Furthermore, there is a discussion 
on how to determine the implementation of operations, with or without the 
resources and capacities of NATO, and how to arrange for participation in 
the operations by members of the European Union, the European members 
of NATO and the associated partners of the WEU. All that means that the 
European Union can in mid-term develop into a very important Western 
European military tool with regard to CPO with Russian partcipation. One of 
the most important advantages the EU has is the apparent lack of the histori-
cally and ideologically motivated Russian prejudices to co-operation with 
this Western European organisation, prejudices which still sour relations 
with NATO and make co-operation with Russia a very difficult task. 
Conclusions 
Both the UN and the OSCE include Russia and the West on a formally equal 
basis. They are therefore, at least theoretically, the best legal and psychologi-
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cal launching pads for a CPO. A CPO in CIS has to be founded on a Security 
Council resolution and/or a decision by the OSCE. 
With a UN or OSCE mandate, several regional organisations and indi-
vidual states have the military capability of leading different types of CPOs. 
The UN itself has conducted several traditional peacekeeping operations 
and observer missions around the world. The global organisation has had 
few, if any, successes in peacekeeping so far. This does not, however, rule 
out the possibility that a revitalised UN will succeed in conducting peace-
keeping and preventive deployment in the future. The fact that UN is already 
in place in two CIS areas of conflict could technically serve as a convenient 
starting point for a UN-led peacekeeping operation on the territory of the 
former Soviet Union.  
NATO seems to be the world’s most competent military organisation. 
The alliance is capable of conducting the whole spectrum of peace opera-
tions, defined in the in NATO terminology as Peace Support Operations 
(PSOs). Partnership for Peace (PfP) is an excellent instrument in training and 
preparing Russian, CIS and Western forces for operating together in CPOs. 
PfP creates interoperability and it is therefore important that Russia is kept 
within the PfP framework. Increased interoperability through PfP improves 
military capability of each participating state, and indirectly of the UN and 
the OSCE, as the very same states are represented in those two organisations 
and may take part in operations launched under the auspices of either of 
these international bodies. The OSCE is at present a political organisation 
with minimal military capabilities. The Istanbul summit has through its 
European Security Charter laid the foundations for OSCE peacekeeping. The 
OSCE presence in several CIS conflict areas could be developed into peace-
keeping operations. 
The rapid development of a European Security and Defence Policy -
(ESDP) within the EU seems to be the most dynamic of the processes form-
ing the new European security architecture. It can make EU peacekeeping 
possible, and in a longer perspective the EU may even be capable of launch-
ing peace enforcement operations. 
The CIS, with assumed Russian domination, is to some extent militarily 
capable of conducting all types of peace operations within the CIS area. 
With a balanced mix of CIS and Western states it should be militarily pos-
sible to conduct peacekeeping operations. The organisation could have some 
minor potential if extended with non-CIS states under the CIS umbrella, but 
this is not likely for political reasons. 
The concept of peace operations led by a single state will be discussed 
later, but Russia and Australia (in East Timor) are already today conducting 
such operations. Russia-led operations will be discussed in a separate chap-
ter. 
There are many options linked to the organisations and single state con-
cept. The Security Council can request a regional organisation or a single 
state to conduct an operation on behalf of the UN. The OSCE can, for in-
stance, request NATO, CIS, the EU or a single state to lead a peacekeeping 
operation. A single state can have a leading role, e.g. provide head-quarters 
and C2 infrastructure.  
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The evaluation of the capability to conduct CPOs is very simple from a 
strictly military point of view. NATO has no efficiency when it comes to 
military capability, the UN has a good conceptual basis, which so far has 
been used in a not so very successful way, the OSCE has not been tested and 
the EU’s capability is not yet in place. NATO supremacy is primarily based 
on Command and Control, intelligence and joint operational capability. 
Under the right political conditions, like in the case of IFOR/SFOR and 
KFOR, NATO is the best military instrument for peace operations. The poli-
tical freedom of action especially in the CIS area is, however, so far very 
limited. Since there is no doubt that NATO is the best military tool, this re-
port will discuss the question where, when, why and how this tool could be 
used with the consent of all interested parties.  
The main question to be addressed here is which organisation/state is the 
best choice for possible CPO in the CIS area. The West and especially the 
USA have so far shown little enthusiasm for the OSCE as more than a man-
date provider. Russia, on its side, is negative to NATO, and maintains that 
the OSCE should have a leading role in peacekeeping. It seems therefore that 
a more positive Western attitude to the OSCE is one of the preconditions for 
closer co-operation between the West and Russia in launching CPOs. The 
UN and the OSCE are the organisations where the West and Russia meet 
each other on equal terms and should as such have the best potential to 
launch CPOs. This does of course not exclude the possibility of assigning the 
task to other institutions.  
 
Russian Concepts and Doctrines Related to Peace Operations  
Overall attitude to the West after the fall of the Soviet Union 
In very broad terms the Russian attitude has gone through three phases after 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union: 
 
• The pro-Western period at the beginning of the 1990s 
• A more balanced and nationalistic approach with some anti-Western 
undertones from the middle of the 1990s 
• As a reaction to NATO enlargement and the NATO air campaign 
against Yugoslavia in 1999, a more anti-Western approach, espe-
cially to the USA and NATO. 
 
Initially Russia intended to follow up on Gorbachev’s partnership with the 
West by clearing away the military and political legacy of Stalinism and 
Brezhnevism. The new democratic Yeltsin regime intended to initiate a pol-
icy of unrestrained partnership and integration with the West. The policy 
was implemented as the new Kremlin rulers saw the Western states as their 
chief ideological and political allies, the main source of economic aid and a 
model for domestic development. The development of closer ties with the 
former Soviet republics grouped in the newly formed CIS was defined as a 
second main task. President Yeltsin had the idea that the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and the annihilation of communism opened wide vistas for 
friendship and fruitful co-operation among new neighbours. Moscow dis-
played a will to confess and correct the historical misdeeds of the USSR. 
This development met a turning point in the middle of the 1990s. Internally, 
the failure of shock therapy led to a weakening of the democrats and 
strengthening of the communists and nationalists. The pressure for a change 
of course came in addition to the opposition from insiders in the Kremlin.  
When it comes to external relations, Russia had become disappointed 
with the behaviour of the West. The perception in Moscow was that the 
West had failed to become a reliable ideological and political ally, the aid 
was limited and the Western models seemed not to work in Russia. The con-
nections to the former Soviet republics were also troubled. Controversies 
developed over the Russian diaspora, property division, arbitrary borders and 
so on. Due to the Russian retreat from Eastern Europe and other parts of the 
world, there were clear economic, geopolitical, cultural and prestige losses. 
Russian foreign policy became a target for criticism and a national debate 
started on new priorities in foreign and security policy. Four main groupings 
were visible: Westernisers, who continued to defend the basic ideas of the 
initial strategy. At the opposite end of the political spectrum were those who 
claimed that the West was a perpetual enemy of Russia and proposed to 
counter the supposed Western threat by creating new alliances, primarily 
with the CIS states, Iran or China. A third faction saw enemies of Russia 
throughout the world. Finally, a camp uniting many democrats and centrists 
proposed a more balanced world strategy, open and co-operative, but with-
out being overly pro-Western.  
This debate inevitably led to a gradual modification of the Russian pol-
icy. More emphasis was put on security, armed forces, foreign intelligence 
Jørn Buø 
nupi april 01 
42 
and foreign strategic partnerships in different regions. Nationalism found an 
expression in the protection of the Russian diaspora, glorification of the Rus-
sian imperial past and reducing the policy of penitence for the misdeeds of 
the communist regime. Super-power ambitions could be observed in grow-
ing claims to play the pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, to 
enter the exclusive club of G7 and to show the Russian flag on all continents. 
Democratic ideas did not influence the Kremlin’s relations with other states, 
while economic interests encouraged Moscow to restore co-operation with 
third world states. From the mid-1990s to the start of the Kosovo campaign, 
Russian policy was less pro-Western and more balanced in relations with 
other global centres of power, more security-minded, more focused on 
potential economic gains and more pragmatic. The near abroad dominated 
the diplomatic agenda, but with little progress in integration matters.  
In 1999 a clear, but possibly temporarily, setback occurred in the Rus-
sian-Western relations, especially relations with the USA and NATO. This is 
thoroughly described in other parts of the report, but in the beginning of 
2000, then acting President Putin and the visit to Moscow of the NATO 
Secretary-General Lord Robertson in February 2000 sent out some positive 
signals. In his interview with BBC Putin hinted that Russia could even con-
sider becoming member of NATO, while Robertson’s visit to Moscow paved 
the way for the resumption of the work of the Joint Permanent Council. The 
following words of the Hungarian ambassador to Norway, Gábor Iklódy, on 
24 January 2000, reflect to a very large extent the realistic perception of the 
need for finding a modus vivendi for Russia’s relations with the West: 
Whatever strange feelings one may have reading Russia’s leaked draft 
military doctrine or seeing the way the new Duma was recently elected, co-
operation with the West has no alternative for Russia. I think that as ration-
alism and pragmatism prevail in Russia this will be more and more realised. 
The CIS area is defined as the Russian near abroad, and is in the brand 
new security doctrine defined as a ‘vital strategic direction’. Right from the 
birth of the new Russia, friendly ties with the newly independent former 
Soviet republics have been a key component of foreign policy. Initially, the 
dissolution of the Union was important to unseat Gorbachev and to avoid 
violent disintegration such as in Yugoslavia. It was also anticipated that it 
was important to give freedom to other people in order to make Russia a 
normal, democratic state. Last, but not least the fact that the Union republics 
had become an economic burden also played a key role.  
The Kremlin’s goal was to develop mutually profitable co-operation, with 
Russia as the natural leader among equals. Initial frictions were anticipated 
as directed against the old regime and temporary in nature. In 1992 the then 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev argued that unity of the CIS peoples was under 
way and agreements regarding defence and military co-operation together 
with a framework for social and economic interaction were to be signed. The 
CIS was one of the main priorities, but the developments however took 
another direction. Some of Russia’s new neighbours displayed open aversion 
for Russia and the Russians. Ethnic Russians were in some cases denied 
basic rights. The Russian minority in the near abroad is a serious challenge 
for all parties involved. This issue, combined with other controversies, like 
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property, borders, historical issues and so forth, has created more friction 
than integration.  
The newly independent states feel that they have to balance co-operation 
against newly won independence. Their leaders have a tendency to blame 
(right or wrong) Russia for their difficulties, and seek protection elsewhere, 
for instance in the West. Reciprocal moves by the ‘would be protectors’ of 
the newly independent states make Moscow even more nervous. The assess-
ment is that Russia will be pushed out of its traditional sphere of influence, 
isolated and thus suffer politically, economically and strategically. There is a 
growing apprehension that the West, if not contained, may come to dominate 
Russia economically, may exclude it from Europe and deny it access to 
Eastern Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union, in other words, 
that it could lead to a new encirclement of the Russian motherland. It is 
widely anticipated in Russia that while Russia step by step tries to get closer 
to the former Union republics, the West encourages them to strengthen their 
independence and search for partners outside the CIS. ‘The aim of the West 
is to cut Russia off from the CIS countries, to restrict its field of activity and 
to make it passive and weak on the international arena’ (Bazhanov 1996:30).  
On the other hand, Russia has undoubtedly reasons for concern related to 
several conflicts in the near abroad. These conflicts are discussed separately. 
Russia’s ambition seems to be a collective CIS security system with definite 
military aspects, such as an integrated air defence. 
National security concept 
Former President Yeltsin endorsed the National Security Concept (NSC) of 
the Russian Federation on 17 December 1997. The Concept is a political 
document that formulates state policy guidelines and principles, constituting 
a foundation for the elaboration of concrete programmes and organisational 
documents on the Russian Federation’s national security. The NSC is sup-
posed to reflect a combination of officially accepted views as regards spe-
cific goals and state strategy aimed at ensuring security against any kind of 
internal or external threat. 
The NSC maintains that there is a tendency towards the development of a 
more multipolar world, and that military factors and power still retain their 
importance inside the overall system of international relations. It also states 
that the various preconditions for the demilitarisation of international rela-
tions have been created, making it possible to strengthen the role of law dur-
ing the settlement of contentious inter-state problems. According to the NSC 
the danger of direct aggression against the Russian Federation has dimin-
ished. Taking this as its starting point, the Concept describes prospects of 
more international integration and co-operation in general and in the CIS 
area explicitly. 
Current and potential hotbeds of local wars and armed conflicts near the 
Russian state border are judged as the most obvious military threat to Russia. 
When it comes to the role of global and regional organisations, it is 
stressed that Russia views NATO’s projected eastward expansion as an -
unacceptable threat to the national security. The eastward expansion could 
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among other things motivate a continental split. There is a clear ambition of 
shaping a collective security system within the framework of the CIS. 
The Concept openly admits that the armed forces and other armed units 
of the Russian Federation have acute social problems, a low level of training 
and lack up-to-date and advanced weapons systems and hardware. Thus in-
evitably the necessity of restructuring the military organisation is also men-
tioned. The importance of increasing the number of professionals in all 
armed formations is stressed explicitly.  
The main task of the armed forces is considered to be to ensure nuclear 
deterrence in order to prevent both a nuclear and a conventional large-scale 
or regional war, and to meet commitments to allies. 
It is important to notice that Russia, for geopolitical reasons, is interested 
in having a military presence in some strategically important regions of the 
world. The deployments should be based on contracts and principles of part-
nership and the purpose is to demonstrate preparedness to meet commit-
ments to allies, help establish a strategic military balance of forces in the 
regions and give the Russian Federation the possibility to respond to critical 
situations as they arise. 
In the Kosovo crisis it became evident that Russia in defending Belgrade 
generally emphasised the primacy of the concept of national sovereignty 
over human rights. It also repeatedly disputed the efficacy of the threatened 
or actual use of military force to bring peace to the Balkans. The Russians 
were in favour of diplomatic means, and they also took part in diplomatic 
efforts to bring peace through Viktor Chernomyrdin’s contribution in the 
final phase of the conflict. By the end of 1999 the Russian government and 
military leaders moved to finish work on several key national security docu-
ments. The two most important are a new version of the military doctrine 
and a new National Security Concept. The Security Council of the Russian 
Federation approved a draft Concept of National Security on 5 October , and 
the document was signed into force by the then acting President Putin on 10 
January 2000. The revised national security encompasses a wide range of 
foreign and domestic policy issues deemed to be of fundamental importance 
to Russian security.  
By the turn of the millennium Russia’s new National Security Concept 
presented the following international threats that are directly connected to 
the West and possible CPOs in the CIS more explicitly: 
 
• The desire of some states and international associations to diminish 
the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, 
above all the UN and the OSCE 
• The danger of a weakening of Russia’s political economic and mili-
tary influence in the world 
• The strengthening of geopolitical blocs and alliances, above all 
NATO’s eastward expansion 
• The possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military 
presence in the immediate proximity of Russian borders 
• The weakening of integration processes in the CIS 
• The outbreak and escalation of conflict near the state borders of the 
Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS member states. 
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Russian officials point directly to NATO’s air campaign in Yugoslavia as the 
key external incentive for rethinking Russian security needs.  
 
The NATO action in Yugoslavia was officially characterised by Russia’s Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs as an aggression against a sovereign state. Some resear-
chers in this context speak even of NATO international terrorism (Krivokhizha 
and Barabanov 1999: 27). 
 
The Russian national security concept and the military doctrine are related 
documents, and are therefore being shaped by the same perceived threats and 
goals. They interpret the promotion of ‘multipolarity’ (the creation of regio-
nal power groupings) as the key goal of Russian diplomatic and military 
policy. US efforts to dominate the world, which presumably includes its 
leadership of the NATO military alliance, are said to be aimed at constrain-
ing Russia’s actions on the world stage and preventing Moscow ‘from estab-
lishing its status as one of the influential centres of the multipolar world’. 
The perceived internal threats to Russia’s security are interpreted in terms 
that have also become widely used in Russia’s diplomatic response to events 
in the Caucasus. They focus on the fight against terrorism and what Moscow 
deems to be various forms of separatism and extremism. Internal and exter-
nal threats to Russia’s security are seen to intersect on the issue of foreign 
support for groups identified as terrorist or separatist by Moscow. That point, 
obviously, reflects recent Russian charges that Chechen rebels are being sup-
ported by fundamentalist Islamic groups abroad. 
Russian political leaders have made it clear that defence spending in Rus-
sia is set to rise. What is unclear is how these documents, meant to serve as 
guidelines for defence policy, will help the Russian government prioritise its 
security-related spending.  
The way Russia handles its conflict with the separatists in the Caucasus 
also seems to confirm Moscow’s priorities. Russian government and military 
officials have expressed fear that NATO might use such a development as a 
pretext to launch an attack on Russia itself – under the guise of a humanitar-
ian mission. NATO reacted to those claims by labelling them as ‘wild imagi-
nations’, but this Russian approach shows quite clearly that Russia and also 
probably the CIS seem to be out of bounds for NATO.  
Specific peace operations issues 
The Concept states very clearly that Russia and other states share common 
interests in a wide area of international security issues: 
 
• Efforts to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) 
• The settlement and prevention of regional conflicts 
• A crack-down on international terrorism and drug trafficking 
• Solutions to pressing global environmental problems. 
 
Such a statement from official Russia indicates quite clearly that there in 
principle is a potential for participating in international peace operations. 
The need for a mandate from UN at the global level and the OSCE and the 
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CIS at the regional level, is mentioned explicitly in the document. On the 
other hand, the Concept emphasises that those mechanisms are not yet effec-
tive enough and the mechanisms for the collective management of global 
and economic processes, primarily through the UN Security Council, should 
be strengthened. It is maintained as necessary to make utmost use of the col-
lective capabilities of the CIS and the UN and in the future of the OSCE. 
Military doctrine 
The basic principles for the first Russian Federation Military Doctrine were 
discussed in the sessions of the Russian Federation Security Council on 3 
March and 6 October 1993. The document was accepted by the same Coun-
cil on 2 November 1993 and was implemented by presidential decree on the 
same day. The doctrine consists of an introduction and three parts: political, 
military and military technological including economical principles. 
Internal armed conflicts are presented as a serious threat to vital interest 
of the Russian Federation and can according to the doctrine be exploited by 
foreign states to intervene in Russian Federation internal affairs. 
The new draft of Russian military doctrine from late October 1999 also 
points to a wide number of specific threats. They include everything from 
local and regional conflicts to the possibility of a large-scale attack, pre-
sumably from the West. The draft also mentions as threats the escalation of 
regional arms races, the aggravation of informational warfare and the alleged 
weakening of international organisations such as the UN and the OSCE. 
Commentaries on the draft military doctrine seem to suggest that all of these 
threats are thought to be increasing. 
In addition, the draft military doctrine, in combination with recent state-
ments made by a number of senior government and defence officials, sug-
gests that the government hopes to optimise defence spending and improve 
general military capabilities by streamlining command and procurement 
within the defence and security establishments. The draft doctrine says that 
Russia will still need conscription but aims at shifting the balance towards a 
more professional army. 
The draft of Russia’s new military doctrine states that nuclear arms are an 
‘effective factor of deterrence, guaranteeing the military security of the Rus-
sian Federation and its allies, supporting international stability and peace’. 
The draft notes that ‘the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear 
weapons in response to the use of nuclear or other mass destruction weapons 
against it or its allies’. Furthermore it can use these weapons ‘in response to 
large-scale aggression involving conventional arms in situations critical for 
the national security of Russia and its allies’. Among the key security threats 
listed in the document is the ‘expansion of military alliances to the detriment 
of Russian military security’.  
Defence experts has signalled that the main surprise of the new doctrine 
was its strikingly anti-Western tone. The new doctrine describes two oppos-
ing trends – unipolar, meaning US superpower domination, and multipolar, 
implying numerous centres of influence, including Russia. The Russian 
leadership considers that social progress, stability and international security 
can only be guaranteed in the framework of a multipolar world. The unipolar 
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world is aimed at constraining Russia’s actions on the world stage and pre-
venting Moscow from establishing itself as one of the centres of influence.  
The United States and its NATO allies are not explicitly mentioned but 
the meaning is clear. The doctrine lists among the country’s main external 
threats attempt to marginalise Moscow in world affairs and the stationing of 
troops near Russia. 
Comments 
The change in attitude to the West could be caused by Russia’s anger at 
NATO’s enlargement to include East European states as members. NATO’s 
bombing of Yugoslavia and Western doubts about the country’s economic 
reforms could also have played a role. The draft doctrine indicates wide-
spread anti-Western opinions inside Russia’s military elite. 
The first strike strategy points above all to the weakness of Russian con-
ventional forces and the passage on ‘situation critical for national security’ 
leaves room for interpretation. The focus on both internal and external 
threats could be seen as possible justification of an increase in defence 
spending during an economic crisis. It no longer seems taboo to be anti-
Western. In 1993 it was old-fashioned to write that the enemy is the West. 
Now it seems to be written between the lines.  
Another, unnamed factor in the shaping of Russia’s new military doctrine 
is the presidential election and the extreme politicisation of key defence 
issues. It is unclear whether the new doctrine is a manifestation of campaign 
rhetoric.  
Specific items related to peace operations 
The 1993 doctrine states that in maintaining international peace and security, 
the prevention of war and armed conflicts, the Russian Federation considers 
all states partners as long as their policy does not threat Russian interests or 
is non-compliant with the UN Charter. Russia is willing to co-operate with 
other states in solving security-related problems in the following way: 
 
• With the member states of the CIS to solve problems connected to 
collective defence and security including co-ordination of military 
policy and restructuring of defence forces. This field of co-operation 
is prioritised 
• At the regional level with the members of the OSCE and other states 
and military structures in adjacent regions with existing and devel-
oping systems for collective security 
• Globally with all members of the UN, primarily within the frame-
work of the UN Security Council and according to the principles and 
standards of international law. 
 
The law of the Russian Federation, along with international obligations and 
treaties, including the CIS, should define the characteristics, conditions and 
appearance of Russian Federation participation in peace operations executed 
by the UN and other international organisations. When participating in peace 
operations, mandated by the UN Security Council or resulting from Russia’s 
international obligations, armed forces can be assigned the following tasks:  
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• The separation of the parties’ armed formations 
• To ensure the provision of humanitarian aid to civilians and their 
evacuation out of the conflict zone 
• Blocking of the conflict area in order to ensure enforcement of sanc-
tions determined by the world community. 
 
The 1999 draft doctrine does not exclude CPOs even though the document is 
more anti-Western in tone. The Russians state very clearly that the UN, the 
OSCE and the CIS are the acceptable organisations related to peace opera-
tions. 
Main lines in foreign policy  
In an article in International Affairs (No.1 1999) Russian Minister of For-
eign Affairs Igor Ivanov highlights some Russian viewpoints that could have 
influence on CPOs:  
All attempts to make NATO the centre of a collective security system in 
Europe are counterproductive. This continent will face another rupture if 
NATO goes on with its expansion. 
The Charter of European Security now being elaborated by the OSCE 
will be the linchpin of a stable and balanced European security structure.  
The founding act between Russia and NATO describe the obligations 
shouldered by NATO and Russia as unprecedented ones. The dialogue 
within the Joint NATO-Russia Council should contribute to elaborating the 
standards of non-menacing behaviour. The Russian-NATO relationships 
may become an important component of the all-European security model. 
Neither the role of the UN nor the OSCE in peacekeeping should be 
doubted. This conviction is supported by the UN’s half a century experience 
in peacekeeping and the OSCE universal and all embracing competence. I 
proceeded from this consideration when I suggested in the OSCE a kind of 
code of All-European peacekeeping intended as a guide to action for indi-
vidual states and their group of alliances. 
The Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership and the NATO-Russia Perma-
nent Joint Council can significantly complement the above effort: relevant 
groups set up within the Council should contribute to creating a joint peace-
keeping potential and elaborating agreements on genuinely equal partner-
ship. These efforts should be co-ordinated with the UN, the OSCE and other 
authoritative international organisations’ peacekeeping efforts. 
The Russian-EU relationship is based on shared values and interests and 
the Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation. I proceed from the 
assumption that the European Union’s concentrated foreign policy and se-
curity measures will stimulate rather than slow down our co-operation. I am 
closely following the initiative of creating an EU defence potential, which is 
gaining momentum and proceed from an assumption that it will be com-
patible with the current elaborated model of an all-European security. There 
is no need to conceal the fact that I expect real support from European part-
ners. It is signally important that the EU lifted trade and investment barriers 
and promoted co-operation in industry, banking and other business spheres. 
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I expect the EU to positively contribute to making decisions related to Russia 
in other international financial organisations. 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov alos spoke on international military inter-
ventions during his 21 September 1999 address to the UN General Assem-
bly. He pointed to separatist movements in countries around the world as one 
of the gravest threats to international stability. The Russian foreign minister 
linked this ‘aggressive separatism’ to what he called the ‘monster of terror-
ism’. Ivanov urged the UN to take decisive action against ‘any manifesta-
tions of separatism’, and to consistently defend ‘the principles of sover-
eignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of national borders’. Moscow 
seems repeatedly to underline that sovereignty and territorial integrity are 
more important than human rights. That stance has been evident especially 
in Moscow’s defence of the Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade and in Russia’s 
sharp opposition to NATO’s effort to rectify the situation there through 
military intervention. Ivanov insisted on the importance of UN Security 
Council approval for all international peacekeeping efforts.  
Russia and the attitude to the West in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
The Caucasus and Central Asia are quite different in terms of their historical 
evolution, their cultural conditions and their ethnic and geographic struc-
tures. For almost 200 years they formed the southern periphery of the tsarist 
and Soviet empires. The region encompasses both successor states to the 
Soviet Union and newly created secessionist entities. This region has be-
come important mainly as a result of the discovery of further oil and natural 
gas deposits and of international controversies over the export channels for 
these strategic raw materials.  
Russian policy towards the South aims at coping with the loss of strategic 
influence in what used to be the southern perimeter of the Russian and 
Soviet empire and responding to growing international influences in the re-
gion. This perspective also has a bearing on Russia’s policy towards a broa-
der South and East (Turkey, Iran, China, former Soviet partners in the Third 
World, the Middle East).  
Increasing competition from the US in the Caspian region in recent years 
has lent weight to Russia’s call for a creation of multipolar world order. The 
United States’ ‘Caspian policy’ is based on the idea that this area is not de-
pendent on any regional hegemonic power, promoting a sort of ‘multipolar 
approach’ to international relations in the region. At the same time the US 
has itself become a weighty actor in the region.  
Russia sees that there is a geopolitical reorganisation going on in the 
southern periphery of its former empire, which poses a challenge to its tradi-
tional status in the Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand it sees for-
ces of disorder acting there which, it fears, could destabilise even Russian 
‘mainland’. The two main challenges in the South are the orientation of 
some of the CIS states towards more co-operation with Western partners, 
and what is perceived as attempts at ‘re-islamisation’ of this predominantly 
Muslim region. The region witnesses today these integration trends, for ex-
ample the development of a supra-regional communication system (new Silk 
Roads) but at the same time there are signs of disintegration due to ethnic 
Jørn Buø 
nupi april 01 
50 
particularism. There are three fields in which Russian politics inter-mesh on 
the southern flank: 
 
• The inner abroad (the Russian federation’s subjects in Northern 
Caucasus) 
• The near abroad (the states of the CIS) 
• The far abroad (the traditional powers with influence in the Caspian 
region such as Turkey and Iran and new influential powers like the 
US, the EU and Japan). 
 
The most complicated area is North Caucasus, the southern periphery of the 
Russian Federation. This area seemed to be drifting farther and farther away 
from Russian government control as ethno-territorial, socio-economic and 
cultural-religious issues have become entangled into a knot of problems 
which neither the federal authorities nor the local regimes are able to resolve. 
The current crisis in Chechnya underlines this trend, although it could also 
be seen as an attempt at restoration of the central power in that region. It is 
quite difficult to see a coherent, concerted and co-ordinated Russian policy 
in this area. It would mean going too far to discuss the rationale for this, but 
it is essential to indicate that there might be too many different Russian play-
ers in the field.  
The Caucasus has become a stage for the formation of partly contradic-
tory foreign and security policies. Besides different attitudes to Russia (at the 
one extreme Armenia with its close security ties with Russia, at the other 
Georgia and Azerbaijan with the opposite orientation), pro- and anti-Turkish 
and pro- and anti-Iranian orientations also clash in the Caucasus.  
With the EU and the US attempting to promote and defend their own 
interests in the Caucasus, it is quite understandable that Russia sees itself 
exposed in that region. Russian foreign, CIS, regional and nationality poli-
cies are particularly closely interwoven in this area. The ongoing conflicts 
inside and outside Russia, the fact that this area is densely populated and rich 
in natural resources makes it very important to Russia. Russia has lost its 
role as the ‘sole arbiter’ for the fates of the Caucasus and Central Asian 
countries, however, despite the significant spread of international influence 
and the diversification of the foreign policy of its former ‘brother republics’, 
it is still a relevant ‘arbiter’.  
In addition to the US and Russia, Turkey, China, and the EU have also 
developed an interest in this region and treat it as important for their foreign 
and security policy. The European approach to the region, with for instance a 
transport corridor project (TRACECA), to some extent shows a different 
emphasis than the American oil and pipeline policy, which seems to subordi-
nate economic and communications targets to strategic considerations. Euro-
pean silk road diplomacy with its call for greater integration will also prob-
ably clash with the manifold rivalries and conflicts of interests that have 
evolved in the Caspian region in the post-Soviet era. Since these also include 
controversial strategic relations with Russia, Europe may run into some diffi-
culties in its endeavours to pursue its interest in the Caspian region while 
avoiding any kind of confrontation with Russia. 
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When it comes to Turkey, it could also be mentioned that the Russian 
treatment of the Turkic minorities in the Caucasus as well as Russia’s heavy 
strategic (military and economic) presence in Central Asia may also result in 
clashes with the pan-Turkish ideology which, according to some researchers, 
seems to be gaining ground in the region at the end of the 20th century. 
Conclusions 
The presence of military formations from the West on CIS territory is 
definitely a sensitive issue in Moscow. The Kremlin will regard most at-
tempts by any Western organisation to get involved as moves to weaken 
Russian influence. 
Much of the anti-Western rhetoric could be a part of pre-election man-
oeuvres. Since this report was finished in January 2000 it will stick to the 
following conclusion with regard to Russian concepts and doctrines: 
The Russian role in the Security Council, and its attitude to the USA and 
NATO, and focus on state sovereignty, all suggest that the principle of 
humanitarian intervention will not win easy approval in the UN Security 
Council. As the UN or OSCE mandate for CPOs seems to be a conditio sine 
qua non of launching such an operation, chances for this type of co-opera-
tion in the post-Kosovo world are relatively slim.  
The newly released draft for the Russian military doctrine shows that 
Russia is more reluctant in its relations with NATO and the USA. This is 
obviously does not create a better atmosphere for CPOs, at least in the short 
term. It is, however, important not to let the doctrine itself be a barrier, but 
seek practical solutions through real negotiations. I will discuss this further 
in the following chapters. The focus on threats in the new military doctrine 
could also be seen as a request for more funding for the defence sector, and 
in that way also indirectly improve the Russian peacekeeping capability. 
It will be extremely difficult to get Russian acceptance for foreign mili-
tary involvement within the Russian Federation. The Russian authorities will 
probably in most cases suspect that foreign states have ulterior motives. This 
makes any discussion of combined peace operations in for instance 
Chechnya a purely theoretical task and is the most important reason why I do 
not discuss this topic in this report. Similar arguments make any Western 
military presence on CIS territory a real challenge to Russian foreign and 
security policy in the region.  
The Russian focus on the creation of a multipolar security environment 
that could counterweight a unipolar world led by the USA and NATO indi-
cates clearly that the UN, the OSCE and to some extent the EU have the best 
potential for CPOs. If the West wants to participate in CPOs in the CIS, the 
chances for success seem to be slightly greater if efforts are channelled 
through the UN, the OSCE or even the EU and not through NATO, which 
has so far been the main Western peacekeeping tool.  
Frictions between the political and military establishment (as illustrated 
by Foreign Minister Ivanov’s ignorance of the capture of Pristina airport by 
Russian paratroopers) causes a great deal of uncertainty about the Russian 
attitude to CPOs. A case-by-case basis analysis is evidently behind any Rus-
sian decision on co-operation with the West, but one should understand that 
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even after signing an agreement at the political level there is still a risk of 
set-back to, confusion over and even cancellation of a possible CPO.  
Taking into consideration the conclusions presented in this chapter and 
the general Russian attitude, it seems that peacekeeping and second genera-
tion peacekeeping operations are the relevant options with respect to CPOs 
in the CIS area. Peace enforcement could under given conditions be appli-
cable only against a threat evaluated as common and very dangerous in both 
Western capitals and Moscow. 
 
Russian-Western Relations, Consequences for CPOs 
Overall Western attitude to C    POs 
A discussion of the Western attitude to Russia in general would require an 
entire report of its own. There are several reasons for this, a decisive one 
being that major Western powers (and small states as well) have their own 
policies towards Russia. In addition, organisations such as NATO and the 
EU constantly change their own ‘Russia policies’. Even though this report 
mainly focuses on Russia, a positive Western attitude is also a necessary 
condition to mount a CPO. Based on the experiences from the Balkans, it is 
pertinent to conclude that the leading NATO and EU countries have regar-
ded it as important to include Russian forces both in IFOR/SFOR and in 
KFOR.  
Furthermore it is possible to assess that the decision on inclusion of -
Russian troops in the peacekeeping forces was purely political. Russian par-
ticipation was considered important to ensure credibility of the force among 
the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs in general.  
A second aspect is the presumed positive effect achieved by giving Rus-
sia special status in the peacekeeping forces and thereby showing that the it 
was treated as a major European power.  
The possible third aspect would be the simple fact that Russia is a key 
player in any game to achieve peace in the Balkans. So far the West has 
shown little will to become involved in the ongoing CIS/Russian peace ope-
rations in the CIS. In spite of harsh criticism of the second Chechen war, it 
so far has had little practical impact on the relationship and it seems that 
much of the rhetoric in the West as well as in Russia is aimed at the domes-
tic audience. The reality so far is that Russia accepted Kosovo and the West 
accepts to a certain extent the legitimacy of Russian goals, thought not meth-
ods, in Chechnya. The West is interested in peaceful, stable and democratic 
development in the CIS countries, but it also has its own economic interests 
in the region, not least in the energy and energy distribution sector. In gen-
eral, the USA and major European powers will look positively on several 
CIS countries’ (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Uzbekistan 
[GUUAM]) general orientation towards closer co-operation with the West. It 
is apparent, however, that the West will not press Russia to self-imposed iso-
lation in order to get access to peace operations on CIS territory. The course 
of action will be to try to convince Russia in the UN, the OSCE, the G8, the 
Council of Europe and bilaterally, that CPOs would be beneficial for the 
region as a whole.  
The current trends in Russia 
‘The implication of NATO victory in Kosovo will be that Russian paranoia 
will wonder where NATO will turn next, and rearmament may follow, which 
is not in Western interest’ (Dick 1999:1). The overall political climate 
between Russia and the West, and the USA in particular, has implications in 
several areas of security. One of the most decisive is the issue of arms con-
trol. Due to the little direct relevance and the complexity of the subject it will 
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not be discussed in this report. Arms control will nevertheless always be a 
subject of discussion in interaction between Russia and other states and orga-
nisations. Although there is not a direct link between CPOs and arms control 
they will probably influence each other. Progress in arms control negotiati-
ons can help create conditions for CPO and vice versa. 
The practical co-operation between Russian and Western forces in Bosnia 
and Kosovo has been both fruitful and militarily successful. On the capital 
level it seems, however, that the optimistic approach towards co-operation 
characteristic of the beginning of the last decade, has given way to more 
Cold War-like thinking, especially in Moscow. Typical of this are statements 
made by the leading Russian military commanders in November 1999: 
Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev explained that the West is out to drive 
Russia from the Caucasus, the Caspian, Central Asia. General Anatoliy 
Kvashnin, chief of the general staff and Russia’s most visible uniformed sol-
dier, says Western action in Iraq is ‘a prelude’ and Western presence in the 
Balkans ‘a bridgehead-steps preparatory to a move against Russia’s under-
belly. According to the five and four-star generals, by standing against the 
black devils in Chechnya, the army stands as it has stood for fifty years, 
against NATO and the Americans (Jamestown, 22 November 1999). 
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Main Directorate for Inter-
national Military Co-operation of the Russian Ministry of Defence often 
seems to focus on and stress all the negative aspects related to the Russian-
Western relationship and KFOR topics in particular. A first impression is 
inevitably that the general with his vital position in the Russian-Western 
relationship related to peace operations seems to be a product of the former 
epoch and continues the confrontation line.  
This can be, on the one hand, a Russian way of playing cards in various 
negotiations with the West. This impression is strengthened by the fact that 
Defence Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev seems very constructive in the final 
rounds, like, for instance, during the Helsinki meeting on KFOR. To under-
line this even more, on 15 September 1999, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
rejected the idea that Russian troops could leave KFOR. On the contrary, he 
reiterated his support for the operation and dismissed earlier warnings by a 
senior Russian Defence Ministry official that Russia would pull out of 
KFOR. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that ‘despite 
the extremely difficult nature of regulating the situation it is possible to 
move ahead with a political solution’. Ivanov said that the UN could count 
on ‘full co-operation with Russia.’ Ivanov stressed that only the president, 
the prime minister, and the foreign minister can make foreign policy state-
ments. This could indicate that some Russian military leaders act independ-
ently of the official Russia. Thus, one of the most obvious examples of the 
lack of co-ordination between various Russian policy-making centres was 
the situation around the Russian capture of the airport in Pristina.  
From a Western point of view such confusion related to who is actually 
in charge makes co-operation with Russia in peace operations complicated 
and unpredictable. On the other hand, there are also some negative signals 
sent by politicians as well.  
When talking about the Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas agreements signed at 
the November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, and about friendly relations 
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between the West and former Soviet states along Russia’s southern border, 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov charged that the West was trying to push -
Russia out of the Caucasus and Caspian Sea region (Reuters, 30 December 
1999). He said the following: ‘An evident battle for spheres of influence is 
under way in this area, in which individual states located thousands of kilo-
metres from these strategically important regions have declared them to be 
zones of vital interest.’ He warned that Moscow would resist the Western 
efforts ‘to supplant Russia and other states, particularly Iran, in these regi-
ons’ and linked Western reactions to the war in Chechnya to ‘attempts to 
limit Russia’s capabilities in the Caucasus’. 
Especially after what is considered as NATO aggression against Yugo-
slavia, Russia is worried about among other things the GUUAM states’ 
ambition of replacing the present Russian peacekeeping model with a -
NATO-orientated one. In Moscow’s opinion Washington is actively support-
ing a system of sub-regional security outside the CIS. Moscow anticipates 
that the West wants to limit the role of Russia in the region by supporting 
groups without Russian participation, like for instance GUUAM. In the Rus-
sian view such groups could develop into regional security and peacekeeping 
groups of their own. The Russians maintain, however, that they welcome all 
peacekeeping initiatives from countries outside the region, including the US. 
The condition is that they take into account Russia’s traditional interests and 
do not try to push Russia out of the region.  
Russia strongly supports and promotes the idea of a multipolar world as a 
counterweight to dominance by the USA and NATO. This is also reflected in 
the Russian view on European security: Russia wants an all-European secu-
rity and co-operation arrangement including all European countries. From 
the Russian point of view, the OSCE is the true and real flagship of such a 
principle of collective security for all. Their ambition seems to be to streng-
then the OSCE as a security policy frame for Europe as a whole. The main 
idea in Moscow is to secure the country’s interest in a regional as well as a 
global perspective. From the Atlantic NATO powers (UK and US) perspec-
tive, however, NATO remains the top priority so far. This is among other 
things presumably caused by fear of extended Russian influence. Germany 
and France, on the other hand, are apparently interested in developing the 
OSCE. They want Russian participation but their main focus is to get the 
European Union in a lead role. 
There are probably many economic as well as political limits to Western -
engagement within the CIS. Russia has, for instance, allowed Western par-
ticipation in the mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and in observ-
ing the developments related to the conflicts in Georgia. Former Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev claimed that the Americans realised 
that conflicts in this part of the world cannot be solved without Russia and 
that Russia has to act as the locomotive (Knoph  et al. 1999: 120). Political 
and military co-operation between the West and Russia is necessary to pre-
vent and solve many ongoing and potential conflicts in the CIS. 
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NATO 
Russia sees NATO more or less as a remnant from the Cold War period. 
Even though there are different arrangements between the Western alliance 
and Russia (NACC, PfP, the Founding Act, the PJC etc.), Russia does not 
feel that NATO treats it as an equal partner. Combined with the ongoing 
plans for further NATO enlargement eastwards and NATO’s air campaign in 
Kosovo, this is definitely provoking Russia. The view in Moscow seems to 
be that this is a strategy to increase NATO and US influence and power in 
the near abroad. As already mentioned, the negative Russian attitude to 
NATO has been severely strengthened as a result of the air campaign against 
Yugoslavia. This does not leave much room for optimism related to further 
co-operation in the field of common peace operations as long as the US 
claims that NATO and not the OSCE should be the mainframe for all-Euro-
pean security. For several reasons it seems obvious that Russia will not be-
come a NATO member in the foreseeable future. 
Only recently Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Colonel Gen-
eral Valeriy Manilov, argued that relations between Russia and NATO must 
be ‘mutually binding’ so that Russia is able to influence decision-making 
related to European security (Radio Free Europe, 28 September 1999). He 
noted that this was a condition for Moscow to restore relations with the 
Atlantic alliance. Then he added that the proposal was aimed at preventing 
the recurrence of such ‘unprovoked aggression’ as that against Yugoslavia. 
He also made it clear that if NATO does not accept this proposal, Moscow 
would ‘evidently have to seek other ways of developing a comprehensive 
European security system together with other countries’. Relations between 
Moscow and NATO have been frozen since the bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia earlier this year. Lord Robertson’s visit to Moscow and Putin’s 
NATO approach can be a turning point. 
The question of further NATO enlargement will constantly have implica-
tions for the relations between Russia and the alliance. Moscow’s reaction to 
new members, especially the Baltic states and other former parts of the 
Soviet Union, will definitely have negative impact on the possibility of 
launching a CPO in general and with NATO participation in particular. To 
put it shortly a new round of enlargement could deal a deathblow to a pos-
sible CPO.  
A positive element might be that the Russian experience from a CPO 
with NATO participation could in fact create a more positive attitude to 
NATO, making a new enlargement a less controversial step from the Rus-
sian perspective. Such an assumption seems, however, to be too positive as 
Moscow could look at this quite differently. NATO enlargement has claimed 
a political price many times higher than originally estimated. While NATO 
is eager to present the IFOR/SFOR/KFOR as a model for future co-operation 
in peace operations, in Moscow the prevalent perception is that of a mistake, 
or perhaps a self-made trap that should never be repeated. The Russian For-
eign Ministry attributes this mistake to the ‘go West’ course of 1992, main-
taining that in autumn 1995 the only alternative to joining forces with NATO 
was complete withdrawal from further political games. Russian engagement 
in the Balkan was caused mainly by a need for getting more financial aid 
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from the West and by a will to prevent NATO from playing too independ-
ently in the region. 
The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security signed 
between NATO and the Russian Federation  
The act was signed in Paris in June 1997. The Act defines the goals and 
mechanism of consultation, co-operation, joint decision-making and joint 
action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO 
and Russia. To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base 
their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:  
 
• The development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, 
enduring and equal partnership and of co-operation to strengthen se-
curity and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area 
• The acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political plu-
ralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liber-
ties and the development of free market economies play in the deve-
lopment of common prosperity and comprehensive security 
• Refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well 
as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or poli-
tical independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nati-
ons Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations 
Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act  
• Respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all 
states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their 
own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples’ right of self-
determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other 
OSCE documents  
• Mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy 
and military doctrines 
• The prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful 
means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles  
• Support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried 
out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsi-
bility of the OSCE.  
 
Based on the development in Russian-Western relations after Kosovo and 
during the second Chechen war, the actual value and future of the co-opera-
tion within the framework of the Founding Act can be questioned. The 
NATO office in Moscow is not yet reopened and Russian contacts with 
NATO are limited to KFOR and SFOR matters, although there are some 
positive signs of reviving co-operation also in other fields. At present the 
Russians do not seem to put much weight in for co-operation. There are, on 
the other hand, still prospects of future positive development. At his 20 
October press conference in Moscow (Radio Free Europe, 22 October 1999), 
Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Colonel General Valeriy 
Manilov, commented that the potential for developing NATO- Russian rela-
tions is ‘fairly big’. NATO on the other hand, seems to be fairly realistic in 
its view on Peace Support Operations on the territory of the former Soviet 
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Union. Chris Donnelly, who is an adviser to NATO’s Secretary-General, 
told the Georgian parliament’s Defence and Security Committee on 13 Sep-
tember 1999 that NATO will not intervene in Abkhazia (Radio Free Europe, 
16 September 1999).  
NATO seems to be interested in rebuilding as good relations with Russia 
as possible at a time when discussion on enlargement and the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia have made these relations more complicated then ever 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is therefore fear that if NATO 
showed too great ambitions with regard to participation in peace operations 
in the CIS area, it might sour relations with Russia even further.  
The European Union 
‘There is a desire in the EU, at least on paper, to work together with Russia, 
to develop joint foreign policy initiatives in support of common foreign pol-
icy objectives. This could include peacekeeping missions together with Rus-
sia after the WEU is made a part of the Union. Russia is satisfied with the 
prospect of stronger co-operation with the EU in conflict prevention, crisis 
management, and conflict resolution within the UN and OSCE frameworks 
in the first place’ (Pozdniakov 1999: 98). 
Several indications point to the European Union and of course the OSCE 
as more suitable tools for promoting co-operation between the West and 
Russia in peace operations. Russia has claimed that it supports the EU’s east-
ward enlargement, and has even indicated a desire to become a full member 
of the EU. The European Council at its meeting in Cologne in June 1999 
discussed and presented its Strategy for Russia (official text at: 
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99). When it comes to peace 
operations the Council has emphasised that the European Union will further 
develop the co-operation with Russia in the new European security archi-
tecture in the OSCE. Furthermore it will consider how to make it easier for 
Russia to participate in EU-led Petersberg tasks operations, and increase co-
operation between the EU and Russia in order to contribute to conflict pre-
vention, crisis management and conflict handling. The European Council 
specifies that it intends to co-operate with Russia in order to develop a joint 
foreign policy with regard to third countries and regions, to prevent conflicts 
and manage crises, especially in areas adjacent to Russia, on the Balkans and 
in the Middle East. 
The 22 October 1999 meeting in Helsinki between the Russian delegation 
led by the then acting Prime Minister Putin and the official EU delegation 
was designed to discuss future relations between Russia and the EU. In re-
sponse to the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis Russia, endorsed in June, Putin pre-
sented Moscow’s blueprint for relations with the EU over the next decade. 
The document is quoted as proposing that the ‘partnership of the Russian 
Federation and the European Union could include the organisation of a pan-
European security system based on European forces, without isolating the 
USA and NATO, but without the monopoly of these on the continent’. Mos-
cow also stressed that it wants a bigger role in European affairs and better 
relations with the EU but will seek neither membership nor association with 
the Union. The Finnish Premier welcomed the Russian blueprint, saying the 
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EU considers it ‘a singularly important outcome in our evolving partnership 
with Russia’. 
The interests in close relations between Russia and the European Union is 
mutual. For Russia the EU is the most important partner involved in transfor-
mation, modernisation and trade. More than forty per cent of Russia’s for-
eign trade is with the EU, and after the EU’s future eastern expansion it will 
be more than 50 per cent. Two issues dominate the Russian perception of the 
EU. The first one is the growing economic weight of the EU symbolised by 
the introduction of the euro, the second is the development of a common 
security and defence policy (which would meet Moscow’s endeavour for 
multipolarity in international relations).  
The European interest in Russia is also obvious as the developments in 
Russia will strongly influence events on the European continent and the iso-
lation of the country is not possible. A stable Russia could become an active 
economic partner and constructive joint creator of international policy. A 
Russia which is inwardly disunited and in economic collapse could 
destabilise the whole region. Russia has probably realised that the EU will 
grow even more strongly into the role of an influential, political and creative 
power in areas like East Central Europe, the Baltic Sea area, the Mediterra-
nean and the Caspian region. 
The Union would like to create permanent mechanism for a political and 
security-orientated dialogue with Russia. It is also interested in including 
Russia in the EU/WEU missions within the framework of the Petersberg 
tasks, and in joint initiatives for conflict prevention and crisis management. 
For several relatively obvious (and some not so obvious) reasons EU mem-
bership is out of the question for Russia in the foreseeable future. The EU 
has, however, promised Russia a relationship which goes beyond an asso-
ciation but remains below the threshold of an option of membership and this 
would give Russia an additional motivation for adapting its economic system 
to EU standards and norms.  
Despite frictions, the fact that the leading EU states are also NATO mem-
bers and the recent quite tough arguing around the Chechnya conflict be-
tween Moscow and EU capitals, the overall climate between Russia and the 
Union may create conditions for future co-operation in peace operations. The 
EU focus on the Petersberg tasks opens interesting possibilities. 
CIS  
The Russian vision of collective security and increased integration in the CIS 
area was an optimistic dream that is probably not possible to implement. 
Apart from the newly signed Union Treaty with Belarus, good connections 
to some other states and positive statements after the CIS January 2000 
Moscow summit, there is a clear trend of eastward orientation among some 
states. As nominally independent states and members in different organisa-
tions, they will obviously seek for Western participation in conflict handling 
on their territory. This is often done with unrealistic expectations of NATO 
involvement and even membership. Such attempts or even thoughts probably 
strengthen Moscow’s suspicions. Russia can of course block participation in 
peacekeeping, especially by using its veto rights in the Security Council or 
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the OSCE. On the other hand, the constant efforts towards greater integration 
and acceptance undertaken by some of these more Western-oriented states 
may result in more Western involvement.  
 
Informal Alliances of States in the Caucasus-Caspian Region 
 
Principal state Secondary 
states 
States or entities 
close to principal 
Connection out-
side region 
Russia Armenia 
and Iran 
Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Turkmenistan 
Greece, Serbia, 
Cyprus, Syria, 
India, China 
United States Turkey and 
Azerbaijan 
Israel, Georgia, 
Kazakstan 
Western govern-
ments, NATO, 
Ukraine, Moldova, 
Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan 
 
The purpose of this table (Blandy 1999: 3) is to show that the CIS as such is 
far from being a united organisation. Some of the CIS states (mainly Georgia 
and Ukraine) have ‘Western ambitions’. Russia has strong concerns about 
the presence and influences of the United States, Turkey and Israel in the 
Trans-Caucasus and in particular the Georgian orientation towards NATO 
with membership as an ambition.  
In 1994 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan created the Central 
Asian Union which in 1998 was joined by Tajikistan. Security issues and 
peacekeeping have gradually advanced on its regional agenda. The most 
concrete arrangement is the forming of a joint peacekeeping 500-men-strong 
battalion in the UN framework. This force has participated in at least one 
PfP exercise. The current capability of this co-operation is estimated to be 
nothing more than a contribution from these three states in a CPO.  
In 1997 the to some extent Western-orientated states – Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova – formed the subregional association GUAM. 
When Uzbekistan joined in 1999 the association was expanded to GUUAM. 
In 1998 GUAM decided to establish a peacekeeping force. Ukraine has been 
willing to send peacekeepers to Transdniester and Abkhazia. Ukraine has 
furthermore been willing to form a joint unit with Georgia to defend the oil 
pipeline to Poti on the Black Sea coast. GUUAM has been strongly criticised 
by Russia because of declared co-operation with PfP and NATO. It is not 
likely that Moscow will approve GUUAM peacekeeping initiatives, since it 
has not even accepted any Ukrainian military peacekeepers in conflicts on 
CIS territory. 
The CIS as a subordinate element for CPO in its own area does not seem 
relevant for several reasons. The organisation has no Western representation 
and CPO has to be based on agreement reached in the Security Council or 
the OSCE. The CIS as such has no common military capability but has to 
rely solely on national resources, in practise Russia and to some extent 
Ukraine. The CIS is, however, relevant as an organisation for peace operati-
ons with forces from its own member states with a UN or OSCE mandate. 
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The CIS can therefore play a political role in CPOs. The main difference 
between NATO and the CIS is that NATO has a unique military capability 
for the whole spectrum of operations. It seems evident that there are several 
different preferences among the CIS members and that they could be willing 
to accept other organisations in order in order to avoid Russian hegemony.  
Yugoslavia  
The Hungarian Ambassador to Norway made the following assessment with 
respect to Russia’s role in the recent Balkan conflict (Iklódy 2000) 
Russia has been playing a kind of champagne diplomacy with a beer bud-
get for many years. Clearly with dramatically reduced resources and in the 
midst of an extremely deep internal crisis, Russia would have not been able 
to play a constructive role in Kosovo, even if it had wanted. Therefore the 
considerations they set for themselves was that of a superpower. First to pre-
serve as much as possible from the country’s superpower role in world poli-
tics, and second to counter NATO dominance in the region by weakening its 
internal cohesion, by preventing it from taking action in a vacuum that 
Russia’s inability to contribute substantially had created. Kosovo’s and 
Serbia’s fate could only have a secondary role to play in Russia’s thinking. 
In addition, Russia’s behaviour was also designed to serve the purpose of 
internal consumption. 
The general Russian perception of NATO as an aggressive organisation 
has probably been strengthened by events in Kosovo. General anti-Western 
perspectives have become more common, also officially. Furthermore, Rus-
sia works to use connections to the West through bilateral channels, the EU, 
the G-8, and simultaneously tries to sideline the Alliance. It has been Mos-
cow’s continued belief that NATO acted improperly in the Balkans during 
the Kosovo crisis. The Russian Defence Minister has criticised the ongoing 
NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, telling reporters that the opera-
tion there had ‘yet to yield real results’ (Jamestown, 14 September 1999). 
Moscow has joined Belgrade in criticising a UN- and NATO-brokered plan 
that called for the UCK to be transformed into a semi-civil ‘Kosovo Corps’ 
seen as an emergency force. Moscow has also criticised the proposal by the 
chief of the UN mission in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, to set up a customs 
service on Kosovo’s border with Macedonia. The previously mentioned 
Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, the chief of the Russian Defence Minis-
try’s Department for International Military Co-operation, said in Moscow on 
14 September 1999 that KFOR has failed to implement UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 September 1999). Ivashov warned 
that Russia would consider withdrawing its forces from Kosovo, arguing that 
‘80 per cent of Serbs living in Kosovo have become refugees.’ He also com-
plained that KFOR has not allowed Yugoslav security forces back into 
Kosovo, ‘As a result, the borders [of Kosovo] remain open and weapons and 
drugs keep arriving.’  
Russian participation seems bound to create disagreements and magnify 
initial problems created partly by NATO, partly by the Russians. Despite 
Russian hurt feelings, it seems that co-operation works on the ground level 
when there is an acute need for solving practical problems. Even though the 
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relationship is working well on the ground in KFOR, the friction at MOD 
level will in the long-term tear hard on the co-operation and to a lesser de-
gree serve as an incitement for co-operation in other operations. The West 
must act according to the intentions in UN Security Council resolutions in 
order to create confidence. 
Related to the conditions for future co-operation with the Russians in 
peace operations it is important that NATO takes the demilitarisation of the 
UCK seriously, and besides that uses all available means to fulfil UN Secu-
rity Council resolution 1244. This resolution requests the Secretary-General 
to appoint a Special Representative to control the implementation of the 
international civil presence and authorises member states and relevant inter-
national organisations to establish the international security presence in 
Kosovo. It outlines the responsibilities of both military and civilian bodies in 
Kosovo.  
On 30 November 1999, amidst mounting tensions between Russia and 
both Europe and the United States over Chechnya, Russian Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov accused Western governments of implicitly condoning a policy 
of ‘genocide’ against ethnic minorities in the independence-seeking Yugo-
slav province of Kosovo (Jamestown, 2 December 1999). Ivanov’s accusa-
tions with regard to the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo were probably an 
attempt to shift international attention away from the thousands of Chechen 
refugees and the situation in North Caucasus in general. Ivanov charged that 
more than two hundred thousand Serbs and other minorities have been 
driven from Kosovo since the NATO-led peacekeeping mission began oper-
ating there. Reports that the United States may be easing its opposition to 
independence for Kosovo appeared to be behind a warning that Russia could 
withdraw its military contingent from the peacekeeping contingent in 
Kosovo (Jamestown, 6 October 1999). The Russian diplomats warned that 
acquiescence by the West to Kosovo’s drive for independence could carry 
‘exceptionally difficult consequences for the region and Europe as a whole’. 
If Moscow is not able to reach a satisfactory understanding with the West on 
this issue, the sources said, ‘the Russian side will have no option but to cease 
taking part in the peacekeeping operation’. 
European governments, moreover, are also reported to be uncomfortable 
with what they perceive to be Washington’s new views on Kosovo. The 
commonality of Russian and European views on these issues could over time 
undermine the relative coherence which has up to now characterised the 
West’s approach to the Kosovo peace settlement. Such a development would 
further complicate the peacekeeping effort there, and might conceivably 
strengthen not only Russia’s diplomatic position vis-á-vis the Kosovo settle-
ment. On the other hand, it could create positive conditions for the future EU 
role in CPOs in closer co-operation with Russia. 
Chechnya 
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot on 2 October 1999 expressed 
understanding for Moscow’s crackdown on terrorists but called for ‘restraint 
and wisdom’ and advocated dialogue with ‘more pragmatic leaders’ in North 
Caucasus. Lord Russell Johnston, Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly 
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of the Council of Europe, released a statement on 1 October similarly ex-
pressing support for the Russian crackdown on terrorism and stressing the 
need to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms while doing so. Ger-
man Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer telephoned his Russian counterpart, 
Igor Ivanov, on 3 October 1999, and the two ministers agreed that ‘the con-
flict in the Caucasus can only be solved through political means’ (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 5 October 1999). 
Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev also lashed out at the West during his 
December 1999 visit to Yugoslavia for its failure to back Moscow’s cam-
paign against the Chechen rebels (Jamestown, 5 January 2000). Replying in 
particular to criticism of the Chechnya campaign voiced by US Defence Sec-
retary William Cohen on 22 December, Sergeyev said that what Moscow 
expected from NATO ‘was not the denunciation of the use of force, but 
effective measures to cut off channels through which terrorists and bandits 
get aid’. If Russia does not do battle against international terrorism on its 
own territory, he went on, then ‘similar problems will arise most acutely in 
Central Asia, Europe and other regions on a much greater scale because ter-
rorists will believe that the world community is unable to confront them’. 
Sergeyev was also quoted as saying that relations between Moscow and 
NATO had reached a new low because of Western criticism of Russia’s war 
in Chechnya.  
The ongoing Chechen war can have a great influence on the political will 
in the Western countries to co-operate with Russian forces even in peace-
keeping operations, but especially in peace enforcement operations. The 
level of criticism from Western capitals against the Chechnya campaign will 
be important. It is difficult to co-operate militarily with someone you just 
have accused of conducting a brutal and bloody war with indiscriminate use 
of force. A second important factor will be the Western evaluation of the 
Russian armed forces’ conduct in the North Caucasus based on how they 
actually behave. Massacres and manslaughter will definitely not have a 
positive impact on the prospects for launching a joint CPO. Thirdly, strong 
criticism from the West may strengthen the Russian negative attitude 
towards Western countries which could take part in CPOs.  
The OSCE summit held in November 1999 in Istanbul showed that the 
Russian delegation felt cornered by the harsh criticism of Russia’s conduct 
in Chechnya. The signing of the deal to build a pipeline from the Azeri capi-
tal Baku to Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan is viewed by some in 
Moscow as evidence of an anti-Russian agenda being encouraged by Wash-
ington. Most Western states would argue that Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
through which the pipeline will pass, have a right to break away from Rus-
sian domination if they so wish. Nevertheless, to conservatives in Moscow, 
this all looks like a deliberate attempt by NATO, and more generally the 
West, to undermine Russia’s influence in the Caucasus. The Western criti-
cism of Russia’s operation in Chechnya is also very often ‘read’ in these 
terms. The Russians feel that what they do in Chechnya is in interest of both 
Russia and the West. The rest of Europe should be grateful because Russia 
fights the Islamic ‘terrorism’ and Chechen ‘bandits’, who have kidnapped – 
and brutally killed – Westerners as well as Russians.  
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Talks between Russian and EU officials held in October 1999 in Helsinki 
focused on the situation in Chechnya. The Russian delegation ruled out any 
international mediation. ‘Mediation between the centre (Moscow) and re-
gions of the Russian Federation is something incomprehensible,’ Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gusarev stated in October 1999 (James-
town, 11 October 1999). The Chechen conflict is a domestic Russian affair 
and requires no outside involvement. The European leaders have been care-
ful not to push Russia too hard. In their public remarks, they reiterated that 
the EU regards Chechnya as an integral part of Russia and the conflict there 
as a Russian internal matter. They, nevertheless, also restated their concern 
over the situation in the North Caucasus and urged Moscow to seek oppor-
tunities for dialogue with moderate leaders in the region. The two sides 
apparently made some progress on an offer by the EU to render humanitar-
ian aid to the Caucasus. Few details of the proposal were available, but Rus-
sian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was reported to have given Moscow’s 
consent to the aid programme. He also emphasised, however, that the Krem-
lin’s willingness to accept aid should not be interpreted as a sign of any 
weakening in the federal authorities’ hard line against Chechen separatists.  
Moscow has come under criticism by Europe and the United States for its 
military operations in the Caucasus. Western leaders have expressed concern 
that the Russian actions could further destabilise the Caucasus region and 
that the costs of the war effort could undermine Russian budgetary discipline 
and, ultimately, economic reform as a whole. There have also been sugges-
tions that the West has softened its criticism of Moscow because of certain 
unpleasant parallels between Russia’s military operations in the Caucasus 
and those conducted by NATO during its air campaign against Yugoslavia.  
The second Chechen war may influence relations between Russia and the 
West in several ways. When it comes to the impact it could have on a pos-
sible CPO, the worst-case scenario is a disclosure of and/or development of 
brutality and non-compliance with international law and standards in Rus-
sian warfare. That could result in the lack of any support for this sort of ope-
ration in the West, as it would be difficult to defend the Western co-opera-
tion with units, which were recently involved in what was perceived in the 
West as a brutal and bloody imperial war. The ‘best-case scenario’ (at least 
with respect to CPOs) would be that the West got the impression that 
Moscow took their criticism of the Chechen campaign into consideration and 
sought political rather than military solutions. This would most likely result 
in a generally more positive attitude to co-operation, also in peace opera-
tions. The most probable development is, however, that the West will keep 
up its disapproval of Moscow’s conduct in Chechnya, which in turn will 
strengthen the negative Russian attitude to the participation of Western 
troops in peacekeeping on CIS territory. 
International Terrorism  
In the wake of the explosions that destroyed apartments in Moscow and 
other Russian cities US Defense Secretary Cohen and Russian Minister of 
Defence Sergeyev announced in Moscow on the 13 September 1999 that the 
two countries would work together to battle international terrorism. Cohen 
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suggested that the two countries would share information about terrorism, 
and that experts from the two countries would meet to discuss the issue 
(Jamestown, 14 September 1999).  
Interpreted in a positive way, this could be seen as the first small step in 
co-operation against a common threat also inside the Russian Federation. 
Utilised in a constructive way and with positive results, this could be a door 
opener and a platform for extended co-operation. At a large scale this could 
imply the use of military force and resources, also in a CPO context. Coun-
ter-terrorism is mostly a police matter. However, the use of special forces, 
gathering of intelligence and enforcement are also elements vital to the suc-
cess of any conceivable CPO. A common threat perception is probably the 
best way to build further co-operation, and the experience of a joint effort 
against terrorism could provide the basis for successful co-operation in 
peacekeeping.  
Other areas with possible implications for CPOs 
Recently Russia has become a full member of the G8 and the Council of 
Europe. Even though none of these organisations have a military capability, 
they can have an impact on the prospects for CPOs. It is important to notice 
that Moscow sees membership in both these organisations as very important 
and prestigious.  
During the Kosovo campaign when Russia cut contacts with NATO, the 
dialogue with the central alliance members (USA, UK, France, Germany and 
Italy) was conducted through the G8 framework. By actively playing on the 
fact that Russia has the status of an equal partner in G8, the West could use 
this forum to persuade Russia understanding that the Western participation 
in a CPO would be beneficial. This of course requires that the West see it as 
beneficial and necessary to be engaged in that area. 
Membership of the Council of Europe requires certain standards related 
to human rights and other values seen as fundamental in a modern society. 
The fact that the Kremlin seems to be proud of its membership can be used 
in negotiations on launching a CPO. 
Conclusions 
By the end of 1999 relation between Russia and the West is still at a relative 
low, but there are some signs that co-operation could gain new momentum 
after the presidential elections in Russia. This does not create ideal condi-
tions for CPO in general, and for CPOs in the CIS in particular. It is impor-
tant, however, to discuss the issue. The West probably has a positive 
approach to participation in peacekeeping operations together with Russia if 
co-operation in this respect promotes the peace process in the conflict. A 
Western approach to CPOs seems to be based on the idea that Russian 
acceptance for this involvement is needed. 
The Kosovo conflict has damaged NATO’s image in Russian eyes. A 
NATO-led CPO is therefore, mainly for political reasons, not likely at all in 
the CIS area. It is most probable that Russia would block NATO presence in 
peace operations on former Soviet Union territory in the UN Security Coun-
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cil. This does probably not totally exclude participation of single alliance 
and PfP states, or of some ‘EU troops’. It seems that a peacekeeping opera-
tion near the Russian borders could be launched only with a very strong UN 
or OSCE mandate and with support of the CIS or the EU. It seems very clear 
that in the foreseeable future neither Russia would accept nor NATO would 
consider any direct NATO involvement in peace operations on CIS territory. 
This does not exclude that individual NATO states could participate in diffe-
rent kinds of missions and operations under other umbrellas. Such a role for 
NATO is by no means acceptable to Moscow. Russia is incredibly suspi-
cious and reluctant to allow Western involvement, and seems to take it for 
granted that there always is a second and hidden agenda.  
The OSCE and the EU (besides the UN) are the only regional organisa-
tions besides the CIS that the Russians under certain circumstances could 
accept on CIS territory. Even though the OSCE is involved with different 
kind of civilian deployments in various CIS conflict areas, it is obvious that 
OSCE’s or EU’s involvement in peace operations would have to be dis-
cussed on a case-by-case basis.  
It seems evident that in order to gain Russia’s accept for Western peace-
keeping involvement on CIS territory, the West should go through the UN 
and the OSCE and accept Russia as an equal partner. As pointed out in this 
report, the rationale for this should not be to grant Russia a green card in this 
area, but the conviction that combined peace operations will have positive 
effects on the conflict and on the Russian-Western relations in general. One 
of the assets in these relations is the positive Russian attitude to the Euro-
pean Union and its work on the European pillar of security. Active work vis-
a-vis Russia could create conditions for the EU to conduct CPOs in the CIS 
area. Positive development and peaceful settling of conflict in the CIS area 
are definitely important for the overall security on the European continent. 
There are two decisive questions with respect to the participation of the 
West in peace operations in the Russian ‘near abroad’: 
 
• Russia must understand that Western participation can be beneficial 
to Russian security interest in some respects, and therefore accept 
participation 
• The West must be willing to participate and change the general atti-
tude of letting Russia be ‘in charge’ on former CIS territory. The 
West must have a ‘soft approach’ to the issue and not push for 
NATO, US or even Turkish participation in the main role. The 
OSCE, the EU and states that are acceptable to the Russians would 
probably be a much better solution. 
 
It is not clear who in Russia is responsible for the country’s foreign policy 
and this makes co-operation in peace operations complicated and unpredict-
able. Surprises like the capture of the Pristina airport are likely to happen in 
the future as well. Russia should make the process of making of its foreign 
policy decisions more clear.  
It is also important to identify what in this politics is pure rhetoric and 
what is realpolitik. Experience from IFOR/SFOR and KFOR shows a great 
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deal of pragmatism when the overall political will is there. This experience 
shows that Russia can be a constructive partner.  
The OSCE and to some extent the UN are already present in almost all 
conflict areas on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and this presence 
could be used in order give the OSCE more responsibility for management 
of peacekeeping operations in the CIS area. 
The presidential election in Russia is the first possible milestone in pre-
parations for a CPO on CIS territory. A stable situation in Russia, with focus 
on co-operation instead of isolation, and good personal relations to Western 
leaders could form a platform for co-operation. If the presidents of the USA 
and Russia agree on launching a CPO, other obstacles would probably dis-
appear.  
The general positive Russian attitude to the EU compared to the negative 
one to NATO could create a window of opportunity for the EU to take part 
in a CPO and to start a closer security co-operation with Russia as envisaged 
in its official document on relations with Russia adopted at the Cologne 
summit in June 1999. A stronger EU with more focus on common security 
and foreign policy could fit the Russian idea on building a multipolar world. 
The West should realise and acknowledge that Russian participation in 
CPOs in general is positive and that NATO is perhaps not the right answer to 
all challenges. In the foreseeable future Russia will need Western support in 
many fields. This creates conditions for co-operation also in other areas, 
such as peacekeeping, and can be discussed in various institutions such as 
the G-8 and the European Council. 

Russian Internal Operations 
The Chechnya war in 1994-96 and the Dagestan/Chechnya conflict in the 
second half of 1999 will receive limited coverage in this report. The world 
community considers the conflict in the Russian republics an internal Rus-
sian affair. This goes for the European Union (Radio Free Europe, 1 October 
1999) as well as the OSCE. In a meeting in Moscow on 7 September 1999 
between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov and the chair-
man of the OSCE, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut 
Vollebæk, Ivanov stated very clearly that Russia would handle this conflict 
internally. The OSCE Chairman also accepted this (Norwegian broadcasting 
7 September 1999). Chairman Knut Vollebæk stated the following in an 
interview, with the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, on 3 October 1999: 
 
The OSCE will offer Moscow its assistance to solve the conflict around 
Chechnya. The all-European security organisation, however, will not act without 
a Russian request. The OSCE condemns terrorism and acknowledges Russia’s 
territorial integrity. The advantages of the OSCE in this conflict are in our opi-
nion that the organisation can be utilised to create dialogue. However, I have to 
stress once more that it is up to the Russians to evaluate whether it could be use-
ful for them. 
 
On the other hand the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov said that he 
would welcome international peacekeepers on the territory of the Chechen 
republic (BBC News 3 October 1999). The OSCE’s stance – and the OSCE 
is the only organisation that could be considered acceptable by the Russians 
– makes any discussion of multinational peacekeeping based on a UN Secu-
rity Council resolution inside Russia a purely theoretical exercise.  
The internal Russian operations with the main aim of ensuring the secu-
rity and integrity of the Federation will therefore be discussed in the context 
of what influence these operations could have on Russian participation in 
peacekeeping operations outside Russia. 
Although the number of refugees from Chechnya surpassed 200 000 by 
the end of 1999, Russia was reluctant to let even humanitarian assistance 
into its territory. This attitude has much to do with Russian perception of 
sovereignty, and it clearly shows that a CPO on the territory of the Russian 
Federation is a ‘no go’. 
There are, however, some developments in the way the Russian army has 
fought the second Chechen war that can have a rather positive impact on 
future CPOs. The most important is that the Russian army has shown a cer-
tain degree of adaptability and ability to learn lessons from the past. Russian 
military commanders have drawn parallels between their air operations 
against Chechnya and NATO’s air campaign against Yugoslavia (BBC 
News, 30 September 1999).  
The Russians are maintaining that the use of air power and precision 
weaponry aims at reducing civil casualties. It could witness a new approach 
to the problem of both civil and military casualties, and in general shows that 
the Russian army can act in a more professional way than in the 1994-96 
campaign. This could create circumstances for a better co-operation in the 
future, also in CPOs. Moscow’s tactics suggests, however, that a successful 
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consolidation of its control over Chechnya and Dagestan could be followed 
by stronger pressure on the neighbouring republics of Georgia and Azerbai-
jan. It could have a negative impact on the possibility of launching a CPO on 
the territory of these countries as they could fear that Russia could use this 
framework to realise its own hidden agenda.  
Conclusions 
Based on the current Russian attitude it is relevant to maintain that CPOs on 
the territory of the Russian Federation is ‘out of bounds’ for the foreseeable 
future. 
The second Chechen war is still going on and conclusions could be pre-
mature. The first Chechen war and its outcome demoralised the Russian 
army. This could be changed if the second war is perceived as a success by 
Russian generals, officers, soldiers and, most important, by the public in 
general.  
The increased defence spending resulting from the war could also im-
prove the general standards of Russian formations designated to participate 
in CPOs. 
The participation in the operations in Chechnya increases the combat ex-
perience at all levels of chain of command of formations assigned to the spe-
cific tasks in this war zone.  
On the other hand, the way the operations are conducted in Chechnya -
could have a rather negative influence on future CPOs as questions could be 
raised about the use of excessive power and violation of human rights. The 
impression that the West at the last OSCE summit seemed to give the Rus-
sians free hands in Chechnya, could make the Russians more willing to co-
operate in CPOs on CIS territory. 
Russian Participation in Peace Operations  
Soviet and Russian peace operations outside the CIS and before IFOR 
Since 1948 the Soviet Union and Russian military formations have been in-
volved in 13 UN missions (excluding successor missions and airlift support 
to three other UN operations), in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo and in four regional missions in the CIS area. The history of United 
Nations peacekeeping goes back to 1948. From 1956 it became tacitly 
accepted that the five permanent members of the Security Council would not 
take part in peacekeeping operations. The fall of the Berlin Wall removed 
Cold War period obstacles related to peace operations. Several new opera-
tions were initiated, often at a larger scale and with an extended task and 
mandate compared to the earlier period. The conflicts became intra- rather 
than inter-state, and the use of force even without the full consent of the par-
ties according to UN Charter VII has been accepted. The permanent five 
members of the Security Council, including Russia, have been taking part in 
peace operations in this period.  
Until the late 1980s the Soviet attitude to UN peacekeeping was one of 
relative indifference. During the 40-year period from 1948 to 1987, the 
USSR took part in one observer mission (UNTSO from 1973). In addition 
the Kremlin provided an airlift for food supplies in support of UNUC (1960) 
and transported Austrian and Finnish troops in support of UNEF II in Sinai 
(1973). It provided no practical assistance to the remaining ten UN opera-
tions of the period. However, during the last four years of its existence 
(1988-91), the USSR tried to change the Western perception of it as a threat 
to peace and security and took part in five of the nine UN peacekeeping 
operations set up during the period:  
 
• Airlift support for Canadian troops taking part in the UN Iran-Iraq 
Military Observer Group in 1988 
• Electoral supervisors for the UN Transition Assistance Group in 
Namibia 1989 
• Observers for the UN Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) in 1991 
• Observers for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO) in 1991 
• Military liaison officers for the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia 
(1991) 
 
It is very important to emphasise that the USSR in fact provided observers 
and airlift to one third of the UN operations 1948-91. The contribution in 
manpower was on the other hand undoubtedly small, as at no time more than 
75 Soviet personnel were on UN peacekeeping duty. Furthermore, the Soviet 
Union made no contribution to any of the multinational or regional peace-
keeping operations during the period and it vetoed the replacement of the 
Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut with a UN force in 1984. 
Neighbouring countries experienced Soviet out-of-area operations in 
Budapest (1956), Prague (1968) and of course in Afghanistan from 1979, but 
none of them had anything to do with peacekeeping although in the official 
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Communist propaganda these operations were to some extent described as 
peace operations.  
Without going into details I can say that the Russian Federation contin-
ued to take a very active part in various UN observer missions in all parts of 
the world. The new thing is that Russia has provided forces to three UN mis-
sions, two NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia and four opera-
tions on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The NATO and the CIS 
operations will be discussed in detail at a later stage.  
It is worth noticing that the sanctioning of operations in the UN Security 
Council often was accompanied by bargaining. This seems to be the case 
when Russia backed the UN missions in Haiti and Guatemala (Kellet 1999: 
7). The Haiti mission seems to have been linked with Moscow’s effort to 
acquire international approval for its regional peace operations in the CIS. 
When the USA and its allies tried to get support for the multinational opera-
tion in Haiti in mid-1994, the Russian ambassador to the UN threatened to 
bloc the US initiative if the  Security Council did not recognise the Russian 
peacekeeping activity in the CIS. Russia and the US were among the spon-
sors of Resolution 937 (21 July 1994) which added to the mandate of the UN 
observer force in Abkhazia the requirement to observe the activities of, and 
to co-operate with, the Russian-led CIS peacekeeping force. Resolution 937 
was widely regarded as conferring the legitimacy that Russia sought for its 
Abkhazia operation. 
Russian participation in peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia marked a 
new practice compared with the one of the Soviet Union. UNPROFOR was 
established in February 1992 and the new Russian Federation decided to join 
the force, thus also the mainstream of the international community. From 
Moscow’s point of view, this could give the opportunity to influence 
developments in Yugoslavia, make Russia a more credible partner and open 
a new chapter in relations with the West. From 1992 to early 1994 the Rus-
sian contribution was one airborne battalion in Sector East in Croatia. In 
March 1994 the Russian contribution was extended to two battalions, includ-
ing 400 troops in Sarajevo. Russia also donated vehicles, equipment and 
generators worth $80 000 to the mission in 1994. When responsibility was 
handed over to SFOR in December 1996 one Russian battalion was sent 
home (or possibly, but not likely, merged into the Russian IFOR Brigade) 
and the other became a part of the United Nations Transitional Administra-
tion for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). This 
mission ended in the autumn of 1997 and the Russian battalion was with-
drawn in November. The Russians kept, however, a guard force until 
September 1998. During the whole period Moscow provided observers, staff 
officers and policemen to various missions in the former Yugoslavia. 
The overall impression of Russian performance in UN operations in 
Bosnia and Croatia is both positive and negative. For instance, the UN 
Secretary-General claimed that UNTAES contributed to peace and stability 
in the region (Kellet 1999: 11). Because the Russian contribution was one 
fifth of the mission, they deserve their share of the credit. There were, on the 
other hand, some definite failures during the UN period, perhaps partly 
caused by Russian military culture, partly by the ‘UN environment’. In April 
1995 Major General Alexander Perelyakin, commander of Sector East, was 
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fired as a result of disciplinary and ethic problems and a failure to prevent 
Serb troops from entering the area from FRY (Kellet 1999: 11). Among the 
charges against the Russian troops were unsatisfactory performance of duty, 
cigarette smuggling, illegal trading in UN fuel, and the organisation of 
brothels. There was also an emerging perception of Russian partiality and 
support to the Serbs. It was claimed that the Serbs could fire on Muslim 
positions protected by the Russian battalion. In 1995, Russian officers 
allowed the Serbs to conduct exercises with weapons that were supposed to 
be kept locked in UN depots. An investigation resulted in the dismissal of 
two senior Russian officers including Colonel Alexander Kromchenko, 
Commander of UN Forces Sector East. Along with other UN personnel Rus-
sian peacekeepers were taken hostage by the Serbs in November 1994 and 
March and May 1995. 
Conclusions 
The fact that the main part of the experience and tradition is from the post-
Soviet period explains why there is no actual Russian terminology, only a 
translated Western version. 
Russia has demonstrated that it can provide force multipliers, especially 
strategic airlift and helicopters.  
The overall experience is that Russian forces have at least a potential of 
meeting the demand of code of conduct, impartiality and professional 
behaviour. 
Russian peace operations in the CIS area 
Introduction  
 
We overthrow a decent religious and democratic government in Tajikistan. We 
are backing the popular front of bandits and communists. Carnage, genocide, 
emigration of the surviving intellectuals. And then our peacekeepers are coming 
into action. Indeed, if you want peace, you have got to start a war. Between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Abkhazia, Pridnestrovye and Moldova. 
First set them against each other and then come to reconcile them. At least in this 
way, hopefully, it will be remembered that you came from a great power. Envy 
us (Novodvorskaya 1999: 47). 
 
This statement by a critical Russian analyst points to crucial questions re-
lated to Russian peace operations. 
Russian involvement in the CIS seems to differ from what in the West is 
defined as ‘peacekeeping’. This lack of compatibility between terms and 
actions can cause serious problems for further co-operation, especially if the 
term ‘peacekeeping’ is used as a disguise for actions which can be inter-
preted as pure pursuit of national interests. Russia has, like any other coun-
try, the right to defend its own territory and interests, but a ‘spade’ should, 
however, be called a ‘spade’. 
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Apart from providing troops to operations in the CIS area Russia has 
contributed to observer missions in the near abroad. Since 1994 the UN has 
maintained two small missions in the CIS. United Nations Observers Mis-
sion in Georgia (UNOMIG) and United Nations Mission of Observers in 
Tajikistan. There also happened to be Russian and CIS peace operations in 
the same countries.  
 
 Despite Russia’s relative unwillingness to take part in multinational peace opera-
tions, its worry about local wars on its periphery has ensured that from three to 
five as many Russian soldiers have participated at any one time in regional 
peacekeeping missions in the CIS, as have been involved in UN or NATO ope-
rations (Kellet 1999: 13). 
 
This chapter will not go into detail about the Russian operations in the CIS 
area because they are thoroughly covered in various reports listed in the lit-
erature list (Kellet, Jonson, Flikke, Baev 1999a, Lynch). The main purpose 
of this chapter is to discuss the conditions for future CPOs in the CIS con-
flicts where Russia is involved. In addition it is relevant to see whether 
Russian operations are successful in solving the conflicts, as it is highly rele-
vant for any discussion on the need of launching a CPO. 
The security of the Caspian Sea region has become an important issue in 
world politics during the 1990s. It has been strongly influenced by increased 
competition among regional as well as several extra-regional powers over 
the control of the vast oil and gas reserves and transport routes. One of the 
major obstacles to the exploitation of the Caspian oil and gas resources was 
the dispute over the existing Caspian Sea legal regime and different 
approaches to its resolution favoured by the littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan). Another problem is linked to the 
question of transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian Basin to global 
markets. This conflict of interests among the littoral states has been exacer-
bated by the growing involvement of the USA and a number of European 
and Asian countries in regional affairs. Finally, the security of oil and gas 
transportation routes passing across or located close to zones of local con-
flicts (in Abkhazia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh) has become increas-
ingly linked to the resolution of these conflicts. The influence of radical and 
militant Islamic groups in a number of Caspian littoral states and their 
neighbours threatens to further destabilise the security of the region. These 
developments have led to increased military presence and militarisation of 
conflicts in the region. Being aware of the dangerous consequences for re-
gional security, the littoral countries have tried to diffuse mounting interstate 
tensions in the region. However, there has been insufficient progress in this 
direction. 
Four ongoing operations and one never launched 
It was in the Dniester area and in South Ossetia that post-Soviet Russia 
gained its first experience in conducting peacekeeping operations on former 
Soviet territory. In these operations an original method was employed – one 
unknown in similar operations conducted by the United Nations – as armed 
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units of both belligerent parties were included in the ‘peacekeeping’ force 
(Globachev 1999: 44). 
Moldova 
After Moldova’s declaration of independence on 27 August 1991, the 
Transdniester region of Moldova declared its own independence. By 
December 1991 the Moldovan government had mostly lost control over the 
Transdniester region. In March-April 1992 a quadripartite mechanism, 
involving Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Romania, was established to re-
solve the crisis, but it never became operational, owing mainly to Russia’s 
objections to its composition.  
The Russian peacekeeping units started arriving in the region in the end 
of July 1992. They included five battalions (2,100 men) and were supple-
mented by six battalions made up of units from Transdniester and Molodova 
(three battalions of 1,200 men each). Peacekeepers have confiscated illegal 
arms and ammunition in great numbers, but the situation in the Dniester area 
is assessed by the Russians to be calm and controllable, although the conflict 
is far from solved. The armed conflict was mainly caused by the clashing 
political and economic interests of the local elites – the supporters of 
Moldova independent existence or the establishment of a ‘greater Romania’ 
incorporating the former province of Bessarabia on the one hand, and the 
adherents of the traditional Soviet way of solving the ethnic and political 
contradictions on the other. 
The conflict also had  economic causes, as the area of secession was the 
best developed part of the former Soviet republic of Moldova. One of the 
main purely military challenges in the area seems to be the large store of 
arms accumulated in the Kolbasna depot in the Dniester area during the 
Soviet period. It occupies more than one hundred hectares and contains, 
according to the most recent estimates, more than 45,000 tons of ammunition 
and explosives with relatively high market value (Globachev 1999: 44). 
In addition to peacekeeping units, Russia had its 14th Army deployed in 
the region. It seemed to support the separatists in the Dniester area during 
the fighting in 1992, and some of its units were latter on transferred to serve 
as ‘peacekeepers’. The withdrawal of the remains of the 14th Army was to 
take place to the end of1997, but has been delayed many times and Russia 
has still some non-peacekeeping units in the region. The need for finding a 
solution to the conflict in Transdniester forced Moldavia to closer co-opera-
tion with Russia and the CIS, and prevented unification with Romania. 
Russian troops are still in the area, in violation of a pledge to leave by 
1997. The Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) is deployed on the 
right (eastern) bank of the Dniester River, in a region with a large Russian-
speaking population. The OSCE over the years has urged the Russians to 
leave, and the  OSCE Istanbul summit, the Russian government promised to 
further reduce the Russian military presence in the region (Jamestown, 19 
November 1999). Moldova seeks the removal of Russian forces within two 
years, through December 2001, while Russia proposes a withdrawal calendar 
of five-and-a-half years. No fewer than eleven OSCE member countries have 
announced their readiness to monitor the withdrawal and share some of its 
financial costs.  
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The deployment of Russian peacekeepers was complicated by the pres-
ence of a separatist Russian population and the Russian 14th Army. On their 
arrival the Russian peacekeepers found that a cease-fire was already in 
effect, largely because of Moldova’s military defeat. The cease-fire has gen-
erally been observed since 1992 and no more people have been killed in 
combat. However, the presence of the OGRF has by and large relegated the 
peacekeeping force to a spectator role, and it has failed to keep belligerent 
troops out of the security zone. This failure, and resort to peacekeeping bat-
talions from the OGRF, give an aura of partiality to the Russian contingent 
(Kellet 1999: 21). 
Abkhazia 
Abkhazia, an autonomous republic within Georgia, declared itself independ-
ent on 23 July 1992. Georgian troops entered Abkhazia, and fighting broke 
out on 14 August 1992. Russian troops in the republic found themselves on 
the Abkhazian side of the battlefield. Even though Russia officially main-
tained neutrality, Russian volunteers and troops initially became a part in the 
conflict (Baev 1999a: 84). A cease-fire agreement was reached in Septem-
ber, but the fighting intensified in late 1992 and early 1993.  
Russia sought to act as mediator in the dispute, its efforts culminating in 
two further cease-fires before a final round of fighting in September 1993 
expelled the Georgians from most of Abkhazia. At least 3,000 people died in 
the conflict and some 250,000 people – mostly Georgians – fled the region. 
An abortive cease-fire agreement signed on 27 July 1993 established a Geor-
gian-Abkhazian-Russian Joint Commission, which was charged with the task 
of setting up ‘interim monitoring groups’. Some 200 Russian troops were 
involved in the activity. On 24 August 1993 the Security Council established 
UNOMIG, a force comprising up to 88 military observers and mandated to 
verify compliance with the cease-fire. UNOMIG was still in the early stages 
of its deployment when the cease-fire broke down in September. It was, 
however, decided to retain UNOMIG in the region, and in July 1994 the 
Security Council authorised an increase in its strength. The force expanded 
rapidly, with Russian observers join in by October 1994. Since then Russia 
has invariably supplied three observers to UNOMIG.  
Georgia was anxious to persuade the UN to send a peacekeeping force to 
Abkhazia, but the Secretary-General decided that the necessary conditions 
for such a mission did not exist, and in April 1994 the CIS agreed that Rus-
sia should send ‘peacekeepers’ to the region. The warring parties agreed on 
cease-fire in May, and in late June Russian troops were deployed in 
Abkhazia. Co-operation with the CIS force is undoubtedly important to the 
fulfilment of UNOMIG’s difficult mandate, and the UN has periodically 
praised the collaboration between UNOMIG and peacekeepers, but there 
were also some problems in this relationship. For example, in October 1998 
the UNSG implied that the co-operation could be improved (Kellet 1999:28). 
At the head-quarters level the working relationship remains good. The CIS 
force provided UNOMIG with valuable support in February 1998 when four 
UN observers were kidnapped. This incident led the UN to consider setting 
up a protective unit for its observers, an idea that did not commend itself to 
the Russians.  
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The peacekeeping force has, at least officially, a collective CIS character, 
but in reality it is maintained by Russia alone – although the United Nations 
has also its observers there. Personnel for the Russian peacekeeping units 
was initially provided by the 345th airborne regiment stationed in Gudauta, 
but troops from Russia proper joined later and the force is made up of 
servicemen from all regions of Russia. The presence of Russian peacekeep-
ers on the Abkhazian-Georgian front line has an aura of ambiguity, as the 
deployment of the peacekeeping force was followed by a Georgian-Russian 
treaty giving Russia basing rights in Georgia and by Georgia’s joining the 
Russia-led CIS co-operation. Russian military bases in Georgia are located 
in strategically important regions of the country – near the capital Tbilisi, in 
the de facto sovereign Abkhazia, in semi-independent Adzharia, and in the 
region with predominant Armenian population (Globachev 1999: 44).  
On 29 August 1999, Georgia’s National Security Council decided to 
prolong the mandate of the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ force in Abkhazia 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 28 September 1999). The Russian peacekeepers are 
probably tolerated due to a lack of realistic alternatives. Georgia’s acquies-
cence can be portrayed as legitimising the Russian operation in Abkhazia. 
On a practical level, Moscow maintains that the proposed changes to the 
mandate (concerning the return of refugees) of its troops would necessitate a 
massive increase in manpower and funding, neither of which Russia can 
afford. That argument constitutes a pretext for freezing the conflict, as Mos-
cow opposes any internationalisation of this peacekeeping operation. Geor-
gia also implied that the West had advised Tbilisi to prolong the Russian 
mandate. Georgia’s hoped also that the NATO operation in Kosovo could 
form a precedent for a similar reversal of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia. The 
Georgians complained that the CIS Force stood aside during fighting in May 
1998, but intervention could have been costly, and the peacekeepers appear 
to have tried to protect the population to some degree. The UN has been 
generally positive to this operation, and the peacekeepers appear to have 
become less partial with time (Kellet 1999: 26).  
South Ossetia 
The deployment in the Georgian region of South Ossetia was the first peace 
operation undertaken by the Kremlin on former Soviet territory. Two-thirds 
of the region’s population were Ossetians, and by 1990 their aspirations for 
greater independence from Georgia had escalated to a call for complete inde-
pendence. Violence broke out in December 1990, and military operations 
continued until mid 1992, taking the lives of some 1,500 people and creating 
a refugee exodus. A cease-fire was agreed in June 1994. All armed forma-
tions were to leave the conflict zone by 1 July, a 15 to 20 km separation zone 
was designated, and a ‘quadripartite military formation’, similar to the UN 
peacekeeping forces, was established along with a mixed control commis-
sion, and an observer group (Kellet 1999: 15).  
Only Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Georgian counterpart 
Edward Shevardnadze signed the accord, but North and South Ossetia were 
also represented at the signing ceremony. The Joint Control Commission 
(JCC) had a mandate to direct and control the peacekeeping force, but it 
seems to have operated fitfully over the past six years.  
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The JCC oversees a joint head-quarters in Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian 
capital, comprising the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian commanders, a 
tripartite observer group of some 40 officers, and a head-quarters company. 
The observers, working in mixed teams, were supposed to visit the force’s 
post daily. The overall force commander appears always to have been a Rus-
sian. Under the cease-fire agreement the peacekeeping force was expected to 
comprise Russian, Georgian and Ossetian battalions of 500 men each, with a 
mixed reserve battalion of 900 men. Russia’s contingent was deployed in 
mid July 1992 and comprised between 900 and 1000 men. Local Georgians 
protested that the Russian contingent far exceeded the agreed size, and was 
much better trained and equipped than the other components of the force. 
The airborne personnel were quickly withdrawn and by mid 1994 the Rus-
sian contingent had shrunk to a single battalion, usually drawn from the 45th 
Motorised Infantry Division.  
Following the disbandment of that division, a battalion from the 
Kantemirovskiy Division took over in 1998. According to the OSCE it was 
better staffed and equipped than its predecessor (Kellet 1999: 15). In Sep-
tember 1998 the Russian Defence Ministry stated that the contingent num-
bered 530 men. The Georgians and Ossetians had respectively around 550 
men. Despite the cease-fire the, the Russian peacekeepers were attacked 
upon their arrival in Tskhinvali on 14 July 1992 and during the following 
weeks suffered a small number of casualties from snipers and mines. The 
force presence seems to have calmed the situation, and the various armed 
groups left the area. Crime became normal, followed by the fact that the 
peacekeepers primary role became law enforcement. The principal activity 
of the force has been the manning of strongpoint- and checkpoints. Unlike 
Moldova where checkpoints are manned on a mixed basis, those in South 
Ossetia are mostly manned separately (Kellet 1999: 16). The deployment of 
the force quickly showed results. The shelling of Tskhinvali ended and high-
ways that had been closed for nearly two years, opened. In addition, some 
refugees returned. The military situation has been calm since summer 1992.  
In general the OSCE mission has been favourably impressed by the per-
formance of the Russian peacekeepers, assessing that they are superior to the 
other contingents in quality, training and equipment. In 1994 it commended 
the Russians for displaying ‘cool professionalism’ and two years later re-
ported that he Russian posts continue to be operated and managed well. In 
mid 1998 the military situation was reported as calm and the population as 
having no complaints about the peacekeeping force. On the other hand Rus-
sian discipline has not always been exemplary. A research team led by 
Professor Neil MacFarlane (Kellet 1999: 16) was told of corruption among 
all three contingents.  
The cease-fire has been maintained for seven years, but 40,000 refugees 
have not returned. Russia’s military doctrine states that the use of Russian 
peacekeepers is intended to localise conflict and to end it as soon as possible, 
thereby creating preconditions for settlement of the conflict by peaceful 
means. The first aim was achieved in South Ossetia, but a political solution 
has not been found, even after eight years. 
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Tajikistan 
Late in 1994 a UN mission – UNMOT – was launched in Tajikistan where a 
regional peacekeeping operation had been under way for over a year. The 
roots of the mission can be traced back to the civil war that broke out in 
Tajikistan in mid 1992. At least 20,000 were killed in the fighting, and about 
half a million fled their homes. For much of 1992 the Soviet/Russian 201st 
Motorised Infantry Division based in Tajikistan remained neutral, but by late 
1992 the division seemingly abandoned its neutrality and supported the Tajik 
ruling elite, led by Emomali Rakhmonov, although this support may have 
been provided reluctantly and under duress (Kellet 1999: 9).  
In September 1993 the heads of the CIS states decided to set up a ‘col-
lective peacekeeping force’ (CPF) in Tajikistan, made up of Russian, Kazak, 
Kyrgyzstani and Uzbek units. The Russian 201st MRD contributed one 
battalion, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan sent one battalion each, while Uzbeki-
stan dispatched a reinforced company. In order to make this peacekeeping 
force more effective a series of exercises was organised in 1993, 1994, 1995, 
1996 and in 1998. These international forces played an important role in 
containing conflict in Central Asia, though they could not be ‘labelled’ 
impartial, as they seemed to support Tajik government forces in their cam-
paign against the local opposition and served as support to Russian border 
troops controlling the Tajik-Afghani border. 
Opposition forces launched a new campaign in 1993 and 1994, but on 17 
September 1994 the warring parties agreed to a temporary cease-fire. A UN 
fact finding team was sent to Tajikistan to assess the modalities for establish-
ing an observer mission. The cease-fire came into effect on 20 October 1994, 
and 50 military observers were temporarily deployed to Tajikistan. On 16 
December 1994, the Security Council authorised UNMOT to monitor the 
cease-fire. Russia has not contributed personnel to the 39 persons strong 
UNMOT. On the other hand it has actively solicited the UN support for its 
own – and its regional allies – peace operations in Tajikistan. While UN 
status has not been granted the CIS’s Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPF) 
in Tajikistan, the Security Council has expressed satisfaction over 
UNMOT’s close liaison with the CPF and with the CIS border troops in the 
region. 
The ongoing civil war in Afghanistan and the fear of the spread of 
Islamic fundamentalism created severe concerns to the new Russian Federa-
tion and made it support the communist regime in the former Soviet republic 
of Tajikistan. The Russians supported the regime against the Muslim oppo-
sition in a civil war that started in 1992. Russian border troops guard the 
Tajik-Afghani border. This has been a long and expensive engagement for 
Russia and the country is probably interested in finding a compromise solu-
tion to the conflict. 20-50,000 Tajiks were killed and hundreds of thousands 
became refugees in the civil war between 1992 and 1994. Around 300,000 of 
the 380,000 ethnic Russians that lived there in 1989 have escaped or emi-
grated to Russia (Simonsen 1999). 
Although Russia seems to regard the peacekeeping operation in Tajiki-
stan as a model of conformity to international standards, it differs substan-
tially from traditional UN peacekeeping and other Russian missions in the 
CIS. The deployment of the force predated the first cease-fire by a year, one 
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of the warring parties was not represented at the CIS summit in September 
1993 that established the force, heavy weapons have been used and the re-
quirement for neutrality in the conflict between the Tajik government and 
the UTO has not been there.  
This is probably mainly caused by the lack of clearly defined priorities 
and goals as the Russian military presence in the region was to defend Rus-
sia’s strategic interests and at the same time serve as a ‘peacekeeping’ buffer 
between the two warring parties. Russia has acknowledged its geopolitical 
interests in Tajikistan, and the mission assigned to the force has elements of 
both collective security and peacekeeping. Because of the border guard’s 
active role in frontier defence the force has avoided fighting for most of the 
time, allowing it both to understate its collective security role and elements 
of neutrality and peacekeeping. The Tajik operation is the largest Russian 
peacekeeping commitment. It is quite ironic that Tajikistan is the only con-
flict where Russian peacekeepers have been deployed, but fighting has 
continued long after their arrival. It is also the only conflict in which a 
negotiated settlement has been achieved mainly through Russian diplomatic 
efforts. The peace process is still fragile and much has to be done in order to 
make this mission a real success story. 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh, or the mission that never happened 
Even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the two USSR republics 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, were engaged in a conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh 
– an enclave in Azerbaijan populated mainly by Armenians. An armistice 
was brokered by the Russian Federation in 1994. The Russian Defence Min-
ster P. Grachev undertook persistent shuttle diplomacy to negotiate a cease-
fire in May 1994 to be guaranteed by Russian troops. It took an enormous 
effort by the Azeri leadership to prevent this operation (Baev 1999: 84).  
The Russian engagement and then defeat in the first Chechen war made, 
however, a lasting impact on Russia’s conflict management and Russia was 
forced to abandon its plan for peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh.  
The situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh is still complicated, al-
though there are some signs that the parties to the conflict are more willing 
to find a lasting solution based on negotiations and mediation involving also 
international organisations and bodies. Armenians still control 20 per cent of 
Azerbaijani territory and Azerbaijan has more than 600,000 refugees 
(Simonsen 1999). The widely expected Russian ‘peace’ intervention did not 
materialise and the mediation efforts remained half-hearted (Baev 1999a: 
83). The cease-fire reached in 1994 is still holding, though there has been a 
number of small arms fire and sniper activities along the line of contact. The 
situation has evolved into a volatile ‘no war, no peace’ situation with 
increasing potential for destabilisation (OSCE HLPG 1999). The attempts at 
resolution of the conflict are co-ordinated by the OSCE Minsk Group -
composed of eleven states and co-chaired by the American, Russian and 
French ambassadors to the OSCE. The OSCE High Level Planning Group 
(HLPG) is working exclusively with the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh with 
the task of drafting agreements between the parties, and drafting a mandate 
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for a peacekeeping force. Due to the international involvement already at the 
early stage of the conflict and work on its successful resolution, the possible 
peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh has the potential of becoming 
the first CPO on CIS territory.  
Important lessons learned 
Russia’s CIS peacekeeping has not been successful in promoting a resolution 
of the conflicts (Jonson 1999: 12). It is, however, not unique in this respect, 
to mention only UNIFIL in Lebanon, which was deployed as an interim 
force in 1978. Perhaps a strong and active third party could stimulate pro-
gress in negotiations. Russia has not been able of fulfil the role of an active, 
impartial third party. The international legitimacy of the operations could 
definitely be questioned. Most CIS member states maintain that the UN, not 
the CIS alone, is the only organisation that can legitimate a peacekeeping 
operation, also on CIS territory. 
Russian leaders have not shied away from associating national interests 
with peacekeeping. Russian peacekeepers have, however, not been as ir-
regular as some critics have averred (Kellet 1999: 37). By and large they 
have followed the principle of consent in three of the four operations, and, 
except from Tajikistan, they seem to have tried to be neutral, usually after at 
rather partial start. As for the use of force, the Russians seem to behave in 
the same way as peacekeepers engaged in several ‘chapter VII’ peacekeep-
ing operations around the world. Although there is no UN authorisation for 
Russian enforcement in the CIS, and there is a tendency among Russian per-
sonnel to view peacekeeping in purely military terms, they appear to use 
relatively little force, perhaps with the exception of Tajikistan.  
The Russians regard some of their departures from international stan-
dards as a potential innovation. Involvement in neighbouring and historically 
close states is something they share with Western states. The solo appear-
ance in Abkhazia and incorporation of belligerent parties in Moldova and 
South Ossetia are definitely a departure from the accepted standards. These 
solutions are to some extent justified by the fact that they have halted vio-
lence (but not solved the conflict) and by the unwillingness of the interna-
tional community to become involved in peacekeeping in the CIS.  
Success, however, is not evident in Russian peace keeping. At least two 
of the conflicts are relatively dormant because of military deadlock and in 
Nagorno-Karabakh a relatively lasting cease-fire was negotiated without the 
deployment of a peacekeeping force. All told, the Russians role as regional 
peacekeepers seems to be positive. The USA has also associated peacekeep-
ing with national interests and there are similarities between Russian and US 
conduct in peacekeeping operations (Kellet 1999: 38). Russia is, however, 
the only country that mixes collective security and peacekeeping by the fact 
that their peacekeepers utilise Russian base facilities in for instance Georgia. 
National interests become inevitably a part of Russian peacekeeping in the 
CIS area (see Lynch: 2000). 
Russia’s credibility as a peacekeeper 
There are several grounds for criticising Russian traditions related to peace 
operations. General misuse of the term peacekeeping was the case during the 
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Soviet period, for instance in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
The conflicts on former Soviet territory after the break-up of the empire have 
resulted in several operations defined by the Russians as peacekeeping. It 
seems, however, that in the majority of these conflicts, Russia supported one 
party initially, and so emerged as an ‘impartial’ peacekeeper. It is a pattern 
traceable in all Russian peacekeeping operations, from South Ossetia to in-
volvement in the former Yugoslavia, where the Russians are considered 
more or less pro-Serbian, but act, however, at the same time as supposedly 
‘impartial’ international peacekeepers.  
To engage in peacekeeping and simultaneously ‘shield’ one of the 
conflict parties is bad policy. The fact that Russia combines its peacekeeping 
efforts with attempts at gaining some ‘strategic’ advantages in the areas of 
conflict does not help to improve the country’s credibility. Russia should 
also realise that it has a responsibility for the conduct of its allies. It is proba-
bly much wiser to make them adopt internationally accepted standards than 
to defend them at all price. The fact that the peacekeeping troops in the CIS 
often consist of the parties involved in the conflict can also cause some 
credibility problems. How would I react to a Serbian/Albanian/NATO 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo? The Russian participation in SFOR and 
KFOR is a means of making the force credible to the Serbian population. A 
CPO in the CIS should have the same aim and hopefully give the same 
effect. 
Conclusions 
The Russian CIS operations have been conducted even during internal wars 
and economic crises. The fact that Russia prioritises military action even in a 
time of economic and political troubles seems to underline Russia’s pre-
occupation with the area which it has defined as its exclusive sphere of inter-
est. This could make getting Russian acceptance to Western involvement in 
peacekeeping in the Russian near abroad a very challenging task. 
The ongoing war in Chechnya, in parallel with Russian peacekeeping in 
neighbouring Georgia, creates questions concerning Russian impartiality. It 
is not credible to have bases and peacekeeping forces in a country that you at 
the same time accuse of co-operation with an internal enemy. The peace-
keeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would increase their credibil-
ity if they were conducted as a CPO. Further negative development in Rus-
sian-Georgian affairs can create new serious conflicts that would have to be 
dealt with.  
So far the West has shown no or little intention, interest, will and capabil-
ity to participate in former and ongoing peace operations in the CIS area. 
The Western intention of participation has to be the first step if such partici-
pation is an aspiration for the future. Oil and gas resources in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, and also the need for more stability, peace, human rights 
and democratisation there, could become important incentives for more 
Western engagement. The challenge for the future is not to negotiate or im-
pose cease-firse, which the Russians have achieved, but to bring an end to 
the conflict. This would probably be speeded up by Western involvement. 
It will take time for Russia to make others believe in Russia’s impartial-
ity. The only way to achieve this is to adopt an impartial approach from top 
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to bottom in the official political and military hierarchy. Military impartiality 
on the ground seems achievable, but the peacekeeping forces in the CIS 
should be balanced better with respect to composition. There has been a 
clear improvement in the Russian conduct of operations in the CIS area. 
They have to a larger extent adapted such principles as impartiality and the 
minimum use of force. This creates conditions for the integration of Western 
and CIS forces in operations, and shows that Russian forces under the right 
conditions can act according to ‘Western standards for peacekeeping’. The 
announced withdrawal from Moldova indicates that Russia under given cir-
cumstances is willing to give the OSCE a role in the CIS area. 
Russia in combined peace operations in a NATO frame 
The overall political background for Russia’s participation in two NATO-led 
operations in the former Yugoslavia, SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo, 
is covered in the two chapters on ‘Russian concepts and doctrines related to 
peace operations’ and ‘Russian-Western relationship and its consequences 
for CPO’. This subchapter focuses on the experiences and conclusions from 
the field in the Balkans that can be useful in future CPOs, for instance in the 
CIS area. Especially in the KFOR context, which I deal with in detail, the 
political agreement between the USA and Russia on KFOR is mentioned. 
IFOR/SFOR 
The SFOR Russian Brigade (RUSBDE) is part of SFOR and participates in 
the Partnership for Peace programme. About 40 per cent of its 1,500 person-
nel are combat veterans. The RUSBDE area of Responsibility covers 1,750 
square kilometres. The 1st Airborne Battalion is responsible for 35 kilo-
metres of the Inter- Entity Boundary Line and the 2nd is responsible for the 
remaining 40 kilometres. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
in Paris in December 1995, the Security Council authorised the establish-
ment of IFOR under UN Charter Chapter VII. Russia probably realised that 
it had to accede to NATO initiatives in order to retain any kind of role in the 
Balkans. After Moscow refused to place its troops under NATO command 
and the US threatened to go on without Russia, the then Minister of Defence 
Pavel Grachev finally accepted a compromise. Russian troops were to be 
subordinated to SACEUR. SACEUR was to command the Russian contin-
gent through a Russian general based in Belgium. In Bosnia, the Russian 
contingent was to be under tactical control of the US-led Multinational Divi-
sion North (MND North). 
Russian deployment began in mid January 1996 and proceeded quickly, 
and the force was in position by the beginning of February. Before deploy-
ment the units were given mission specific training (Kellet 1999: 12). The 
force was made up of an independent airborne brigade drawing upon 76 and 
98 Guards Airborne Divisions with around 1,500 personnel, 116 armoured 
combat vehicles and eight artillery pieces. The Brigade was deployed in the 
Posovina corridor close to the Yugoslavian (Serbian) border. Main task of 
the RUSBDE was to run 12 control and checkpoints and patrol the area of 
responsibility. Initially there were some frictions and the first commander 
was sent home after irritating NATO by meeting Bosnian Serb general and 
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war crime indicted Ratko Mladic. Most frictions seem to have been solved 
without fuss. IFOR met most of its objectives and it is obvious that the Rus-
sian contingent also contributed to the relative success of the military mis-
sion in Bosnia. A US liaison officer with the RUSBDE had the following 
experience (Russian soldiers are) Less available than his own (US) country-
men to call on available legal, civil affairs and other specialist assistance, but 
(they) tended to deal more on a personnel level (Kellet 1999: 12).  
Among the strong and weak points of the Russian troops in SFOR, their 
partners usually mention the following points: 
 
• Co-ordination problems 
• No 24-hour planning and operations cell 
• Excellent communications 
• Well-informed on activities in own sector. 
 
Russia has had its brigade-size unit in SFOR since 1997. There is consider-
able co-ordination with US troops in the Posovina region, but some NATO 
initiatives, such as the seizure of Serbian television transmitters in October 
1997 and the arrest of a Bosnian Serb Corps commander in December 1998 
caused Russian unease and Russian units tried to avoid taking part, even 
though it was in their own area. 
At the official level NATO seems to be very satisfied with the Russian 
contribution. The participation of Russia in IFOR and SFOR is very impor-
tant and is an example of how NATO and Russia can work together in a 
fruitful manner. It was at that time a major step in the evolving NATO-Rus-
sia co-operative relationship. Russian forces joined IFOR in January 1996 
and Russia continues to contribute to SFOR. Russia’s participation is subject 
to special arrangements between NATO and Russia. The Russian contingent 
was directly subordinated to Colonel General Leontiy Shevtsov, as 
SACEUR’s deputy. In theatre, the Russian brigade is under the tactical con-
trol of the US-led Multinational Division North (MND N). 
The practical military experience with the Russian contingent in SFOR is 
positive. When the special command and control arrangement was in place, 
co-operation on the ground went smoothly. The US division commander 
under whom the Russian brigade serves in the field has been satisfied with 
the proficiency and capability of Russian soldiers in this particular 
peacekeeping mission. This is also based on experience from joint US-Rus-
sian patrolling. The local public and the Republika Srbska forces in the Rus-
sian sector also seem to have little complaints. There have been no rumours 
of corruption, black market arrangements and other negative things which 
often are mentioned in connection with for instance Ukraine’s contingent. 
Conditions for such good military co-operation have been created 
through dialogue and co-operation in establishing peacekeeping procedures, 
techniques and tactics within the Partnership for Peace framework and bilat-
eral arrangements, especially Russian-US. 
It can be maintained that the Russian Brigade in SFOR not always has 
acted in a completely impartial way. Russian sympathy to the Serbs is well 
known. This leads to a very close monitoring from those who are responsible 
for the impartiality of the troops. However, it is important to have in mind 
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that this claimed Russian partiality is to some extent balanced by the fact that 
the MND North also comprises a Turkish brigade showing some pro-Muslim 
sympathies. 
A Norwegian flag officer serving at Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces 
Europe (SHAPE) during the initial phase of IFOR expressed a generally 
positive attitude to the Russian effort in the IFOR period. This covers the 
troops on the ground in Bosnia as well as the Russian representatives in the 
command chain up to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). 
The Russians had a professional attitude and they acted in accordance with 
international standards. It is important to have in mind that Russia kept its 
brigade in the US-led multinational division North in SFOR also during the 
NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia. However, they made some changes 
in the command and control arrangements, taking orders from the Russian 
Chief of the General Staff instead of SACEUR (Sherr 1999: 8). 
KFOR 
The CPO concept that Russia and NATO have chosen for KFOR is rela-
tively new and still working. It is therefore presented in detail as it can serve 
as a conceptual framework and platform for CPOs in general. The US Secre-
tary of Defence, Cohen, and the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergeyev, 
agreed on the following points on Russian participation in KFOR after long 
negotiations in Helsinki in mid June 1999 (NATO homepage):  
 
• To accept the Agreed Principles attached as the basis for Russian 
participation in the international peacekeeping force (KFOR) in full 
compliance with Security Council Resolution 1244.  
• To provide for participation of one to two Russian battalions operat-
ing in Kosovska Kamenica in the US sector according to the at-
tached command and control model. A Russian officer will serve as 
the representative to the Sector Commander for Russian forces.  
• Additionally, the US will recommend that NATO agree that Russian 
forces also participate in the KFOR forces deployed in the German 
and French sectors. According to the command and control model 
specifically that Russia provide one to two battalions to be part of 
the KFOR force in the German sector, to operate in the area near 
Malisevo. One battalion to the KFOR force in the French sector, to 
operate in the area near Lausa. A German company and a French 
company will also operate in the Malisevo and Lausa areas respec-
tively. Russian officers will serve as Representatives for Russian 
Forces to the sector commanders in the German and French sectors, 
respectively.  
• The total Russian deployment in Kosovo will not exceed five battal-
ions with a total strength not exceeding 2,850 troops, plus up to 750 
troops for the airfield and logistics base operation combined, plus 16 
liaison officers. The level of Russian participation will be reduced in 
proportion to reductions in the overall size of KFOR.  
• To resolve the Pristina (Slatina) airfield issues on the basis of the 
allocation of responsibilities described in attachments. All KFOR 
participants will have access to the airfield, under procedures to be 
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established by KFOR. Details to be determined by Commander, 
KFOR in consultation with Russian representatives.  
• That Russia will have the right to establish a logistics base with an 
appropriate site security in the vicinity of the town of Kosovo Polje, 
as agreed with COMKFOR, to support Russian forces in KFOR.  
• To send a Russian military representative to SHAPE and to augment 
his staff and expand his responsibilities to include Russian partici-
pation in KFOR, and to establish liaison and planning cells at 
AFSOUTH and KFOR as rapidly as possible.  
• To convene consultations as soon as possible to develop details for 
implementation of these agreements.  
• That these points, including determination on which sector the Rus-
sians will participate in, will be confirmed by the NAC for NATO 
and by the Government of the Russian Federation. The scheme of 
deployment of the Russian of KFOR may be reviewed and adjusted 
in the light of the prevailing circumstances by mutual agreement of 
the confirming parties, keeping in mind all aspects of a continued, 
appropriate Russian presence. 
• All command arrangements will preserve the principle of unity of 
command. It is understood that the Russian contingent in Kosovo 
will be under the political and military control of the Russian Com-
mand. 
 
The following principles were accepted as the basis for Russian participation 
in a militarily effective peace enforcement operation in Kosovo:  
 
• Common mission/purpose  
• Common rules of engagement  
• Single airspace management 
• Single system of ground movement control  
• Intelligence sharing and exchange  
• Co-ordinated public information process 
• Single system to co-ordinate national logistics and KFOR base support  
 
KFOR freedom of manoeuvre and operation  
Allocation of responsibilities between Russian Armed Forces and KFOR 
at the Pristina (Slatina) Airfield should follow the rules described below: 
 
• The Overall direction for the operation of the airfield and airspace in the 
KFOR AOR will be provided by the Director of Kosovo Air Operations 
working for the KFOR Commander.  
• The Chief of the airfield is a Russian officer, while the Chief of Air 
Movement, who is a representative of NATO. They will carry out their 
functions in the name of the Director of Air Operations in Kosovo and 
KFOR Commander. In the agreement their functions are listed in detail 
(NATO Homepage). 
• In each of the created functions assigned to NATO, a group of Russian 
representatives will be created. Detailed development of plans for these 
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representatives will be accomplished after the Russian aviation group 
arrives at Pristina airfield. 
 
Command structure: The command structure depicted on the chart 
(Russian Participation in KFOR) will be the command structure for Russian 
participation in KFOR (NATO homepage).  
 
 
A= 
 
Allied, Partner, or other non-Russian Contingent 
 
 
The following details the agreed liaison arrangements for Russian forces in 
KFOR:  
 
• Russia will return the Russian Military Representative to SHAPE, aug-
ment his staff and expand their responsibilities to include Russian par-
ticipation in KFOR. The Russian representation will consist of up to 10 
officers.  
• Russia will establish a liaison group with head-quarters AFSOUTH. The 
Russian liaison group will consist of three officers.  
• Russia will temporarily establish a liaison group with CAOC to co-ordi-
nate the initial strategic deployment of Russia’s peacekeeping contin-
gent.  
• Russia will establish a military representative at KFOR head-quarters ( 
six to eight officers for planning and support) for matters pertaining to 
the planning and employment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in 
Jørn Buø 
nupi april 01 
88 
KFOR. Regarding co-ordination of Russian activities in KFOR brigade 
zones (2-3) officers per zone where the Russian peacekeeping contingent 
is located).  
Practical experiences in KFOR 
Two incidents related to the Russian contingent in KFOR at the end of 
August and the beginning of September 1999 are worth mentioning. At first 
glance these incidents seem insignificant, but they are, nevertheless, relevant 
positive indications related to Russian participation in international peace 
operations. 
On 23 August 1999 Russian peacekeeping troops were supposed to take 
over the town of Orahovac from Dutch and German peacekeepers. They 
were, however, blocked by the Albanians accusing them of supporting and 
favouring the town’s Serb population. The Russians tackled this difficult 
situation according to the rules of engagement and adapted peacekeeping 
principles. 
The second, and probably from a psychological view even more impor-
tant incident, was the Russian killing of three Serbs on 6 September 1999. 
The Russians shot back when fired on by Serbs caught beating two wounded 
Albanians in the village of Korminjanje. 
According to NATO General Secretary Javier Solana this proved that the 
Russian peacekeepers behaved according to the obligations of all KFOR 
troops. 
‘Therefore they deserve the same respect that KFOR troops from any 
other country deserve. I have one KFOR, and not two KFORs. I think today 
is the proof of that’(BBC News, 7 September 1999). 
The Russian Colonel Mikhail Kovtunenko had the following comment: 
‘This incident is a good example of how Russian peacekeepers came to 
Kosovo with a peacekeeping task in mind to normalise the situation in the 
region. I are fighting against criminals no matter nationality, Serbs or 
Albanians’ (BBC News, 7 September 1999). 
In the short term this could serve to improve the reputation of the Rus-
sians among the ethnic Albanians. Seen from a wider and longer perspective, 
the incident could be a vital brick in the creation of general conditions for a 
CPO. It shows that in September 1999, when the overall agreements with the 
Russian Federation had been reached at the top political level, securing im-
partiality and action according to international standards, intentions, RoE 
and SOP, Russian KFOR units had the potential of behaving as an impartial 
and credible peacekeeping force. 
Russian anger related to the KFOR mission in Kosovo, voiced more by 
political and military officials in Moscow than by Russian commanders in 
the field, is still present. Aside from the situation in Orahovac, Moscow has 
also continued to lambaste NATO more generally for what it says is the 
NATO’s failure to enforce order in Kosovo and to protect the province’s 
non-Albanian inhabitants. Moscow has protested particularly against what it 
describes as NATO’s coddling of the KLA. This friction between the West 
and Russia on the political level underlines even stronger the necessity of 
having an overall agreement at the highest political level prior to the launch-
ing of a peacekeeping operation on the ground. 
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On 16 September 1999 Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, 
Ambassador Sergei Kislyak, stated that NATO and Russian diplomats 
agreed the previous day that it was necessary to demilitarise the UCK by 19 
September (RFE/RL Newsline, 20 September 1999). He added that both 
sides also agreed and worked on deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the 
town of Orahovac. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at 
ambassador level met on Wednesday, 15 September 1999 at NATO Head-
quarters to discuss the situation in and around Kosovo and exchange views 
on NATO-Russia co-operation in the international peace operation (KFOR) 
(NATO Homepage). Stressing their commitment to full implementation of 
the provisions and goals of Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO and 
Russia commended the co-operative and professional relationship among 
NATO participating states and Russia within KFOR and discussed ways to 
further improve the security situation in Kosovo. NATO and Russia also 
stressed the importance of the 19 September deadline regarding the UCK 
demilitarisation. NATO and Russia agreed that the international community 
should keep this process under close scrutiny and ensure its proper comple-
tion. Close co-operation between NATO and Russia resulted also in the lift-
ing of Albanian barricades around Orahovac.  
Conclusions 
The Yugoslav conflict shows that it is possible to include Russian forces in 
NATO-led operations outside the CIS as long as the operations are mandated 
by UN Security Council resolutions and that NATO and Russia may work 
together in order to find pragmatic solutions for organisational command and 
control arrangements.  
In IFOR/SFOR Russian airborne troops have shown that they have the 
ability to act as professional second generation peacekeepers and meet inter-
national norms and standards. This organisation and the structure, command 
and control arrangements, and experience create a constructive military plat-
form for possible CPOs in the CIS area. The fact that the West and Russia 
could find a working solution in the former Yugoslavia once more empha-
sises that the challenge of mounting such a combined operation is first of all 
of a political nature.  
Co-operation between the West and Russia in any kind of peace opera-
tion must be based on specific, overall binding agreements ensuring that the 
overall intention for the operation and the basic principles of peace opera-
tions are agreed upon.These agreements should be signed at the highest pos-
sible level (at least MFA, MoD). The KFOR model describing Russian 
representation, participation and command and control arrangements in a 
very detailed way and on all levels of responsibility is a very useful example 
to follow. The detailed agreement concerning allocation of responsibilities 
between Russian forces and KFOR at Pristina Airfield is another document 
to be used as a ‘pattern’ for possible CPOs. It is therefore important to build 
on this positive experience when preparing or launching a CPO on CIS terri-
tory. The IFOR/SFOR and KFOR combined peace operations have shown 
that command and control arrangement can function in practice at least as 
long as the operation does not develop into an enforcement operation. The 
experience is that the Russians airborne officers and other ranks seem to be 
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very professional and dedicated peacekeepers. It is important to focus on 
development of common, or at least compatible, procedures, doctrines, 
techniques and tactics as well as joint exercises within the framework of 
bilateral and multilateral co-operation as it would improve the chances of 
making a CPO a success story. It could result in a substantial improvement 
of the military capability for CPOs, and other, even more requiring forms of 
co-operation could also be considered. The main challenge with respect to 
combined peace operations seems to be of a political nature. If Russia and 
the West could agree on and draw clear lines on the governmental and mili-
tary-political level, smooth co-operation on the ground would be possible. 
Russian Military Capability Related to Combined Peace 
Operations 
The experience with Russian forces participating in CPOs in Bosnia and 
Kosovo is in general positive. They are primarily fulfilling their tasks 
according to mandate and intentions. Operations in the CIS area also seem to 
have a positive development to the observance of underlying principles of 
traditional peacekeeping. Moscow has, however, so far drawn peacekeepers 
to IFOR/SFOR and KFOR from a quite limited source, namely the airborne 
units. If the overall evaluation in MoD and the General Staff is that they are 
the only qualified international peacekeepers, the capability to participate is 
limited to the 5 airborne divisions (plus one division for training purposes), 
each with 2 parachute regiments. On the other hand, within the CIS units 
from motorised rifle divisions have been successfully deployed in the areas 
of conflict and served as peacekeepers. 
There are several uncertainties related to Russian conventional military 
capability. This is especially the case for rather small-scale operations like 
CPOs. In this context it is not relevant to discuss neither nuclear capability 
nor conventional full-scale war. These uncertainties are based on the experi-
ences and results of the first Chechen war that became a disaster for the Rus-
sian Army. When writing this report the second Chechen war is still going 
on and the final result is not given. This conflict has, however, shown a few 
interesting aspects: 
 
• Strong political and military will 
• Capability to concentrate ground troops (approx. 100,000 men) and air 
forces and furthermore allocate a wide spectrum of resources to the cam-
paign 
• Operational concept and tactics adapted to experiences from the first 
Chechen war and NATO operations in Kosovo  
• Commanders who intend to avoid humiliation at almost any cost. 
 
It seems, therefore, that Russia in a given situation and with necessary politi-
cal and military will, could be able to mount a considerable military force for 
CPOs. The fact that the Russians still are present as peacekeepers in Bosnia 
and Kosovo despite Chechnya and verbal attacks on NATO and the West 
indicates a will to co-operate.The fact that Russia has not withdrawn its 
peacekeeping forces deployed abroad indicates a considerable capacity, as it 
shows that Russia is able to engage its best troops in two difficult missions 
running at the same time. 
The conclusion will therefore be somewhat superficial and general: if the 
Russians were to base their commitment solely on airborne formations they 
should be able to mount 2 divisional headquarters and approximately 4 air-
borne regiments. If Moscow decides to use other formations the number of 
troops available for missions will be higher. So far only airborne troops have 
been deployed to serve in integrated units with Western participation. For 
command and control purposes they total 5 Army and Corps headquarters 
(Military Balance). At least one of these could be used for CPO. According 
to the Military Balance and taking into consideration operations in Chechnya 
there should be a reasonable amount of Combat Support and Combat Service 
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Support to support one to two airborne divisions abroad. Chechnya gives 
evidence of available combat aviation. What will probably be the most 
important constraint on potential Russian engagement in CPO-like opera-
tions is not the number of troops, equipment, materiel and units, but the abil-
ity to finance forces abroad. 
At present around 100,000 troops from several power ministries (mainly 
MoD and MoI) are involved in the operation in Chechnya. Even after the 
end of hostilities it is quite probable that Russia will have considerable 
formations deployed in the region to ensure full control over the area. This 
could mean that Russia will be short of forces available for peace operations 
abroad. It could have either a positive or a negative impact on potential 
CPOs. Positive, because it will make Russia more willing to allow troops for 
the West to take part in CPOs; negative, because Russia could use all the 
opportunities available (Security Council or OSCE) to block launching an 
operation in the area which is still perceived as the country’s exclusive 
sphere of influence.  
Resources 
Reform of the Russian armed forces is suffering from a definite lack of re-
sources. A complete reform of the military would require between 150 and 
300 billion US$. (Russlands Perspektiven. Kritische Faktoren und mögliche 
Entwicklungen bis 2010, 1999). This indicates that they can afford a total 
force of 550,000 to 600,000 men, which is half of today’s strength. 
Russia can probably not afford large military involvement in the CIS or 
elsewhere. It is important to bear in mind that while traditional UN peace-
keeping operations are paid by the UN, in all other operations the participat-
ing states usually have to bear the costs themselves. The Russian involve-
ment in SFOR, supported economically by the UN, has been an exception. 
The cost of having the 1,200-men Russian brigade in Bosnia amounts more 
than 20 million US$ a year (Kuchin 1999: 47). The cost of the KFOR contin-
gent, which it seems like the Russians have to pay for, is estimated to around 
65 million US$ a year. The lack of funding necessary to conduct peacekeep-
ing operations could be a very strong limiting factor when it comes to -
Russian participation in different kinds of operations. The West could of 
course pay for Russia if it considers its participation necessary from a politi-
cal and economic point of view. It is, however, important to know whether 
Russia will accept such an offer, what effect it could have on Russia’s atti-
tude to the West and whether Russian would not see it as an offence to its 
national pride. The delicate question of financing Russian participation has 
to be carefully examined by the West in an open dialogue with Russia on a 
case-to-case basis. 
The conflict in Chechnya and Dagestan, at least in its early phase, has 
shown the poor co-operation between troops from Russia’s various ‘power 
ministries’, and the apparent failure of the government to equip Russian 
troops with the latest weaponry and military hardware.  
This is linked to a broader debate over budgetary priorities which seem to 
favour the country’s strategic forces rather than its conventional ones. 
Marshal Igor Sergeyev is himself a former rocket forces commander, and as 
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defence minister he has pushed a concept of military reform which priori-
tises support for the strategic forces while deferring much-needed moderni-
sation of the conventional forces’ ageing military-technical base. 
The head of the Defence Ministry’s Budget and Finance Department, 
Colonel General Georgii Oleynik, told on 24 September that because of the 
conflict in Dagestan, the government has boosted by 2.5 billion rubles the 
ministry’s 8.3 billion ruble spending limit for September. Oleynik said he 
hopes that as a result of the conflict, the amount of money allotted to defence 
in the 2000 budget will be increased by 25 billion rubles (RFE/RL Newsline, 
28 September 1999). 
The then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told the Duma on 28 September 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 29 September 1999) that it is time to ‘centralise federal 
budget allocations for the armed forces’ and to transform the military into a 
professional army. He added that national security ‘costs a lot’ and this pro-
gramme ‘should not be regarded as cheap.’ Under the current draft, 119.3 
billion rubles are devoted to national defence and 77.8 billion rubles to law 
enforcement out of a total spending of 803.0 billion rubles. According to 
Colonel General Georgiy Oleynik, Director of the Defence Ministry’s Main 
Directorate for the Military Budget and Finances, the funding of the armed 
forces remains ‘complicated’, despite some signs of improvement. While 60 
per cent of the military’s needs were met over the past three years, that fig-
ure stands at 75 per cent for 1999. The state’s, however, owed the military 
some 52 billion roubles by the end of August.  
The conciliatory commission has worked out a compromise version of 
the 2000 budget. In the new draft, revenues amount to 791.3 billion rubles 
($31.4 billion) and expenditures to 849.2 billion rubles. The previous draft, 
which the Duma rejected on 28 September 1999, provided for revenues to-
talling 745.1 billion rubles and outlays of 803 billion rubles. More than half 
of the additional 46.2 billion rubles added for expenditures will be devoted 
to defence needs. This represents a 22 per cent hike in the defence budget 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 5 October 1999).  
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin promised to rebuild Russia’s military 
power. ‘The government has undertaken to rebuild and strengthen the mili-
tary might of the state to respond to new geopolitical realities, to both exter-
nal and internal threats.’ Putin said that military spending would be in-
creased by 57 per cent next year, to 146 billion rubles (Jamestown, 29 Octo-
ber 1999). The government has already increased military spending to pro-
vide additional means to conduct the operation in Chechnya. Deputy Prime 
Minister Ilya Klebanov said that US$160 million would be added to the 
1999 defence budget to purchase planes, helicopters, communications equip-
ment and night vision goggles for use against Chechen guerrillas. 
Although the conciliatory commission has already approved a 26 billion 
ruble hike in defence spending in the 2000 budget, former Defence Commit-
tee Chairman Roman Popkovich suggested that even more funding is neces-
sary. He called for expenditures totalling 37 billion rubles, which would 
represent a 31 per cent hike over the figure proposed in the draft budget 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 12 October 1999).  
These financial decisions can increase the general capability of mounting 
headquarters and forces to CPO and improve the material situation in the 
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armed forces in areas such as combat aviation, communications and night 
vision equipment. 
The latest developments with high oil prices on the world marked have 
provided Russia with some extra incomes which could be used to finance the 
Chechen campaign. In the long term, however, Russia’s ability to finance its 
armed forces and participate in peace operations will depend on the imple-
mentation of so needed structural reforms.  
Taking into consideration the economic constraints limiting Russia’s 
ability to participate in CPOs, it is important to investigate other concepts for 
CPOs funding. 
Interoperability 
When discussing the interoperability of forces taking part in a military 
operation it is important to focus on the areas, which could have a decisive 
impact on the success or failure of the possible CPO. These areas are:  
 
• Language 
• Materiel and equipment  
• Operational concept, tactics, procedures and techniques 
• Command and control infrastructure, concept and techniques 
• Lack of common training and exercises in enforcement operations. 
 
The above-mentioned areas are all decisive factors in military operations and 
seem to pose a challenge even in operations including only NATO states. 
More than 50 years of standardisation in most aspects of military operations 
has not overrun the fact that NATO is made up of 19 independent states with 
different languages, culture, military tradition and to a large degree national 
equipment. A peace enforcement action which in most cases would be an 
offensive joint military operation including at least ground, air, and perhaps 
naval elements is very complex. It is therefore from a military point of view 
relevant to maintain that CPOs should in the foreseeable future be limited to 
second generation peacekeeping as the highest ambition.  
This limitation does not exclude mutual support to peace enforcement. 
Such support implies that for instance NATO forces are not an integrated 
part of the Russian force, but have a separate mission to support the opera-
tion. The other possibility is Russian support to a NATO enforcement opera-
tion. Relevant examples of such co-operation between Russia and the West 
in the field of mutual support could be: 
 
• Russian strategic air lift capacity would be a vital asset in any military 
operation 
• Russian operational and tactical lift with fixed or rotary wing aviation 
• Intelligence 
• Western support with delivery of smart weapons 
• Western sea lift support 
• Logistic support 
• Western financial support 
• Rear area and flank security 
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• Support operations in other directions as a separate, but co-ordinated 
force. 
 
When discussing potential Russian-Western co-operation in peace enforce-
ment operations it is necessary to underline that the above-mentioned aspects 
are seen from a strictly technical military perspective. The prospects for a 
Combined Peace Enforcement Operation or even mutual support to such 
action are at the moment rather grim, as there is still a deep mistrust between 
the Kremlin and the Western capitals.  
Personnel 
 
‘In war, the relative strength of forces count ¼, and the morale ¾’. 
Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
The rate of attrition among career officers in the armed forces is ‘signifi-
cantly exceeding’ the rate of planned cuts. There are reports that every 10th 
officer post is vacant and that there is a 20 per cent shortfall among platoon 
and team commanders, with that figure rising to 30 per cent in some eastern 
military districts. This development is believed to be caused by the fact that 
one-third of officers with more than 20 years’ service are seeking to retire, 
while almost half of newly graduated officers opt for resignation upon com-
pleting their education. In all, almost 20,000 officers under the age of 30 re-
signed last year (RFE/RL Newsline, 15 October 1999). 
The Defence Ministry’s inability to retain in the service its best young 
officers is not a new phenomenon. It has a devastating impact on the army’s 
morale and capabilities. It has contributed to a ‘greying’ of the officer corps, 
the result being that older, more conservative officers stay in the service 
while their often more dynamic junior colleagues leave the army. In practical 
terms, the demographics underlying this loss of officers have meant espe-
cially difficult staffing shortages among platoon and unit commanders, con-
tributing directly to the decline of the army’s combat capabilities.  
The difficulties of life in uniform and the lack of prospects in the army 
contribute greatly to this drainage. Participation in peacekeeping operations 
seems to be one of the effective ways of alleviating the problems of the 
army personnel. According to available and reliable data there are four to 
five persons applying for each peacekeeper position among the Russian air-
borne troops (Koldbodskaya 1999: 4), which so far are only formation used 
in SFOR and KFOR. The main reason of this interest in peacekeeping mis-
sions is without any doubt the pay offered to those who are chosen. Rranks 
earn approximately 800 US$ a month, and officers from 1000 to 1200 US$. 
In the short term this will obviously promote recruitment of well-qualified 
servicemen. In a longer perspective, however, such differences could create 
envy and serious frictions within the Russian armed forces and even 
corruption and nepotism, as participation in peacekeeping missions can 
become the sole material incentive for those serving in the army. 
The Ministry of Finances reports that armed forces personnel are still 
owed 8.7 billion rubles in back wages, while Prime Minister Putin has 
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pledged that soldiers in combat zones will earn $1,000 a month rather than 
the usual $300. After meeting with Putin and Defence Minister Igor 
Sergeyev to discuss funding for the Chechen conflict, Central Bank 
Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko promised that the bank will issue new state 
securities to fund the war effort.  
Another important problem the Russian authorities have to deal with is 
economic crime in the armed forces. Military Prosecutor Yurii Demin 
proclaimed that economic crime is steadily rising in the armed forces and 
other military branches of the Russian Federation. Crimes uncovered by 
military prosecutors in the first six months of this year cost the armed forces 
more than 4.7 million US$. The number of officers found guilty of theft and 
graft leaped to 1,017 in 1999, compared with 185 over an unspecified period 
up to 1993 while the number of known cases of bribery in the army rose by 
82 per cent in the same period. In August 1999, Demin announced that some 
20 lawsuits against generals and admirals are being considered by the mili-
tary prosecutor’s offices around the country (RFE/RL Newsline, 11 October 
1999). 
Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for Strategic and 
Technological Analysis, claims that of the 1.2 million members of the Rus-
sian armed forces, no more than 100,000 are combat ready (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 11 October 1999). The Russian military is largely composed of 
military conscripts who serve for two years. Defence experts claim that those 
conscripts spend the first year on training and the last six months preparing 
to leave. 
The current Chechen campaign is in fact a decisive turning point for the 
morale among Russian generals, officers, non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) and conscripts. If the general public concludes that this war was a 
failure and another humiliation, then it is very probable that it will cause 
severe, long-lasting damage to all groups of personnel in the Russian armed 
forces. If, on the other hand, the second Chechen war is to be considered a 
success, it can give a distinct boost to the armed forces and personnel.  
Notwithstanding the problems they face in their duty, Russian soldiers 
in both Bosnia and Kosovo have shown that they can act according to over-
all intentions and RoE when they are a part of a multinational peacekeeping 
force. 
Military Reform 
During most of the 1990s there has been an ongoing planning process to re-
form the military system (Knoph & Leijonhielm 1999:217). The need for 
such a reform has been evident since the Soviet period, but the responsible 
national authorities have not been capable of systematically approaching this 
challenge. By the second half of 1997 a reform plan was authorised, and the 
work on changing the Russian military system started. There are, however, 
indications of disagreement within the leadership of the armed forces 
concerning the implementation and goals of reforms. The plan is to imple-
ment the ongoing reform in two steps to 2005. The intention is to have 
armed forces with the standard operational ground, air/space and naval ele-
ments. The total personnel strength shall not exceed 1.2 million with a mix-
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ture of volunteers (professionals) and enlisted (conscripts). The number of 
military districts is to be reduced from eight to six. Four of these districts are 
to be reorganised to strategic/operational commands with responsibility for 
command and control of all forces within their area of responsibility and two 
are to become territorial commands with the task of preparing and conduct-
ing mobilisation of reserves. The reform is also meant to cover the paramili-
tary forces from the other power ministries and the military-industrial com-
plex. The General Staff will have the overall co-ordinating responsibility for 
all forces. Some elements of the reform have already been implemented, 
especially on the organisational part. The financial situation will, however, 
decide whether the plans of the reform progress will be implemented. 
Besides the reorganisation of the structure, research and development are 
prioritised, but procurement of new military equipment will be limited due to 
economic constraints. Not until some years after 2000 will there be an 
increase in equipment investments and from 2005 an extended increase in 
procurement. The ambition is that Russia should have an optimally equipped 
and trained defence force by 2025. 
The drive for military reform in the Russian Federation has been led by 
economic pressures and the need for savings on operations and for moderni-
sation of the armed forces rather than by changes in Russia’s threat assess-
ments, dramatic as they have been (SIPRI homepage). For a short period 
after the spring of 1997, after the appointment of Defence Minister Igor 
Sergeyev, some momentum built up for cuts and reorganisation. Since re-
form involves rather high costs, caused mainly by demobilisation and re-
equipping of the armed forces, and Russia has not yet recovered from the 
financial crisis of August 1998, it is unlikely that the country will now meet 
its target for reduction in troop numbers to 1.2 million by 1999 or transform 
its forces into a professional army by the end of 2000.  
The Russian budget allocation for ‘national defence’ for 1999 was 93.7 
billion roubles, 2.3 per cent of GDP, or about 120 billion roubles (3.2 per-
cent of GDP) if some other budget items such as military pensions and 
international activities are added. This represents a nominal increase over the 
1998 budget but will not cover the costs of demobilisation, promised salary 
increases, payment of wage arrears or the accumulated Ministry of Defence 
debt to the arms industry (19 billion roubles in early 1998). Procurement and 
R&D have been particularly hard hit. Implementation of Russia’s commit-
ments to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons is threatened. Above all, it 
is generally agreed in Russia that the nuclear forces should have highest pri-
ority in the Russian defence posture to compensate for the weakness of the 
country’s conventional capabilities. The nuclear forces serve as an ‘um-
brella’ for implementing military reform and as the only remaining element 
of the Soviet superpower status. 
The main challenge related to CPOs will be to find necessary economic 
resources to equip and train forces capable of operating and, if necessary, 
leading multinational formations. There is probably also a requirement for 
standing formations with professional soldiers. However, it is not likely that 
in the foreseeable future the military reform will make the Russian armed 
forces capable of conducting operations with higher ambitions than in 
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Bosnia and Kosovo, where they were, at least partly, financed by the interna-
tional community. 
Conclusions 
The Russian prioritisation of the strategic branch of the country’s armed 
forces at the expense of the conventional forces and the army in particular 
gives the Russians little freedom of action when it comes to assigning forces 
for peace operations. This freedom of action is further limited by the rela-
tively high-profiled Russian internal operations in Chechnya and Dagestan. 
The lack of co-ordination between the ‘power ministries’ creates difficulties 
in optimising Russian forces’ contributions to peace operations in general. 
The capability of the Russian army at present is limited to combined 
peace operations in a second generation peacekeeping scenarios, like KFOR 
or SFOR. For military, financial as well as political reasons it is difficult to 
expect that the country will have combined peace enforcement capability in 
the near future. The coming discussion of possible CPOs in the CIS will 
therefore focus on traditional peacekeeping.  
Russian short- and mid-term financial shortcomings as well as internal 
needs in the Caucasus region limit the amount of forces available for CPOs. 
Assuming that Russia will limit its contribution to CPOs to airborne troops, 
the capacity, given political, military and financial conditions, could be two 
airborne divisions consisting of two regiments each (three battalions) with 
headquarters and necessary combat support and combat service support. At a 
higher level one army and/or one corps head-quarters with combat support 
and combat service support could be available. The options discussed below 
are based on those numbers. 
The financing of Russian participation has to be examined carefully by 
the West and discussed openly with Russia on a case-to-case basis. The 
SFOR UN-sponsored model could be an alternative solution. From a strictly 
financial point of view, the traditional UN peacekeeping operation fits the 
Russian economy best. 
Even though Russian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia seem to be 
well-paid, lack of payment according to agreements could further demoralise 
soldiers and officers. Higher wages promote the recruitment of qualified 
officers and other personnel. At present this is mainly applied to the selec-
tion of airborne troops. The long-term effect of creating ‘A’ and ‘B’ teams 
can have a devastating impact on the morale of the armed forces. This could 
have a decisive effect on the efficiency and capability of the Russian armed 
forces in general, and therefore also on the forces taking part in CPOs. On 
the other hand, a positive Russian contribution to CPOs (as in Bosnia and 
Kosovo) can have positive spill-over effects on the armed forces in general. 
The development has to be monitored closely as the negative development 
will inevitably have a negative impact on Russian peacekeeper behaviour 
and their ability to act in compliance with international standards. 
Even though the conclusion is that conditions for CPOs in a peace 
enforcement context are not present, this does not exclude mutual support 
in peace enforcement operations. Possible areas of co-operations are men-
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tioned in this chapter. Peace enforcement as such will not be discussed in 
this report, except for mentioning the option in the overall conclusion.  
Experiences show that it is decisive to extend common training, educa-
tion and exercises to improve capability of both Russian and Western troops 
to conduct operations within the CPO framework.  

Possible CPOs in the CIS  
The discussion in this chapter is primarily based on arguments and conclu-
sions presented in the previous chapters with comments based primarily on 
author’s own experience as peacekeepers. 
It must be emphasised that the use of military force, also in peace opera-
tions should not be an objective per se. On the other hand, it has recently ( in 
Bosnia and hopefully Kosovo) been shown that troops on the ground can be 
a basic tool to create conditions for a peaceful and stable development. The 
necessary, but ambitious goal of any peace operation should be to achieve 
that the force has no raison d’être and can withdraw (or more realistically, 
be systematically downsized). In all Russian or Russian-led peace operations 
in the CIS cease-fires were achieved, only to be followed by a political stale-
mate. The main purpose of introducing CPOs as an interesting alternative 
should be to end this stalemate and start working on lasting solutions. A joint 
Russian-Western peacemaking effort could probably bring about some posi-
tive effects, but there is at least one important obstacle to overcome – the 
lack of political will to find solutions at the highest level in Moscow and 
Washington (Brussels) to establish the overall political framework including 
a mandate from the Security Council and/or the OSCE as the legal founda-
tion for joint operations. Sensitive areas, such as command of national forces 
and command and control in general will probably also have to be dealt with 
at the highest level. 
The experience from the establishment of KFOR showed clearly the 
importance of high level Russian-American involvement. With this in place, 
the establishment of the force seemed to tune smoothly on the military level. 
In the near future co-operation between Russia and the West will probably 
be based not on an overall agreement but on a case-by-case principle.  
This report has previously concluded that a CPO has to be based on a UN 
Security Council resolution or decision taken by the OSCE. The most rele-
vant and challenging area for CPOs is at present the the CIS area. The two 
sides are today engaged in two ongoing CPOs in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Experiences from the Yugoslav conflict so far indicate that it should be pos-
sible to implement a similar concept if (or when) new conflicts should arise 
in the Balkans. The recent East Timor conflict exemplified that Russia is 
willing to support operations outside the CIS and Europe if they are man-
dated by the UN Security Council. The limits on Russian participation in the 
foreseeable future are due to the lack of resources necessary to deploy large 
contingents overseas. East Timor is a good example where the Russians sup-
ported the decision on the Australian-led peacekeeping force in the Security 
Council, but did not provide troops to the peacekeeping force. At present the 
Russians seem to prioritise deployments in the Russian Federation, the CIS 
and Europe (so far the Balkans). 
It seems that CPOs outside the CIS or Europe are rather unthinkable in 
the foreseeable future. The real challenges are located in the CIS area, but 
CPOs on Russian ground are ruled out for political reasons. Russia is already 
involved in four operations in the CIS area and some of them (for instance in 
Nagorno-Karabakh) could be seen as potential target areas for a CPO.  
The conclusions drawn so far in this report indicate quite strongly that co-
operation between Russia and the West at present and in the foreseeable 
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future should be limited to preventive deployment and traditional peace-
keeping operations. In other words, peace enforcement does not seem to be 
relevant at present. This is primarily because: 
 
• From a military point of view, the interoperability (human, linguistic, 
C2, conceptual and material) between Russian and Western countries to 
conduct combined joint offensive operations is not yet achieved. 
• Politically it is very unlikely that Russia and the West (especially 
NATO and the US) will be able to reach an agreement on conducting 
such an operation, especially if I take into consideration the Russian 
ideas on creation of a multipolar world and the fear of US and NATO 
dominance, particularly in the ‘near abroad’. 
 
It could, however, be possible to see the West and Russia co-operate in 
minor-scale operations against terrorism they consider as a common threat. 
So far there has been no military co-operation, but according to news sources 
there has been intelligence and police co-operation and discussion of these 
matters at minister of defence level (Jamestown, 14 September 1999). This 
area of common interest could be further exploited to establish a base for 
extended co-operation and increased confidence. 
Force composition including Russian contribution 
A basic assumption in discussing force composition and configuration is that 
every CPO in the CIS area will be unique and require specific political as 
well as military measures. A solution that could be acceptable in Moldova 
could be totally unacceptable in Abkhazia. Furthermore, the question of 
force composition and configuration will be so important to the Russians 
(and the West) that it probably would have to be orchestrated before decision 
in the Security Council or the OSCE. Seen from a Western point of view, 
this is an important element in discussions with Moscow before eventually 
mounting a CPO in the CIS area. Based on IFOR/SFOR and KFOR experi-
ence, it would be very relevant to point out that Russia will have great 
difficulties in participating in multinational peace operations above brigade 
level. Operations within the Russian Federation or on CIS territory will be in 
the foreseeable future conducted with Russia in the lead chair. Practice in 
KFOR has shown the Russian peacekeepers have been very eager to show 
that they are just as impartial as soldiers from the Western major powers. 
SFOR has operated with three Multinational Divisions (MNDs) dividing 
Bosnia in their respective Area of Responsibility (AOR). The MNDs are 
lead by respectively the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The 
Russian Brigade is a part of the US-led division, made up in addition of the 
Nordic-Polish Brigade, the Turkish Brigade and US formations.  
It could be tempting in order to build more confidence between parties to 
have at least the ambition of giving the Russian troops greater responsibility. 
The point of departure should, however, be the SFOR model with independ-
ent Russian formations, in most cases with their own AOR. When it comes 
to command and control, Russia should be able to provide higher echelon 
head-quarters with necessary infrastructure. 
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From a military point of view, multinationality has it limitations. As a 
rule of thumb in peace enforcement, division level should be the lowest one 
in any multinational operation. This would, however, be very difficult to 
obtain, so it is perhaps necessary to lower the ambition level to brigade. 
Most of the European smaller states (like the Nordic ones) are not able to 
maintain more that a battalion-size force in international operations at any 
time. Concerning peacekeeping it is important to say that a lower level of 
intensity of the conflict would require a smaller international (multinational) 
force to handle it. Battalion level is ideal, but for instance in Moldova com-
pany level could be accepted. The problem is that multinational companies 
seem to not function very well, mainly due to the fact that the responsibility 
of the commander in personnel matters is pulverised. The SFOR 
multinational Nordic-Polish Brigade (1996 to 2000) with independent 
national battalions has proven quite successful by integrating units from a 
former Warsaw Pact state (Poland) with units from NATO countries (Den-
mark and Norway) and neutral states (Finland and Sweden). This indicates 
visibly that if there is a positive will, multinational brigade formations can 
solve advanced peacekeeping missions. The PfP concept and framework 
seem to have played a crucial role in creating this capability.  
Mandate – responsibility – type of peace operation 
As previously concluded, it is natural to base the discussion in this report on 
peace operations based on resolutions in the UN Security Council. Opera-
tions without mandate will most probably look like Kosovo or for that matter 
Chechnya with the West or the Russians operating ‘on their own’ and under 
strong criticism from the ‘other side’. 
As it seems that the CIS will remain in the foreseeable future out of 
bounds for NATO as an alliance, no peace operation in this area, even 
approved by the UN Security Council, can be led by NATO. This leads to 
the next conclusion that if the West want to have influence or participate 
‘east of the Balkans’, the OSCE is the organisation to emphasise. Operations 
on or close to Russian territory will be regarded as ‘internal affairs’ by the 
Russians and they will not be willing to let others, let alone NATO, to be in 
charge.  
Russia has more or less reluctantly accepted that NATO was allowed by a 
UN Security Council resolution to be responsible for the operations in 
Bosnia and Kosovo.At present there are few reasons to believe that such 
arrangements should not be possible in the future as long as: 
 
• The operation is based on a UN Security Council resolution or a 
decision by the OSCE 
• Russia is not a party to the conflict 
• The conflict is outside the Russian zone of vital interests  
• Russia and the West have a common perspective on the conflict  
• The West treats Russia as a serious and equal partner in the diplo-
matic, political and military actions leading to the peace operation. 
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By supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 1264 on East Timor Rus-
sia has accepted Australia as the leading state in the East Timor peace opera-
tion. The resolution also states that the multinational force led by Australia 
as soon as possible should be replaced by a traditional UN peacekeeping 
force. It is also interesting to point out the fact that China is mentioned as a 
potential participant in the Australian-led force (BBC, 16 September 1999). 
Such a step on the part of China could be a sign of future Russian considera-
tions related to their own participation in joint operations, as it would estab-
lish a precedent to be followed in future joint operations. 
If the situation so permits, the Russians could accept a peace operation 
led by other states as well as a traditional UN peacekeeping operation. It is 
important to bear in mind that while traditional UN peacekeeping operations 
are paid for by the UN, in all other operations the participating states have to 
bear the costs themselves. Taking into consideration the poor shape of the 
Russian economy, this could be a very strong limiting factor with regard to 
Russian participation in CPOs not financed by the UN. The report has previ-
ously mentioned that an alternative to CPOs could be development of a 
corps of observers or monitors within an OSCE or UN frame. Their 
organisation would include representatives from Western countries and the 
task would be to monitor and observe peace operation forces from Russia 
and/or other CIS states, as its is case already today in Georgia and Tajikistan. 
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Responsible organisations in CIS area operations 
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When developing its military capability, the European Union should exploit 
the actual window of opportunity created by the surprisingly positive Rus-
sian view on THE Union, also in defence matters. Invitations to incorporate 
Russian forces in EU-led peace operations is in fact the most interesting 
challenge I have discovered while working on this report. 
Examples of current peacekeeping solutions 
There are some recent very relevant examples of different solutions which 
could be used in a CPO context: 
 
• Australia as leading state in East Timor 
• The United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL), traditional 
peacekeeping 
• NATO tasked by the Security Council in SFOR and KFOR 
• The Multinational Force and Observers is an independent (non-UN) 
peacekeeping mission, created as a result of the 1978 Camp David 
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Accords and the 1979 Peace Treaty. The MFO’s expenses, less the 
contributions of Germany and Japan, are funded in equal parts by 
Egypt, Israel and the USA. Since 1982, various states have contrib-
uted military and civilian personnel to serve in Egypt’s Sinai Penin-
sula as part of this highly successful organisation. The ten currently 
participating states are Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, 
Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, the United States and Uruguay. Nor-
way, while not a participating state, provides the MFO with four 
staff officers. 
 
Both the lead state concept and MFO in Sinai are interesting solutions. The 
purpose of this presentation is to underline that there are several solutions to 
a peacekeeping challenge, also in a CPO frame. Bearing in mind the conclu-
sion that the question of CPO is first and foremost a political one, creates a 
wide spectrum of options. Especially THE MFO concept has some note-
worthy aspects. It is a force explicitly formed and organised for a specific 
mission related to one conflict. Perhaps a similar force concept could be 
agreed upon under the control of Russia, USA and the European Union with 
the task of conducting a peacekeeping operation in one of the relevant CIS 
conflicts? 
Contributing states 
In a CPO in the CIS area the need for overall political acceptance of the in-
volved states and Russia in particular will totally overshadow the ideal mili-
tary requirements related to participating states. The above-mentioned Rus-
sian struggle for a multipolar world instead of a US-NATO dominated uni-
polar one, creates some basic restrictions. The history of the Turkish domi-
nance in the region is a second condition that makes it difficult for non-Mus-
lim states, and Russia especially, to accept NATO member Turkey as a lead 
nation. Even though the Russian-German relations have developed positively 
in the last decades, WW II experiences will probably still have an impact on 
the general attitude to German troops on the former Soviet Union territory. 
On the other hand, German troops are accepted in the former Yugoslavia 
(where they also have a bad record from WW II) and KFOR is even com-
manded by a German general. If an agreement is reached between Russia 
and the US at the highest political level, many states could be involved in 
this theoretical operation.  
Traditional peacekeeping states like the Nordic ones, and especially the 
non-NATO but EU members Sweden, Finland and Austria, could be the 
most acceptable ones from a Russian point of view (even though all of them 
have a history of turbulent relations with Russia). Reliance on small states in 
a CPO could lead to continuing Russian domination in the CIS area. The 
participating small Western states could as a result of this become Russian 
‘hostages’. However, if the West wants to participate in CIS peace opera-
tions, a ‘soft approach’ through the smaller non-NATO states could be 
adopted, which in the next turn could create conditions for participation of 
larger states and NATO members. Such an approach could also help con-
vince the Russians and other involved CIS countries that there is no hidden 
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agenda or offensive objectives behind deployment of Western forces in a 
CPO in the CIS area.  
The challenge of participating states is also closely related to the 
organisation in charge of the single operation. The difference in the Russian 
attitudes to the EU and NATO creates conditions for the EU to play a part in 
future CPOs in the CIS area. As an element in this positive attitude to the 
EU, the member states including larger countries such as France, Italy and 
Spain and perhaps the UK have slight potential as participants in CPOs in 
the CIS area. Besides the USA, the UK, France, Germany and Turkey have 
the military capability to play a role of lead state in a complex peacekeeping 
operation. Spain and Italy probably have the capability to be the leading state 
in a low-intensity peacekeeping operation, such as for instance Moldova. 
Peace enforcement would require a US or NATO lead role.  
Russia also seems to have a more positive attitude to some Western 
states. Greece, which happens to be a NATO member, but also a close Rus-
sia co-operation partner and an Orthodox nation, is perhaps the most obvious 
choice. Moscow would probably also have positive views on France, judging 
Paris as a counterbalance to Washington in European security. Besides the 
overall Russian and Western preferences it will be necessary to take into 
consideration the views of the states and/or organisations involved in the 
conflict. A peacekeeping operation, whether it is traditional or second 
generation, requires consent of the parties. The report has so far shown that 
second generation peacekeeping is the highest relevant ambition for a CPO 
in the CIS area. A possible approach from a Western point of view seems to 
suggest contribution from one of the great powers supplied with uncontro-
versial small states. A relevant example would be France plus Greece/Italy 
and Benelux and/or Nordic countries.  
The ideal ambition would be that every unit and single peacekeeper in a 
peacekeeping force was considered impartial by all parts involved in the 
conflict. Regrettably this is a totally unrealistic aim. This would in fact ex-
clude most of the states and organisations with military capability. It is there-
fore much more important to see the whole force or parts of the force as a 
whole. The force composition must be balanced so the parties to the conflict 
could see it as impartial, even though some of its elements could be per-
ceived as closer to one of the parties.  
Military requirements 
The composition of forces will depend on whether the operation has a UN 
Security Council mandate and under what’ umbrella’ (UN, OSCE, NATO, 
CIS) it would be conducted. Furthermore, the choice of a traditional multina-
tional UN-led operation or ‘lead nation/organisation’ concept will also have 
an impact on the composition of forces. From a military point of view the 
ideal solution would be an operation based on a clear mandate, taking into 
consideration the determinants of the conflict and geographical conditions 
under which the force would operate. The force should be built in close co-
operation with participating states and if possible approved by Russia and 
the US. The states will provide the troops necessary to conduct this opera-
tion. Unfortunately, the reality will probably be that the commander of the 
force would have the force structure decided before taking on his duty.  
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When putting together different states in a multinational peace operation 
it is important to have in mind what sort of tasks this force would have to 
handle, whether it will be assigned a peace enforcement role or whether its 
deployment has a more preventive character. Here follows a brief analysis of 
various challenges confronting the force in various types of operations. 
 
• Peace enforcement poses many challenges. Military operational re-
quirements seem to be high and solidarity among the participating 
states is also an important prerequisite. For instance, during the Gulf 
War, Saddam Hussein tried to split the coalition between the West 
and the Arab countries by trying to force Israel into engagement. 
Also in Kosovo Milosevic and some forces in Moscow tried to split 
the Alliance. The main limitation for a joint peace enforcement 
operation seems to be the lack of interoperability in complex joint 
operations and air operations particularly. This can in the future be 
improved by building on experience from joint peacekeeping and 
training and exercises under the PfP programme. 
• Traditional peacekeeping requires the trust of all parties involved in 
the conflict, the creation of a force that could be impartial as a 
whole and sufficient military capability to deter potential threats to 
the force itself and to the peace process that the force is supposed to 
protect. SFOR in Bosnia is a relevant example.  
• Second generation peacekeeping, including preventive deployment, 
requires sufficient military capability to be deterrent and have credi-
bility in the area of deployment (UNPREDEP Macedonia). It should 
not be regarded as having offensive ambitions by the local actors, 
but should, however, be effective in containing potential conflicts. 
The deployment area must not be assessed as a bridgehead for 
operations against the potential ‘aggressor’. It is interesting to no-
tice that the UNPREDEP in Macedonia is in fact one of the few 
successful UN peace operations. The force fulfilled the intentions of 
the deployment until China halted the mandate in the UN Security 
Council. This shows the weakness of the UN Security Council, but 
it also indicates that preventive deployment can be an underesti-
mated approach to conflict prevention. 
 
Experiences from UN peace operations, in contradiction to the two NATO-
led operations in the former Yugoslavia, give clear evidence of the necessity 
of a potent and well balanced force. This implies that the force must consist 
of tailor-made capability in: 
 
• Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I). 
• Manoeuvre force trained and prepared for the explicit mission (Ref. 
underlying principles for peacekeeping) 
• Combat Support including combat aviation (CS) 
• Combat Service Support (CSS). 
In addition to the assets of the force, the commander must have other assets 
available at the operational and to some extent the strategic level. These 
assets could include, depending on the needs, air power, amphibious forces, 
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naval assets and logistics. The force must be potent enough to deter the 
belligerent parties. A challenge with Western forces in the CIS area is to find 
the right balance between deterrence in the area of responsibility and assur-
ance to Russia. Concerning intelligence this has been one of the important 
lessons learned in the transition from UN- to NATO-led operations in the 
Balkans. Even though the UN, in order to act impartially, used the term in-
formation instead of intelligence, not only the name was inappropriate. A 
military commander depends on adequate intelligence to fulfil his mission 
and take care of his personnel (force protection). Obviously there is less need 
for high-level intelligence in peacekeeping operations than in peace enforce-
ment. On the other hand, it should be up to the force commander to decide 
what intelligence he or she needs to protect his soldiers and achieve tasks in 
the best way. Intelligence co-operation in a potential CPO will probably pose 
a huge challenge. On the other hand, intelligence co-operation seems to 
function rather smoothly in SFOR and KFOR. Undoubtedly the NATO 
countries have a well working integrated regional intelligence, but the Rus-
sian experience and know-how from the CIS will be vital. Taking into 
account the pragmatic approach visible in military co-operation, this should 
also be possible in this field. 
Command and control arrangements (C2) 
C2 needs a separate paragraph because these elements play a decisive role in 
any modern military operation. The fact that in peace operations, what a 
civilian does at the crossroads in Pec only few minutes later can have 
implications in Moscow and Washington, indicates that this has to be met 
with a ‘top-down’ approach. In other words, for each mission there has to be 
developed a specific C2 wiring diagram that regulates responsibility between 
the participating forces (KFOR being a good example).  
The C2 arrangement must be sanctioned at MoD level in the major capi-
tals involved. A C2 arrangement in any kind of military operation should 
follow ‘One level – one commander principle’. The Russians have not 
accepted being under NATO command neither in SFOR nor in KFOR. They 
have negotiated C2 solutions that have been acceptable to NATO. The UN 
force to East Timor has also an interesting C2 arrangement with Australia as 
the lead nation. This complies with the principle of simplicity, is quick to 
establish and is less bureaucratic than a traditional UN peacekeeping opera-
tion. On the negative side one should mention that it could create challenges 
related to impartiality and credibility of the force. Unity of command and 
simplicity of C2 are decisive in a peace enforcement operation. In preventive 
deployment and peacekeeping it is strongly desirable from a military point of 
view, but if the political situation requires more complex and multinational 
C2 arrangements (not talking about integrated NATO C2), it could be 
accepted. KFOR and SFOR have shown that politically motivated command 
and control arrangements work satisfactorily in a peacekeeping operation.  
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Possible deployments1 
Moldova 
It could become possible to replace the Russia-led peacekeeping operation in 
Moldavia with an international one. This operation could be a testing ground 
for the OSCE. This organisation is the one preferred by the Kremlin. This 
force could be deployed without a political solution of the conflict and as 
such create conditions for a breakthrough in the work on conflict solution. 
This would be a classical peacekeeping operation with the following tasks: 
 
• Observe cease-fire 
• Support the withdrawal of Russian troops 
• Guard Russian ammunition storage sites 
• Support the demolition of old Russian ammunition. 
 
The force requirement is estimated at one reinforced battalion task force with 
extended demolition capacity and competence. In addition movement control 
competence would be required. The OSCE could serve as a political and 
military umbrella and costs should be covered by the participating states. 
The main risk or challenge would be to establish working co-operation with 
the Russian troops and with the local Russian-speaking population. An 
important ambition in a CPO would be to let Western Countries Movement 
Control and EOD (Explosive and Ordnance Demolition) teams support the 
Russian force withdrawal and ammunition demolition. 
Abkhazia 
This conflict could evolve into a situation where an international force would 
be requested. Georgia is very critical of the current Russian operation in 
Chechnya and may demand the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from 
Abkhazia as well as troops based there. The CIS mandate might not be pro-
longed after mid 2000. Georgia then might request a NATO, OSCE or UN 
force to be deployed there. The most realistic and constructive alternative is 
probably a UN force. There is already the small-scale UNOMIG deployed in 
the area of Russia-run peacekeeping operation there. It could be possible to 
expand UNOMIG to UNPFG without adopting a new Security Council 
resolution as Russia could of course block such a resolution. Relevant tasks 
are: 
 
• Monitoring cease-fire 
• Ensure safe return of some 250,000 refugees to Abkhazia. 
 
It cannot be taken for granted that the parties to the conflict will be able to 
reach a peace accord. The Abkhazian side might create all sorts of difficul-
ties for the operation, including direct resistance. A robust force at heavily 
armed and reinforced brigade level with combat and vertical transport avia-
tion and naval support might be needed to face the challenges in that area. 
There is also need for an amphibious capability at battalion size within the 
                                                     
1 These examples were discussed with Pavel Baev, at an informal meeting at PRIO 3 
December, 1999 
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force. Primary risk would be mining and terrorist attacks. The geographic 
and strategic conditions for such an operation are quite good with the 
possibility of logistic exploitation of the Black Sea and the fact that the 
Abkhazians could not count on the support of troops from the Northern 
Caucasus, as was the case during the fighting in 1992-93.  
Nagorno-Karabakh 
The OSCE has a commitment from the Budapest summit in 1994 to under-
take a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, provided that a peace 
accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan is reached. Detailed plans have 
been developed, but they have not been implemented due to the lack of a 
peace agreement. The prospects for such an agreement are grim, and even if 
it is reached, implementation will be difficult. There are great logistic chal-
lenges and some of the field commanders are not entirely controllable. A 
cease-fire would be fragile and often deliberately violated. The political sta-
bility in both states is shaky, the leaders may be replaced by coups, tripping 
up the peace process.  
The OSCE hardly has the military capabilities needed to launch such an 
operation. However, there might be a request for a different ‘peace opera-
tion’ aimed primarily at securing the oil pipelines. The international consor-
tium operating in Azerbaijan has started oil delivery from the Caspian Sea 
and other projects are developing, though slowly. Until now, oil has been 
delivered to the port of Supsa in Georgia but a new pipeline to the Turkish 
port of Ceyhan is planned. On Azerbaijan’s territory both pipelines will go 
less than 100 km north of Nagorno-Karabakh. This can make the oil facili-
ties vulnerable to terrorist attacks and raids. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia 
are highly interested in international help protecting the pipeline. The OSCE 
HLPG Planned options are: 
 
• Three classic peacekeeping options supplied with military observ-
ers, varying from a 3,917 to a 1,667 strong forces 
• One purely military observer option, with altogether 830 men. 
 
All options are based on the same concept, as the basis and the main effort 
are to be concentrated in the lines of lommunication (LOC). They further-
more envisage the creation of an area of separation (AOS), monitoring of 
heavy weapons and special area, flight exclusion zone (FEZ) and certain air-
fields. 
The three peacekeeping alternatives call for a traditional infantry type 
force supported by engineering troops and aviation. The command and con-
trol is divided into three levels. 
1. The politico-military strategic level corresponds to the OSCE Ministerial 
Council/Senior Council/Permanent Council and Chairman in Office. 
2. The operational level is the OSCE Head of Mission (HOM) who is the 
senior command in theatre 
3. The tactical level is the military force commander or in OSCE language: 
Head of Military Force (HMF). 
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When it comes to financing of the operation, it is assumed that the troop con-
tributing states will be reimbursed for the use of troops and equipment. This 
concept could help Russia send its troops in spite of economic constraints.  
Comments 
Two Russian officers serve at the OSCE HLPG as special advisors. This 
indicates that Russia is willing to at least investigate the possibility for 
OSCE peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is also a point that the head of 
HLPG is a French brigadier general, and he might perhaps be an acceptable 
force commander. It seems, however, that even the most robust force pro-
posed by HLPG would be insufficient. The force should have combat avia-
tion and air support available, at least in theory. The command and control 
arrangement can imply direct interference from high level and little freedom 
of action for the military commander on the ground. There are many logistic 
and infrastructure challenges that could complicate deployment, mainte-
nance and withdrawal. The most important objection is the fact that the 
OSCE never has set up a large mission with formed military units. The first 
OSCE mission is probably better served by being launched in the less com-
plex Moldova. My suggestion concerning Nagorno-Karabakh would be an 
EU French-led CPO with Russian units included and of course massive Rus-
sian support units. 
 
Overall Conclusions 
Peacekeeping, including second generation peacekeeping, is the highest 
CPO ambition for the next five years. Several political as well as military 
factors strongly limit the possibility of launching a peace enforcement opera-
tion. The current operations within the SFOR and KFOR frameworks show 
clearly that Russian- Western military co-operation in peacekeeping opera-
tions works well when the overall political issues are settled. Both Russian 
and Western commanders, officers and other ranks generally behave 
pragmatically in negotiations and according to internationally accepted stan-
dards in the field. The question of combined peace operations is a political 
question and that only. CPOs have to be based on UN Security Council 
resolutions or OSCE decisions. It seems evident that the main obstacle is the 
lack of political will in Moscow, Washington, Brussels and other capitals. At 
present there are two political and one politico-military major uncertainties 
that will have major influence on the prospect of launching a CPO on CIS 
territory: 
 
• Russia’s course under Putin 
• The priorities of the American president and administration from 
January 2001 
• The outcome of the second Chechen war. 
 
With respect to CPOs on CIS territory the main challenge will be to con-
vince Moscow that such operations can promote peaceful and stable devel-
opment, and that it is not a bridgehead for ambitious Western military inter-
vention and policy in the Russian near abroad. Western leaders are aware 
that they have to have Russian acceptance for such an operation. Time and 
patience are crucial elements in achieving Moscow’s recognition of Western 
participation. The obvious paradoxical situation related to CPOs in the CIS 
area is that the best military solution, NATO, seems totally unacceptable 
from a Russian political point of view. The development in the Alliance of 
Combined Joint Task Forces as headquarters for Peace Support Operations 
and closer cooperation with Russia through the Partnership for Peace pro-
gramme could ease tensions between the potential partners in a CPO. It is 
obviously relevant to ask whether a CPO in the CIS is possible at all in the 
foreseeable future.  
The CIS is promoted by Russia as a relevant framework for peace opera-
tions within its own area, and is in fact already operating with Russia in 
peace operations. It does not seem credible that Western states would join 
this special CIS/Russian peacekeeping concept. There are several obvious 
political as well as military reasons for this. The most important political one 
is the risk of acting as a guarantor of Russian (or other CIS states) near 
abroad policy and conduct. It would also be very difficult to solve problems 
related to the establishment of command and control routines. UN has a 
well-tested but so far not successful concept for peacekeeping. In this 
organisation, Russia and the West are equal partners, which opens possibili-
ties. The UN plays a role in Georgia, and could play a larger role in a small-
scale operation using for instance its SHIRBRIG capability. After several 
UN failures in the former Yugoslavia it is doubtful whether the major West-
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ern powers once more would be involved in traditional UN operations in the 
vicinity of its borders.  
The lead state concept utilised by the UN in East Timor can be held open 
as an option with for instance France taking on that role. The OSCE plays an 
active monitoring role in the CIS, a role that could be extended to 
peacekeeping. Not wanting to end up like the UN, the organisation must 
achieve a success in its first peacekeeping operation. Since the OSCE lacks 
almost completely military capability it should be a small-scale operation. 
The OSCE has for years been planning for Nagorno-Karabakh, which actu-
ally might be too large-scale, if the operation is to be conducted without -
NATO support or without a major European power as lead nation. Moscow 
would most probably veto the first option, and it will probably be difficult to 
find candidates for the second alternative. 
A European Union with its own defence identity and capability might 
turn out to be an interesting new peacekeeping option, also in the CPO in the 
CIS area. The Kremlin might see a strengthened Europe as a step towards a 
multipolar world. This positive Russian attitude to the EU compared with the 
negative perception of NATO could actually become a window of opportu-
nity for the EU in peace operations. This could be what they are searching 
for with their Petersberg tasks and independence of USA. In the next five to 
seven years it will, however, be very difficult to expect the EU to be capable 
of launching anything more than a second generation peacekeeping opera-
tion. 
Positive conditions 
The positive practical results from for instance Bosnia, Kosovo and to some 
extent the OSCE summit show that behind the rhetoric there is an acceptance 
of the common dependence on co-operation in order to protect, preserve and 
develop security in Europe. In the final phase of the Helsinki negotiations 
prior to the deployment of KFOR, Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev appeared 
very constructive. Even though it may be hazardous to rely solely on such 
limited experience, it is an important indication.  
Some of the newly independent states in the former Soviet Union have a 
westward orientation. Georgia, which also has unresolved issues with ongo-
ing Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations, will probably constantly drive the 
process of implementing Western forces in the operations. Even though Rus-
sia at present is very negative to the GUUAM initiatives, this group can in-
flict positively on the Western will to be involved in the CIS area. 
Taking into account economic interests, mainly oil production and 
distribution, the West can become increasingly interested in ensuring a stable 
development in the Caucasus and in the Caspian area. It seems evident that 
this can be achieved most constructively in co-operation with Russia.  
Russia needs economic and other support. Its participation in the G-8 and 
the Council of Europe creates possibilities for the West to advocate in these 
organisations a joint effort by the West and Russia in achieving peace, stabil-
ity and human rights in the former Soviet states. 
There are clear indications of a lack of Russian military capability to 
handle several conflicts with adequate forces in the CIS area. This might 
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lead to the conclusion in the Kremlin that a CPO is an acceptable solution to 
hinder the spread of conflicts to Russian territory. 
Negative conditions 
There are very few signs of Russian movement towards the acceptance of 
Western peacekeeping troops in the CIS area. They do not even accept 
Ukrainian forces. Simultaneously the West has shown no or little intention, 
interest, will or capability to participate in former and ongoing peace opera-
tions in the CIS area. 
The media are full of evidence of friction and harsh statements made by 
Russian leaders commenting on relations with the West. This has been the 
case both during the Kosovo and the Chechnya conflicts. From the Russian 
side leading officers in the MoD (Marshal Sergeyev, Colonel General 
Ivashov) and General Staff (General Anatoliy Kvashnin, Colonel General 
Valeriy Manilov) have spoken with at smell of Cold War thinking. This has 
been documented in writing through the draft military doctrine published in 
October 1999. It is quite difficult to see a clear-cut overall strategy from the 
Russian side. Discrepancies between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Defence and the General Staff make Russian actions unpredict-
able. Surprises like the capture of the Pristina airport are most likely to 
happen in the future as well. The Russian friction between the political and 
military establishment could impact negatively on co-operation. It could in 
fact imply that a CPO in CIS will be judged as too a risky a project by the 
major Western powers. 
The West has so far shown little will to send its military forces to peace-
keeping operations in the CIS. It has been more or less silently accepted that 
the area is a zone of Russian vital interests. It is perhaps a good approach to 
avoid dangerous confrontations with the Russians, but in the long run it 
might not be a good way to ensure peaceful and democratic development in 
the region. 
The way ahead 
This report concludes that there is a slight potential for combined peace 
operations in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Assuming that there 
is a positive attitude to CPOs in the major Western capitals, the overall chal-
lenge will be to convince Russia that CPOs in the CIS also could be in Mos-
cow’s interest. In order to achieve this it is necessary to focus on the need of 
getting out of the stalemate and finding political solutions to the conflicts. It 
should help Russia understand that stability in the region is definitely in its 
interest.  
Both the West and Russia should be interested in launching combined 
peace operations. Such operations provide an opportunity to develop 
confidence, trust and ethically and morally high performance standard of 
single soldiers, NCOs, officers and units in joint peace operations. They also 
serve as a good school for the participating parties. Such operations can help 
create conditions for better mutual understanding and confidence between 
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the military of Russia and the West and in a longer run improve relations 
between authorities, politicians and peoples in general. 
The Russian attitude to NATO and the USA and Russia’s struggle against 
a unipolar world dominated by Washington nonetheless give rise to some 
difficulties. It would be rather difficult to see Russia accept NATO military 
presence and action on CIS territory, as it would be interpreted as encroach-
ing on Russia’s vital interests rather than a friendly support for solving 
problems in Russia’s neighbourhood. Russia’s preoccupation with creation 
of a multipolar world with several centres of power could on the other hand 
create better conditions for the involvement of the EU with a more integrated 
military structure based on the CFSP and ESDI. In the shorter term it seems 
though that the UN and the OSCE are the only security organisations with 
some potential of involvement in combined peace operations in the CIS area. 
This option is perhaps less tempting from a Western point of view, but it 
can give a possibility of ensuring higher standard of peace operations and 
their compliance with UN and OSCE requirements. The West could partici-
pate in the following ways: 
 
• Observers and monitors following the Russian and/or CIS opera-
tions 
• Western force provisions to Russian/CIS-led operations on a bilat-
eral level 
 
The following points are crucial when assessing the possibility of Russian-
Western co-operation in peace operations on CIS territory: 
 
• Western participation in the CIS area needs Russian acceptance and 
a political will from the West to be involved. The West must have an 
indirect approach and limit its ambitions. Initially the main aim for 
the Western participation in the CIS area should be to stabilise and 
improve relations with Russia and other CIS states. 
• The operation must be sanctioned by the UN Security Council or by 
the OSCE. Bilateral and/or multilateral agreements could be an 
alternative, but it less probable that Russia would accept this option. 
• The West must have the will to participate in the CIS area, which 
has not been seen so far. 
• If the West wants to participate and not let Russia run the show it is 
better to adopt a policy of small steps according to a policy that one 
has more influence with one participating battalion than with none. 
 
It might be possible for the West and Russia to co-operate in minor-scale 
operations against terrorism they both consider a mutual threat. This area of 
common interest could be further exploited to establish a base for extended 
co-operation and increased confidence. 
There is an overall necessity for combined Russian-Western training, 
exercising and education of units and single officers in combined peace 
operations. The PfP concept should be exploited for this purpose. This is not 
only for strictly military reasons, but also for development of officer codes, 
Overall Conclusions 
nupi april 01 
117 
ethics and morale necessary in future peace operations in a complex environ-
ment, where impartiality and code of conduct will be essential. 
The prospects of ‘keeping the peace together’ in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States are rather thin in the nearest future. On the other hand 
they are present and should be used as a brick in the construction of a 
peaceful and secure environment we all want to live in. 
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Abbreviations 
 
AFSOUTH Allied Forces South Europe  
AOR  Area of Responsibility, military term  
C2  Command and Control 
C3I  Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence  
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy  
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
CJTF   Combined Joint Task Force  
CNR  Commission on National Reconciliation, Tajikistan  
CPF   CIS’s Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan 
CPO  Combined Peace Operations, including Russian and Western 
(NATO/EU) forces 
CS  Combat Support including combat aviation  
CSS  Combat Service Support  
CST  Collective Security Treaty of the CIS  
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
ESDI   European Security and Defence Identity  
EU  European Union 
GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova 
IFOR Implementation Force, the first NATO-led CPO 
peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
HLPG High Level Planning Group, OSCE Military Planning 
Group, explicitly for Nagorno-Karabakh 
JCC  Joint Control Commission, North Ossetia 
KFOR   Kosovo Force, the NATO-led CPO in Kosovo 
MND (N) Multinational Division North SFOR, US-led with RUSBDE 
MINURSO  UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
MoD   Ministry of Defence 
MoI  Ministry of the Interior 
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding  
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NBC  Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical (anti) warfare 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
NUPI  Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
OGRF  Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova 
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PKO  Peacekeeping Operation, UN term 
PLANELM  Permanent planning element to exercise all the pre-deploy-
ment functions of SHIRBRIG, and on deployment, to 
become the nucleus of the deployed brigade head-quarters. 
PARP   Planning and Review, process within PfP 
PCC  Partnership Co-ordination Cell, NATO partner countries 
PfP  Partnership for Peace 
PSEs  PfP Staff Elements  
PSO   Peace Support Operations, NATO term 
RoE  Rules of Engagement 
RUSBDE SFOR Russian Brigade 
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US General 
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SFOR   Stabilisation Force, the follow-up CPO to IFOR 
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe  
SHIRBRIG UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade 
SOFA   Status of Forces Agreement 
SOP  Standing Operations Procedure  
UN  United Nations 
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
UNIKOM  United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observers Mission 
UNMOT United Nations Military Observers in Tajikistan 
UNOMIG  United Nations Observers Mission to Georgia 
UNOSOM II  United Nations Operation in Somalia II  
UNPREDEP  United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia  
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
UNITAF  Unified Task Force Somalia  
UTO   the United Tajik Opposition  
WEU  Western European Union  
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction  
Summary: 
The main goal of this study is a detailed discussion of various possible sce-
narios for future Russian-Western co-operation in the field of peace-keeping 
on the territory of the former Soviet Union.  
In order to place the topic in a proper context the author takes a closer 
look at various political, mental, historical and not least purely technical 
determinants limiting the potential scope of the joint peace-keeping.   
The study contains a detailed analysis of international (UN), Western 
(NATO, Canada) and Russian peace-keeping terminology. It also discusses 
the importance and relevance of various international frameworks deter-
mining the field, the scope and the geographical dimension of the potential 
Russian-Western co-operation, as well as the practical experience from the 
joint peace-keeping missions in the former Yugoslavia. The study gives a 
good insight in the history and practice of joint Russian-Western peace-
keeping efforts. It also outlines and analyses various practical and political 
challenges linked with development of this relatively new and still chal-
lenging field of co-operation between Russia and the West. As such, it is 
relevant for both theoreticians of peace-keeping and for those who work with 
peace-keeping in the field.  
 
